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Assessing the Effect of Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Trade on the 
Competitiveness of Arab Economies: 
An Econometric Approach Using Panel Data 
 
Abstract 
In spite of the Arab region having a comparative advantage in natural resources and 
other factor endowments such as labour and capital, the region’s competitiveness 
ranking is weak when judged globally. In particular, inflows of foreign direct 
investment and foreign trade volumes are not commensurate with what would be 
expected for this group of countries, given their factor endowments and comparative 
advantage. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the low competitiveness rankings 
obtained by Arab countries, and to analyse the viability of improving this 
competitiveness by enhancing foreign trade and foreign direct investment in the 
region. This is a topic that, to the best of our knowledge, has not previously been 
researched at all for Arab countries in the empirical economics literature. 
First, we set out the conceptual underpinnings of competitiveness and the ways in 
which a country’s competitiveness is measured in practice. We then apply 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a dynamic panel data model with fixed 
effects, in order to estimate the effect of foreign direct investment and foreign trade 
on the competitiveness of Arab countries. The dataset covers 17 Arab countries, 
spanning the period 1998-2009. We adopt panel data methodology, by applying. The 
results of the empirical model reveal that FDI inflows and foreign trade both have a 
positive impact on the competitiveness of Arab economies. In addition, control 
variables reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries such as domestic 
credit to the private sector, corruption, inflation, labour productivity and nominal 
exchange rate are found to be significantly and positively related to competitiveness. 
On the other hand, interaction terms for FDI and trade with economic freedom were 
found to be insignificant. We then offer policy recommendations, based on these 
findings. 
 
Key words: comparative advantage, factor endowments, foreign direct investment, foreign trade, 
competitiveness, panel data, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), dynamic panel data model, 
fixed effects. 
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Assessing the Effect of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Foreign Trade on the Competitiveness of Arab Economies: 
An Econometric Approach Using Panel Data 
 
Introduction and motivations 
 
Competitiveness, as a macroeconomic concept, is rarely mentioned in economic 
textbooks, in spite of its familiarity in general terms. Economics textbooks typically 
refer instead to comparative advantage. Competitiveness can be derived from 
various economic theories, but the dynamics of the competitive process are not 
considered by these theories. Therefore competitiveness remains an ambiguous 
notion. 
 
There are, as we show later, many definitions of competitiveness; and several 
indicators available to measure the competitiveness of nations. These come from the 
work of international and private organizations such as The World Economic Forum 
(WEF) and The Institute for Management Development (IMD). 
 
In this thesis we focus on the countries of the Arab region. In spite of these countries 
having a comparative advantage in natural resources and other factor endowments, 
the global competitiveness ranking of these countries is weak in most cases. In 
addition, the inflows of foreign direct investment and foreign trade volume are not 
commensurate with their factor endowments and comparative advantages, compared 
with other regions globally. 
9 
 
The Arab region is uniquely located at the crossroads of international trade routes. 
Moreover, it has a comparative advantage in natural resources such as oil and gas. 
Arab countries produce about 30 % and 17 % of the worlds crude oil and gas, 
respectively. Moreover, crude oil and gas reserves in the Arab region account for 55 
% and 28 % of global totals. The region is also endowed with a young labour force 
and one of the highest population growth rates in the world (AMF, 2016). 
 
This paradox – of rich resource endowments but relatively low international 
competitiveness – motivates the present study. In particular, the primary research 
question is asked: “can Arab economies’ competitiveness be boosted by improving 
foreign trade and foreign direct investments (FDI)?” To answer this question, we 
provide empirical analysis of the relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade 
and FDI for Arab economies. To help with this analysis, we consider the following: 
“to what extent can macroeconomic policies enhance the competitiveness of Arab 
economies?”; and “to what extent have macroeconomic policies improved the 
investment climate in order to attract more FDI and increase exports of Arab 
countries?” In our empirical econometric specification, we then pose four specific 
research questions: 
• What is the relationship between competitiveness, FDI and foreign trade in 
Arab countries? 
• Can FDI flows affect the competitiveness of Arab countries? 
• Does foreign trade affect the competitiveness of Arab countries?  
• Are there any other factors that could affect the competitiveness of Arab 
countries? 
 
10 
 
The answer to these questions will enable us to answer our primary research 
question. 
 
We base our empirical analysis on a panel-data econometric model to explore the 
relationships between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI for Arab economies, 
using data for 17 countries over the period 1998-2009. In our DBA journey, we have 
not found any other example of this kind of empirical work. We start to plug this 
gap, by studying perhaps for the first time in the academic literature the effect of 
macroeconomic policies on the competitiveness and investment climate in Arab 
countries. The technique we adopt is Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), in a 
dynamic panel data model, with fixed effects. Panel data models are the most 
appropriate technique for regional modelling, (Melecký and Nevima, 2011).  
 
The results of the empirical model reveal that FDI inflows and foreign trade have a 
positive impact on the competitiveness of Arab economies. In addition, control 
variables reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries, such as 
domestic credit to the private sector, corruption, inflation, labour productivity and 
nominal exchange rate, are found to be significantly and positively related to 
competitiveness. These findings, obtained using GMM, also confirm the results of 
the Generalized Least Square Estimator model (EGLS) allowing for fixed effects, 
which was adopted in Document 4 of our DBA project. We note also that our 
exploration of interaction terms, for each of FDI and trade with economic freedom, 
generated results that were statistically insignificant. 
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We start our thesis by introducing the role of macroeconomic policies and structural 
reform policies in support of the competitiveness of Arab economies. In Chapter 2 
we show the effect of macroeconomic policies on the current competitiveness 
position of Arab countries. The third chapter provides an overview of the concepts 
and theories underpinning the idea of competitiveness. Chapter 4 offers a review of 
the literature on the role of FDI and foreign trade in enhancing the competitiveness, 
in general and specifically for Arab countries. Chapter 5 presents our quantitative 
analysis using the GMM model. The last chapter offers conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
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Chapter 1 
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Competitiveness in Arab 
Countries: Background and Policies 
 
 
 
This chapter aims at clarifying the role of macroeconomic policies and structural 
reform policies in support of the competitiveness of Arab economies. According to 
WEF (2015), there are three factors that shape competitiveness. These factors are 
stable macroeconomic conditions, which comprise the functions of fiscal, monetary, 
financial, and exchange rate policies in supporting competitiveness. The second 
factor is business-environment policies and regulations which include goods, 
services, capital and labour markets. The third element includes foreign economic 
policies which locate the country, region, and city in the global economy through 
foreign trade, finance, foreign direct investment, foreign workers and tourism as part 
of groups of economic activity related to global value chains. 
 
We address each of those three factors in this chapter. We will start the first part by 
introducing the macroeconomic performance and the policies adopted over the 
period 2000-2015, in order to improve the competitiveness of Arab countries. The 
aim of this part is to demonstrate to what extent the comparative advantage of natural 
resources is reflected in the macroeconomic performance of the Arab region during 
the last 15 years, in light of the increasing role of oil and gas in Arab economies. In 
addition this part will highlight the role of macroeconomic policies in mitigating the 
effects of fluctuations associated with the international oil market, and build on other 
13 
 
factors to increase the competitiveness of the Arab economies, notably in attracting 
more FDI inflows. 
 
The second part will consider the policy reforms adopted to improve the business 
climate in Arab countries. Then we will look at the FDI performance in Arab 
countries and will clarify its impact on the economic performance and 
competitiveness of Arab economies since 2000. The last part of this chapter will 
include an analysis of the trade performance of Arab countries during the last 15 
years and its effect on economic growth and competitiveness in the Arab region. 
 
1.1.  Macroeconomic performance and policy reforms adopted in Arab 
countries  
 
The Arab region is characterized by a unique location among world countries, at the 
crossroads of international trade routes. In addition this region has a comparative 
advantage in natural resources such as oil and gas. Arab countries produce about 30 
% and 17 % of world crude oil and gas production. Crude oil and gas reserves in the 
Arab region account for 55 % and 28 % of world reserves, respectively. In addition 
the region is endowed with a young labour force and high rate of population growth, 
one of the highest growth rates in the world, (AMF, 2016). 
 
In spite of these advantages, the region is highly vulnerable to changes in oil market 
prices, in addition to fluctuations in external demand which constitute about 40 % 
of total aggregate demand, (AMF, 2016). In addition this young labour force lacks 
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the required skills and talents to cope with new technology. Moreover the majority 
of investments are directed to the oil sector, which restrict the diversification 
required by Arab countries. 
 
Arab economies1 have witnessed a range of global and regional developments and 
transformations that have affected the economic performance of this group of 
countries over the period 2000-2015. During these 15 years we can distinguish 
between two periods, each of them characterized by a major set of factors that pushed 
macroeconomic performance indicators for the Arab countries in different 
directions. The first period spans the years from 2000 until 2008, while the second 
period covers the years from 2009 until 2015. During these two periods, the major 
economic indicators for the Arab Countries (economic growth, inflation, the general 
budget balance, the current account balance) took different paths, affected by 
international and regional economic conditions. 
 
In the first period, 2000-2008, although these years witnessed at the beginning a 
slowdown of global economic growth due to lower global demand levels arising 
from the bursting of the dotcom bubble, the September 11 attacks and other factors, 
the policies adopted during that period, especially expansionary monetary policy, 
contributed to stimulate global growth from the beginning of 2003, and recovery 
during the remaining years of this period. The recovery of the global economy also 
had positive repercussions on Arab economic growth. The global recovery was seen 
in the positive performance of the European, United States and Japanese economies. 
                                                     
1 Include: Jordan, U.A.E, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, 
Comoros, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, and Yemen.  
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In addition, this recovery was supported by the continued growth of developing 
countries, in particular China and India, which achieved annual growth rates of 12 
per cent and 8 per cent respectively during that period. As a result, international trade 
grew by nearly 7 per cent annually. This is mainly reflected in the performance of 
developing countries’ exports, especially electronics, textiles and ready-made 
clothes from Asian Countries. FDI inflows to developing countries also witnessed a 
remarkable increase of 22 per cent annually. These developments helped to raise the 
growth rate of the global economy to 4.3 per cent, on average, over the period 2000-
2008 (IMF, 2016). 
 
All the factors referred to above reflected positively on the economies of Arab 
countries, which also benefited from policy reforms during this period, to achieve 
economic stability and market liberalization, to ensure an efficient distribution of 
resources, with increased productivity and competitiveness. These policies helped to 
raise the growth rate of the Arab countries to 6.3 per cent annually, on average, over 
the period 2000-2008 (AMF, 2016). Indeed, there was a high correlation between 
the growth rate of Arab economies and the growth rate of the world economy. The 
correlation value2 between the two variables reached about 0.70, which indicates a 
strong positive link between the Arab economy and the World economy, (Annex 
Table 2/1 & Figure 1). 
 
 
                                                     
2 Calculated using IMF and AMF data. 
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Figure (1) 
Economic indicators for Arab countries compared to the world 
 
Source: Annex Table (2/1) 
This strong correlation can be attributed to a number of factors. The key factor is the 
importance of the external demand component in aggregate demand in the majority 
of Arab countries. On the other hand, there was a limited role for some economic 
policies adopted by Arab countries to mitigate the domestic impact of fluctuations 
in the international environment. This limited role is attributed to the lack of 
independence of monetary policy due to the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime 
in some Arab countries; and certain fiscal policy choices. These factors affected the 
ability of the Arab economies to absorb external shocks and economic fluctuations. 
 
Over the second period, 2009-2015, Arab countries have been affected negatively 
by many factors. These include weak global economic growth, reflecting the impact 
of the global financial crisis and the resulting financial turmoil inflicted on world 
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markets. Despite the unprecedented stimulus policies that have been adopted to 
overcome the negative fallout from the global financial crisis, which contributed to 
help the global economy to overcome the recession that occurred in 2009, the 
consequences resulting from the crisis represented by high public and private debt 
levels led to uncertainty and reduced consumer and investor confidence levels in 
many developed countries. This is reflected in the growth rates of developing 
countries and emerging market economies, especially those that suffer from internal 
and external economic imbalances. In total, these developments have worked to 
reduce the growth rate of the world economy to 3.3 per cent on average during that 
period (IMF, 2016). 
Figure (2) 
 
Source: Annex Table (1/1). 
Habibi (2009) stated that the global financial crisis affected the economies of Arab 
countries through various channels of transmission, including FDI inflows, oil 
prices, tourism and global demand for the non-oil exports of Arab countries. All of 
these activities registered a decline during 2009. He also added that the revenues of 
Arab oil exporting countries declined, although they were able to maintain their 
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development projects because of their large sovereign funds. The North African 
Arab countries however suffered from the decline registered in exports, tourism and 
remittances owing to the severe recession in Europe, the main trade partner of these 
countries. In response to these economic developments, North African Arab 
countries introduced economic stimulus packages to strengthen domestic demand, 
hence to minimize the impact of the crisis on their economic performance. These 
policies included providing credit support to banks, and fiscal stimuli such as 
increasing government spending. 
 
The impact of the global financial crisis on Arab countries varied according to their 
economic structure, notably the level of development of their financial and banking 
sectors, and the degree of openness to the global economy. The majority of Arab 
stock market and banking sector indicators declined sharply. The decline in the stock 
markets of Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC)3 led the decline in the stock 
markets of Arab countries overall. Dubai registered the highest level of decline, of 
60 %. Moreover, the demand for real estate was affected heavily (Soufan, Abdul-
Khaliq and Abu Shihab, 2012). In the same context, Gressani and Kouame (2009) 
divided the Arab countries into four groups in order to identify the channels of 
transmission of the global financial crisis. The first group was countries with strong 
economic links to GCC, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Egypt (partially). The 
effects on this group were through lower tourism, remittances and FDI inflows from 
GCC. The second group were those oil exporting countries characterized by large 
social needs and weak fiscal positions, despite significant oil revenues, such as 
                                                     
3 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, and Qatar. 
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Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Syria and Sudan. The third group included countries with strong 
economic relations to Europe, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt (partially). These 
countries suffered from the severe effect of the crisis on demand for their exports, 
lower tourism revenues, remittances, and FDI inflows. The last group were the GCC 
countries which faced the crisis with sound fiscal and external positions. They were 
able to deal better with consequences of the crisis. The impacts on this group 
transmitted through lower oil exports due to lower prices and lower global demand. 
 
Furthermore, the economic performance of Arab countries was affected from the 
beginning of 2011 by the developments and unfavourable internal conditions 
resulting from the Arab Spring 4  revolutions. These developments negatively 
impacted the Arab countries which witnessed these dramatic changes, leading to a 
contraction of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As a result, production fell and 
the proceeds of foreign exchange declined markedly in key sectors such as oil, 
industry, agriculture, tourism, exports and FDI flows (AMF, 2012). 
 
These developments also impacted on some of the oil exporting and importing Arab 
countries, either directly or indirectly. It exacerbated the effects of the downward 
movement of global oil prices which started from the beginning of the fourth quarter 
of 2014. Oil prices declined by 49 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, which 
resulted in a marked decline in the growth rates of oil exporting Arab countries 
                                                     
4 The term Arab Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that started independently and spread across the Arab 
countries in 2011. This movement begun in December 2010 in Tunisia and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. 
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(AMF, 2016). Therefore, the growth rate of the Arab countries as a group declined 
to 3.5 per cent during the second period. 
 
Concerning the inflation developments over 2000-2008, the trend of inflation in the 
Arab countries was contrary to the trend in global inflation rates. Global inflation 
stabilized at around 4 per cent during 2000-2007. However, 2008 witnessed an 
upward trend in the global inflation rate to, 6.3 per cent. This was attributed to the 
surging prices of a number of primary commodities, led by oil, which increased by 
about 37 per cent compared to 2007 (IMF, 2009). At the same time, inflation rates 
in Arab countries tended to rise, most notably driven by an increase in domestic 
demand, with the improvement in economic activity and a remarkable rise in rates 
of domestic liquidity growth. Another factor was the impact of the declining value 
of the US dollar on the value Arab currencies, pegged to the US dollar, against other 
major currencies. Therefore, 2008 witnessed the highest rise recorded in the 
consumer prices index, reflecting the sharp increase in the prices of basic 
commodities, led by oil (Annex Table 1/1 & Figure 3). 
Figure (3) 
 
Source: Annex Table (1/1). 
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During 2009-2015, there was a downturn in global inflation resulting from the global 
financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. These two crises led to a 
decline in global demand and the adoption of austerity fiscal policies in a number of 
countries, especially advanced economies, causing high unemployment and a 
decline in inflationary pressures. 2010 and 2011 are considered as an exception to 
this downward trend in world prices. The global inflation rate recorded an upward 
movement in those two years in the shadow, once again, of high rises in food and oil 
prices (IMF, 2016). 
 
As for inflation rates in the Arab countries during 2009-2015, they followed a similar 
trend to developments in global prices. 2011 witnessed the highest inflation 
recorded, caused by factors including higher oil prices, as well as the impact of 
internal developments (the Arab spring) in some countries, on basic commodity 
networks (AMF, 2012). In addition, higher inflation resulted from the decline in the 
value of some Arab currencies against major currencies, due to the Arab spring 
developments (AMF, 2015). 
 
With regard to monetary developments, interest rate trends in the Arab countries 
have been strongly associated with changes recorded in the domestic and 
international economic environment, particularly the adoption of a fixed exchange 
rate policy by twelve Arab countries. Over 2000-2008, long-term interest rates fell 
significantly in a large number of major industrialized countries, in particular over 
2000-2003, reflecting the efforts of the developed countries to get out of the 
economic slowdown. Monetary policy supported the economic recovery during the 
early years of this period, after which global interest rates tended to rise in light of 
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the high rates of economic growth and the emergence of inflationary pressures 
(AMF, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, during the second period, following the global financial crisis, 
expansionary trends prevailed in the orientation of monetary policy in a number of 
developed countries. Central banks conducted successive cuts in interest rates and 
injected liquidity in the banking system, through continuous rounds of quantitative 
easing programmes aimed at encouraging banks to provide credit and overcome the 
problem of lack of liquidity (IMF, 2013). 
 
In general, the movements of interest rates in the Arab countries reflected the 
changes in international interest rates, particularly for the Arab countries with fixed 
exchange rates. However, we should refer to the keenness of some of these countries 
to keep a margin between the interest rates on local currencies and interest rates on 
anchored currencies, in order to provide space for the independence of monetary 
policy to achieve its ultimate goals, liquidity management and granting credit, in line 
with their economic conditions. In terms of the Arab countries that adopted more 
flexible exchange rate systems, their currencies were relatively stable against the 
major foreign currencies during the first period, taking advantage of the 
improvement in economic activity and accumulated foreign reserves in those 
countries. 
 
During the second period, some currencies of Arab countries faced pressures in the 
foreign exchange market and significant fluctuations, especially currencies of Arab 
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states that witnessed unfavourable conditions at the beginning of the 2011. Central 
banks’ interventions in those countries did not solve this problem. Therefore many 
central banks adopted measures to increase domestic interest rates to defend the local 
currency, or implemented successive reductions in the value of their local currencies 
(AMF, 2013). 
 
On the other hand, the changes in domestic liquidity in the Arab countries reflected 
to a large extent the international economic environment, especially with regard to 
developments in oil prices. During the first period, global oil prices took an upward 
trend, helping to increase fiscal surplus levels in the oil-exporting Arab countries. 
This contributed to a significant rise in the volume of domestic deposits, and a surge 
in domestic liquidity levels in those countries; this was mainly driven by the 
expansionary impact of net foreign assets. These developments necessitated the 
intervention of the monetary authorities in the oil-exporting Arab countries to absorb 
excess liquidity. 
 
Concerning oil-importing Arab countries, part of these fiscal surpluses went to the 
Arab oil-importing countries through workers’ remittances and FDI flows, which 
helped to raise the average growth rate of domestic liquidity in these countries to 
about 15 per cent annually during the first period (Annex Table 1/1 & Figure 4). 
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Figure (4) 
 
 Source: Annex Table (1/1). 
In contrast, the downward trend of global oil prices during the second period is 
reflected in declining growth rates of domestic liquidity. This is mainly due to the 
marked decline in net foreign assets of Arab countries. In addition, the internal 
circumstances witnessed in some Arab countries impacted negatively on the levels 
of domestic prices, as a result of liquidity crises in these countries. This spurred the 
central banks to intervene by using a number of mechanisms to mitigate the impact 
of low levels of liquidity on credit volume granted and economic growth. In light of 
these developments, the contribution of net foreign assets as a source of expansion 
in liquidity fell significantly, whereas net domestic credit increased markedly, 
reflecting the large escalation in government borrowing in order to finance the large 
deficits in public budgets. As a result, the domestic liquidity growth rate declined 
during the second period to reach about 8 per cent (AMF, 2015). 
 
Some empirical studies have addressed the reforms adopted in the Arab countries. 
Zouache and Ilmane (2008) stated that most Arab countries implemented 
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progressive reforms during the last two decades aiming at ensuring the independence 
of the central banks and increasing their efficiency in achieving monetary policy 
goals. New legislation has been enacted to give central banks full authority in setting 
and implementing the appropriate measures to achieve monetary policy objectives. 
Within this, interest rates have been liberalized, central banks have shifted to market 
oriented and indirect monetary policy tools; and more emphasis has been placed on 
achieving price stability and anchoring inflation expectations. These efforts were 
supported by successful parallel efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation in many Arab 
countries (Abdel Monem, 2012; IMF, 2013). 
 
Few studies have addressed the issue of central bank independence5 in Arab 
countries. The most important is the study by the Arab Monetary Fund which 
assessed the degree of central bank independence by constructing a composite index6 
to measure the degree of legal independence of the central banks in eleven Arab 
countries7. The study ranked the central banks of Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
                                                     
5 There are many definitions for central bank independence used in empirical studies, without any consensus on one 
agreed-upon definition. Some definitions distinguish between de jure independence (Legislations that govern the 
central banks), and de facto independence (the level of authority that the central bank enjoys with respect to the 
authority). Other definitions distinguish between political independence (the ability to take monetary decisions apart 
from any political intervention) versus economic independence or monetary policy independence (the ability to use 
the monetary instruments freely to achieve monetary policy goals) (Zouache and Ilmane, 2008).  
6 The composite index comprised four sub-indexes addressing the following issues: 1. The hiring process of the 
Governor of the central bank and his hiring term, 2. The way of formulating economic policies and the way of solving 
any possible conflict between the central bank and the government, 3. Monetary policy goals and to what extent price 
stability considers a top priority, 4. Limits on government lending (Sadek, Jarehi and Latifa, 1996).  
7 These countries include: Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, 
Egypt, Morocco and Mauritania.   
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Algeria as the top four independent central banks within the studied countries 
(Sadek, Jarehi and Latifa, 1996).  
 
As for monetary policy independence, it worth mentioning that the main goal of 
monetary policy in twelve Arab countries8 (The majority of which are Arab oil-
exporting countries) is to preserve exchange rate stability, so interest rate decisions 
in these countries are mainly imitating the monetary policy decisions in the most 
important trade partner. As small open economies with no restrictions imposed on 
capital account transactions, many Arab oil exporting countries9 opted to maintain 
fixed exchange rate regimes against the US dollar. The logic behind this policy lies 
in the major contribution of oil receipts in their economies. Oil exports, priced in US 
dollar in international markets, contribute the lion’s share in their total export 
receipts and public revenues. In addition, these countries hold huge US dollar 
denominated assets invested in sovereign wealth funds. Fixed exchange rate regimes 
against the US dollar help these countries to avoid harmful fluctuations in the value 
of oil receipts, enabling them to stabilize exchange rate expectations, hence 
controlling inflation and preserving the value of the wealth invested in sovereign 
funds. For these countries, there is limited room for adopting an independent 
monetary policy as a result of the macroeconomic policy trilemma10.  
                                                     
8 Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Djibouti. 
9 Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq. 
10 According to this argument, policy makers could at most achieve two objects/policies of what so called "impossible 
trinity", at the same time. These objectives/policies are: 1. Fixed exchange rate regime, 2. Independent monetary policy 
and 3. Free capital mobility. To achieve any two targets of the abovementioned targets, policy makers should rule out 
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For instance, the pegged exchange rate regime with the US dollar in GCC countries11 
limits the ability of these countries to adopt an autonomous monetary policy, 
especially with free capital flows. Policy rates in GCC follow Federal Reserve Board 
decisions, so there is a long-term relationship between domestic interest rates in 
GCC and the US interest rate. However, in the short run there is some degree of 
deviation between monetary policy decisions in GCC and those of the United States. 
The speed of adjustment in GCC to US interest rate decisions varies between these 
countries, with Bahrain the fastest and Oman the slowest (IMF, 2011). 
 
In addition, GCC countries tended after the financial crisis to use other instruments, 
such as the reserve requirement ratio, loan to deposit ratio and other macro-
prudential measures, to manage domestic liquidity and ensure financial stability 
(Abdel Monem, 2012; IMF, 2011). Many factors related to the characteristics of 
GCC economies underscore the role of macro-prudential policy as an important 
macroeconomic policy used to prevent credit booms and contain systemic risks. 
Since there is limited monetary policy independence in GCC, fiscal policy is playing 
an increasing role in managing total demand in these countries. However, as fiscal 
policy is the first line of defence and could not be used sometimes to prevent credit 
booms and contain systemic risk, there is an irreplaceable role for macro-prudential 
policy in stabilizing the economy and enhancing financial stability (IMF, 2014). 
 
                                                     
the third one. So there is a always a trade-off between exchange rate stability and the autonomous of monetary policy 
even exacerbating more by free capital mobility (Obstfeld and Taylor 1996 ; IMF, 2013). 
11 Except Kuwait which pegs its currency to a basket of currencies dominated mainly by US dollar. 
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Other Arab countries (like Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) shifted in the last 
decade towards more flexible exchange rate regimes, or pegging their currencies to 
a basket of currencies, to address economic vulnerabilities, restore economic 
resilience and enhance competitiveness. The monetary policy in these countries 
proved to be relatively more independent in curbing inflation, fostering economic 
growth and managing domestic liquidity (Abdel Monem, 2012).  
 
Regarding the main monetary policy transmission mechanisms, these differ greatly 
between Arab countries according to many factors, such as the degree of financial 
market development, the importance of domestic savings and the exchange rate 
regime. The market interest rate, credit availability and asset prices are the main 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Arab oil-exporting countries, which 
are characterized by relatively more developed financial markets and higher levels 
of domestic saving. Nevertheless, the efficiency of these transmission mechanisms 
could be further enhanced through the development of money and capital markets. 
For other Arab countries (like Jordan, Tunisia, Djibouti, Sudan, Comoros, Lebanon, 
Egypt, Mauritania, and Yemen) which have lower levels of domestic saving, credit 
availability is the main monetary policy transmission mechanism, while the 
exchange rate channel is also one of the main monetary policy transmission channels 
in Arab countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes (IMF, 2011; 2013). 
 
As for the link between monetary policy and competitiveness in Arab countries, it is 
worth noting that the above mentioned monetary reforms have helped some Arab 
countries to enhance their competitiveness measured by output growth. In this 
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context, a study conducted by Ersel and Kandil (2000) addressed the effect of 
monetary policy decisions affecting the money supply on output growth in eight 
Arab countries, including three oil-exporting countries (Algeria, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait) and five Arab oil-importing countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Morocco) during the period 1955-1994. 
 
The study concluded that both the anticipated and the random unanticipated 
fluctuations in the money supply are statistically significant in determining real 
output growth in Algeria, Jordan, and Tunisia. Accordingly, changes in the money 
supply have non-neutral lasting effects on output growth over time. For the other 
Arab countries, monetary policy is not statistically significant in determining real 
output growth (Ersel and Kandil, 2000). 
 
Regarding the exchange rate reforms in Arab countries, they accelerated in the 1990s 
as many Arab countries adopted fixed exchange rate regimes. However, with the 
poor performance of the export sector and modest capital inflows, these countries 
faced significant strains on their balance of payments and hence tended to enforce 
controls on the foreign exchange markets to prevent the devaluation of their 
currencies. The aforementioned circumstances led to the existence of many pricing 
mechanisms for foreign exchange and contributed to the emergence of parallel 
markets in many Arab countries, like Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Syria and 
Yemen. In response to the economic imbalances resulting from overvalued 
currencies, the 1990s reforms mainly focused on the unification of foreign exchange 
markets, eliminating multiple pricing mechanisms for foreign exchange, and the 
gradual depreciation of some Arab currencies (El-Erian and Tareq, 1993).   
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On the other hand, the exchange rate reforms in the first decade of the new 
millennium were aiming at achieving exchange rate stability to create a conducive 
environment for economic growth and increase the resilience of Arab countries to 
external shocks (Abdel Monem, 2012).  
 
As for the role of exchange rate policies in enhancing the competitiveness of Arab 
countries, one should distinguish between the Arab countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes (which are mainly Arab oil-exporting countries) and the other Arab 
countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes (mostly Arab oil-importing 
countries with more diversified economies).  
 
For the first group, there is a relatively limited role for exchange rate mechanisms in 
increasing the competitiveness of these countries, as the main channel to affect the 
real exchange rate in these countries is the inflation rate channel. In addition, the 
price of their main exports (oil) is basically determined by developments in the world 
oil market. On the contrary, there is a greater role for exchange rate mechanisms to 
enhance the competitiveness of the second group which have more diversified 
economic structure and more flexible exchange rate regimes.  
 
Among the few studies that addressed the link between the exchange rates and 
competitiveness in Arab countries, Abdel Monem (2012) studied the role of 
exchange rates reforms in achieving economic stability in Arab countries during the 
period 1980-2010 after dividing it into two main sub-periods. She confirmed that the 
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reforms implemented in Arab countries during the period 2005-2010 helped to 
reduce the degree of exchange rate fluctuations significantly in fifteen Arab 
countries, compared to the period 2000-2004. In addition, the study found that the 
exchange rate reforms and the sound macroeconomic policies aiming at containing 
inflation in Arab countries, enhanced the competitiveness of twelve Arab currencies, 
reflected by the improvement in their real effective exchange rates during the period 
2005-2010 compared to the period 2000-2004. 
 
At the country level, a study conducted by Alhabib (n.d.) tested the relation between 
the exchange rate in Algeria and competitiveness, measured by the economic growth 
rate during the period 1970-2002. This study found a relatively weak relationship 
between these two variables. It confirmed that economic growth in Algeria is mainly 
determined by developments in the world oil market (which is expected, as Algeria 
is one of the main Arab oil-exporting countries), with a limited impact of exchange 
rate changes on economic growth. Alhabib estimated that only 21 per cent of the 
changes in economic growth can be attributed to changes in exchange rates. In order 
to enhance the competitiveness of the Algerian Dinar, he recommended policy 
makers focus more on attracting investments to non-oil sectors and to diversify the 
composition of the Dinar's price basket. 
 
Concerning more diversified Arab countries, a study conducted by Brixiova, et al 
(2013) assessed the misalignment between the real exchange rates and equilibrium 
levels in three Arab countries, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, in the past three decades. 
The study referred to competitiveness challenges faced by these countries in the 
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global markets, reflected by their small share of world exports, which negatively 
affects domestic demand and leads to increasing levels of unemployment in these 
countries. The study found a significant misalignment between the real exchange 
rate and the equilibrium level in Egypt due to overvaluation of the real exchange rate 
during the period from the mid 1990s to the mid 2000s as a result of increasing 
inflation. On the other hand, the study confirmed that the real exchange rates in 
Morocco and Tunisia broadly reflected the underlying fundamentals, with minimal 
misalignment from equilibrium levels.  
 
The study attributed the low misalignment in Tunisia to the shift in monetary policies 
towards anchoring the real exchange rate instead of the nominal exchange rate, 
which allows for greater exchange rate flexibility, while in Morocco it can be 
explained by efficient monetary policies aiming at a gradual shift towards inflation 
targeting. Nevertheless, the study confirmed that non-price structural factors such as 
the flexibility of the labour market, the investment climate and employment skills 
are the main factors that could explain more of the changes in the competitiveness 
levels in these countries (Brixiova et al 2013).  
 
With regard to the fiscal situation of the Arab countries as a group, their 
performance has been affected mainly by the changes in oil prices, but also a number 
of additional political and economic factors. During the first period, Global oil 
prices12 rose by 242 per cent, to reach about $ 94.50 per barrel in 2008 compared 
with about $ 27.20 per barrel in 2000. This increase is reflected in the fiscal and 
                                                     
12 Based on the average of OPEC basket prices. 
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external positions of Arab countries during that period. The relative importance of 
oil revenues increased to about 70 per cent of total public revenues and about 69 per 
cent of the proceeds of the Arab countries' exports (AMF, 2009). 
 
High oil prices enabled Arab countries as a group, during the first period, to improve 
public revenues, which increased by 21 per cent per year on average. As a result 
fiscal surpluses accumulated in the Arab oil-exporting countries, which were utilized 
in financing infrastructure projects, plans and in enhancing the assets of sovereign 
wealth funds, in addition to enhancing foreign investments in Arab oil-importing 
countries. On the other hand, public expenditure rose dramatically during the first 
period, in both oil-exporting and importing Arab countries. As a result, public 
expenditure of the Arab countries as a group grew by 15 per cent annually during 
that period (AMF, 2009). This public expenditure was directed to increasing current 
and capital expenditure levels to support economic growth and finance infrastructure 
projects and alleviate the disparity in income distribution in some Arab countries, 
through a number of subsidy programs, and social security networks. 
 
Despite that increase in public expenditures, the general budgets of the Arab 
countries as a group recorded fiscal surpluses during the first period. The highest 
levels of budget surplus was registered during the period 2005-2008, reaching10 per 
cent of GDP. These positive developments in public finance enabled a number of 
Arab countries to use part of these surpluses to pay off a significant part of their 
debts, especially domestic public debt, which constitutes the biggest part of their 
total public debt. During the period 2005-2007, Arab economies reduced their 
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domestic public debt by 45 per cent, to reach $ 187 billion in 2007, from $ 342 billion 
recorded in 2005 (AMF, 2008). 
 
In contrast, in the second period the public budgets of Arab countries were hit by a 
number of negative factors, reflected in fiscal consolidation, higher deficits and 
public debt. The main factors included, the repercussions of the global financial 
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, unfavourable circumstances in some Arab 
countries from the beginning of 2011, and the effect of the downward trend of global 
oil prices from the second half of the year 2014, (Figure 5) (AMF, 2015). 
Figure (5) 
 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report Database, (AMF, 2016). 
 
The GCC countries were amongst the first Arab countries to deal with the impacts 
of the financial crisis. In order to sustain economic performance, they applied rescue 
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packages and assigned significant resources to revive domestic demand. Other Arab 
countries were stuck and incapable of dealing with the impacts of the financial crisis 
owing to their budget restrictions and limited financial resources (Saif and Choucair, 
2009).   
 
Roy et al (2011) stated that Arab countries have different fiscal space owing to the 
different income levels in these countries13. They distinguished between Arab oil 
exporting countries and Arab oil importing countries. Gulf countries, in addition to 
Libya and Algeria, did not face difficulties concerning fiscal space; the main 
problem for them was to select and implement suitable policies in order to diversify 
their economies, as they are the main Arab Oil exporting countries. Moreover, these 
oil exporting countries were shown to be more advanced in achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals. The paper considered other Arab oil exporting 
countries like Yemen and Sudan, as lower-income oil exporters in a risky position 
owing to the deterioration in their oil reserves and the increase of their poverty levels. 
On the other side, the paper stated that the fiscal space of oil importer countries had 
to be managed carefully. In this same vein, the paper considered that Jordan, 
Lebanon and Tunisia were in a better position due to their small populations, larger 
per capita income and their revenues from tourism, transfers and remittances. In 
contrast, Egypt, Syria and Morocco were in a difficult position due to their 
dependence on deteriorating oil revenues and growing internal debt. 
 
Gressani and Kouame (2009) found that many Arab countries responded to the crisis 
by implementing stimulus packages, but that these varied according to their 
                                                     
13 This assessment was before the Arab Spring. 
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circumstances, especially their ability to increase public spending, and channels of 
transmission of the crisis to their economies. For instance, Egypt adopted a stimulus 
package to increase public spending on infrastructure projects, Tunisia applied a 
stimulus package to encourage SMEs, to compensate for the negative impact of the 
deterioration in their exports to Europe. We argue that the high economic growth 
rates recorded in these countries before the crisis supported the fiscal space 
available, reflected in lower rates of budget deficit in these two countries. 
Consequently, these countries were later able to increase the level of public spending 
in order to overcome the impacts of the crisis, which led to higher rates of budget 
deficit. In Tunisia the budget deficit jumped from US$ 0.3 billion in 2008 to US$ 
1.2 billion in 2009, while in Egypt the deficit recorded US$ 13 billion in 2009 
compared with US$ 11 billion in 2008, (AMF, 2010). 
 
We therefore argue that Arab countries worked hard to rescue their economies in 
response to the consequences of the financial crisis. Their responses varied 
according to their economic structure, the circumstances of each country and 
availability of resources. The main objective of the stimulus packages applied by 
Arab countries was to stimulate domestic demand through supporting the private 
sector and SMEs, or by implementing projects related to infrastructure to boost 
demand levl, improve the investment climate and enhance their competitiveness 
levels. 
 
These developments had a significant effect on the public budgets of the Arab 
economies. On the one hand they affected negatively public revenues, oil and tax 
revenue, in addition to the unprecedented increase in public expenditure. Market 
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developments led to a decline in oil revenues in the Arab oil-exporting countries. 
Also, tax revenues in the Arab oil-importing countries were impacted negatively, as 
a result of the decline in economic activity. At the same time, the Arab Spring led to 
growing social demands and the trend of governments to increase spending to 
increase workers' salaries in the government sector and raise social spending. In 
total, the second period witnessed a negative impact on the public finance position 
in many Arab countries. Therefore the majority of Arab countries recorded deficits 
in the general budget, including Arab oil-exporting countries, for the first time in 
years. As a result the consolidated budget surplus for the Arab economies declined 
to register about 0.16 per cent of GDP during the period 2009-2015 (AMF, 2016). 
Consequently, these developments forced many Arab countries to borrow, which 
increased public debt for these countries by 186 per cent to reach $ 636 billion in 
2015, against $ 222 billion recorded in 2008 (AMF, 2016). 
 
There is no doubt that the large increase in the levels of public debt for the Arab 
countries had many negative repercussions on macroeconomic performance and the 
competitiveness of Arab countries, across a number of channels. The main channels 
included the effect of crowding out caused by increased borrowing from the 
domestic market, which negatively affected the credit granted to the private sector, 
raising its cost. As the high burden of domestic debt service in some Arab countries 
drains a large portion of the public revenues annually. this does not allow room for 
much more spending on infrastructure, education health and other sectors, as drivers 
of economic growth in the future. In addition, the high external public debt service 
affected the levels of available foreign exchange and generated pressures on 
domestic currencies. 
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1.2.  The policy reforms adopted to improve the business climate in Arab 
countries 
 
This part will focus on the reform policies14 adopted in order to improve the ranking 
of the Arab countries in the indicators included in the doing business report, 2016, 
of the World Bank15. The main topics include starting a business, dealing with 
construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts and resolving insolvency, Annex Table (3/1). 
 
In Algeria, the measures taken during the period 2008 – 2016 to improve the 
business and investment climate and enhance competitiveness included reform 
policies for starting a business, construction permits, access to credit, paying taxes, 
contract enforcement and trading across borders. In order to make starting a business 
easier, Algeria eliminated requirements to obtain managers’ criminal records. The 
measures taken to improve construction permits included enhancement of the 
                                                     
14 These policies are derived from the website of the World Bank – Doing Business, through the following address: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/Overview/Region/middle-east-and-north-africa, and attached in Annex 
Table (3/1).  
15 According to World Bank (2016), the main indicators include dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, 
registering property, enforcing contracts, labour market regulation and trade across borders. Each indicator contain 
sub-indicators, construction permits include an index of the quality of building regulation and its implementation. And 
the getting electricity indicator includes a measure of the price of electricity consumption and an index of the reliability 
of electricity supply and transparency of tariffs. The registering property indicator includes an index of the quality of 
the land administration system in each economy in addition to the indicators on the number of procedures and the time 
and cost to transfer property. Also, the indicator of enforcing contracts includes an index of the quality and efficiency 
of judicial processes. The labour market regulation indicator includes areas capturing aspects of job quality. Trading 
across borders includes, for each economy, the export product, the import product, and trade partner. In addition to, 
measuring the time and cost of export and import. 
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process by introducing new regulations aimed at improving the administration of the 
process, and ensuring the safe and timely completion of construction projects. They 
also eliminated the legal requirement to provide a certified copy of a property title 
when applying for a building permit, and reduced the cost of registering property by 
reducing notary fees and eliminating capital gains.  
 
With regard to access to credit, Algeria guaranteed by law the right of borrowers to 
inspect their personal data and eliminated the minimum threshold for loans to be 
included in the database. These measures improved access to credit information and 
facilitated access to credit. Trade across borders was made easier by upgrading 
infrastructure at Algerian ports, despite the difficulty of increasing the number of 
inspections carried out. Also, Algeria tried to reduce taxes by decreasing the 
corporate income tax rate for tourism, construction and public works, and the 
production of goods. In addition to previous reforms, Algeria enhanced contract 
enforcement by presenting a new civil procedure code that reduces the steps and 
time required and by fully computerizing the courts, including setting up an 
electronic case management system. 
 
The reforms in Bahrain included the fields of registering property, access to credit, 
starting a business, trading across borders, and construction permits. Concerning 
registering property, Bahrain reduced the registration fee in 2015 to overcome the 
reform measure of 2011, which increased the fees at the Survey and Land 
Registration Bureau. For access to credit information, Bahrain adopted the measures 
of starting to gather payment information from retailers, and authorizing the credit 
bureau’s collection of data on companies. Starting businesses in Bahrain is more 
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expensive, as the authorities in 2014 increased the cost of the business registration 
certificate. However trade became easier, since the Bahraini government in 2011 
built a modern new port, improved the electronic data interchange system and 
introduced risk-based inspections. Also the authorities in Bahrain made construction 
permits easier by further consolidating preliminary approvals for building permits in 
the one-stop shop and reducing the time needed to obtain a building permit. 
 
The reforms in Djibouti focused on the areas of construction permits, starting a 
business, secured transactions system, trading across borders, and taxes. Djibouti in 
2012 increased the fees for inspections and the building permit and added a new step 
for inspection in the preconstruction phase. However in 2015 the government 
applied a new measure aimed at reducing the time taken in getting a construction 
permit, by simplifying the review process for building permits. Starting a business 
became easier once the government removed the minimum capital requirement, 
along with the prerequisite to publish a notice of start of activities. Also, Djibouti 
reinforced its secured transactions system by applying a new commercial code, 
which broadens the range of movable assets that can be used as collateral. 
 
Furthermore, the government developed a new container terminal, improved port 
administration, removed some health and technical procedures, implemented an 
electronic manifest system, and reduced the required documents for the process of 
exporting and importing. These reforms helped Djibouti to make trading across 
borders easier and faster. Moreover, the authorities replaced the consumption tax 
with a value added tax on the supply of goods and services, in order to make paying 
taxes easier for firms. 
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Egypt adopted several reforms during the period 2008 – 2016 to improve the 
business environment. These reforms included investor protection, taxes, starting a 
business, trading across borders, construction permits, access to credit, enforcing 
contracts, and property registration. Egypt introduced during 2015 and 2016 new 
reforms to reinforce investor protections, such as excluding subsidiaries from 
acquiring shares issued by their parent company, in addition to presenting extra 
prerequisites for approval of related-party transactions and greater requirements for 
disclosure of such transactions to the stock exchange. 
 
Moreover, Egypt made starting a business easier by eliminating the minimum capital 
requirement, abolishing bar association fees and automating tax registration. Egypt 
reduced registration fees, and improved the process at the one-stop shop to simplify 
starting business procedures. Trading across borders became easier by adopting an 
electronic system for submitting the documents for exports and imports, enhancing 
the facilities of Alexandria port, making customs clearance faster, and reducing the 
time needed to open a letter of credit. 
 
Concerning construction permits, to make the process easier, Egypt eliminated most 
preapprovals for building permits, established a single window to facilitate related 
approvals, and reduced the cost of registering a new building. Access to credit 
information was enhanced by creating a new private credit bureau, and giving 
borrowers the right to inspect their own data in the private credit bureau.  
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Moreover, Egypt took measures to improve property registration, such as 
simplifying administrative procedures, reorganizing business workflows between 
the real estate registry and the Egyptian Surveying Authority, introducing time limits 
for several procedures, and introducing a low fixed fee. Egypt also created 
commercial courts to facilitate enforcing contracts. However, in 2014 taxes were 
increased. 
 
Measures taken in Iraq, on the other hand, made starting a business more 
expensive, since the cost to obtain a name reservation certificate increased and the 
cost for lawyers to draft articles of association rose too. 
 
The reform measures in Jordan addressed trading across borders, starting a 
business, access to credit, taxes, constructions permit registering property, and 
contract enforcement. The reform policies adopted to simplify trading across borders 
include enhancing infrastructure at Aqaba port, and applying X-ray scanners for risk 
management systems. In addition, to cut the time needed for exporting and 
importing, a risk-based inspection system with post destination clearance for 
preapproved traders was adopted, decreasing the number of containers subject to 
physical inspection and allowing online submission of customs declarations by fully 
adopting the ASYCUDA World electronic data interchange system. 
 
Also, Jordan facilitated starting a business by reducing the minimum capital 
requirement from 1,000 Jordanian dinars to 1 dinar, and reduced the time and 
number of procedures by implementing a one-stop shop. Concerning credit 
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information systems, Jordan applied a regulatory framework for creating a private 
credit bureau, in addition to reducing the threshold for loans to be reported to the 
public credit registry. Also, Jordan simplified paying taxes by applying an online 
filing and payment system and simplifying tax forms. 
 
Jordan facilitated dealing with construction permits by extending the services of the 
one-stop shop, and registering property by decreasing property transfer fees. The 
government, to enhance contract enforcement, created a specialized commercial 
court division, provided its courts with a computer-aided case management system 
and raising the ceiling for cases heard by the lower court to enhance the distribution 
of the caseload. 
 
Kuwait, during the period of 2008 – 2016, adopted reform policies for starting a 
business, investor protection, labour regulations, trading across borders, 
construction permits, and credit information. To facilitate starting a business, Kuwait 
reduced the minimum capital requirement, however it also increased the commercial 
license fee. Investor protection regulation was improved by enabling the possibility 
for minority shareholders to request an auditor to review the company’s activities. 
Moreover, Kuwait increased the period of paid annual leave and increased the notice 
period applicable in case of redundancy dismissals. It enhanced trading across 
borders, improving administrative procedures and staff training, construction 
permits by adopting an automated system for issuing technical approvals for utility 
connections, and credit information as the private credit bureau extended its 
coverage through adding retailers to those providing it with credit information. 
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In Lebanon, the adopted measures to enhance the business climate included 
transferring property, getting electricity, starting a business, credit information, and 
taxes. The measure adopted for transferring property complicated the process by 
increasing the required time for property registration. However Lebanon facilitated 
starting a business by simplifying the registration process of the business, and 
excluding the prerequisite to have books of the company stamped. On the other hand, 
the cost of starting a business increased.  
 
The authorities in Lebanon facilitated paying taxes for firms by removing the 
requirement to obtain permission to use accelerated depreciation and to effect 
payment electronically, and to get electricity more cheaply by decreasing application 
fees and security deposits for a new connection. Also, credit information was 
enhanced by permitting banks online access to the public credit registry’s reports. 
 
Reform policies in Morocco over the period 2008 – 2016 contained measures for 
starting a business, construction permits, employment, property transfers, taxes, 
getting electricity, trading across borders, property registration, investor protection, 
and access to credit information. The area of starting a business witnessed measures 
to simplify the required procedures, such as removing the need to file a declaration 
of business incorporation with the Ministry of Labour, decreasing firm registration 
fees, and excluding the minimum capital requirement. Construction permit 
facilitation measures in Morocco included reducing the time needed to get an urban 
certificate, and applying a one-stop shop to reduce the required procedures. 
Concerning labour regulations Morocco adopted an unemployment insurance 
scheme and increased the minimum wage. 
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Furthermore, Morocco facilitated getting an electricity connection by delivering fee 
estimates faster, and property transfers through launching electronic links among 
different tax authorities, and improving the electronic platform for filing and paying 
corporate income tax, VAT and labour taxes. In contrast, Morocco enlarged the 
social charge rate paid by employers.  
 
Morocco simplified trading across borders by decreasing the required number of 
export documents, and removing the container identification card for exports and 
imports. With regard to investor protection, Morocco adopted measures to support 
and protect investors such as letting minority shareholders attain any non-
confidential corporate document, and requiring greater disclosure in companies’ 
annual reports. Also, the government enhanced access to credit information by 
creating a private credit bureau, and guaranteeing the right of borrowers to review 
their own data in the public credit registry. However Morocco made registering 
property more expensive and complicated.  
 
Oman improved the investment climate through adopting reforms in the areas of 
trading across borders, labour regulations, access to credit information, taxation, and 
starting a business. For trading across borders Oman speeded up the procedures for 
exports and imports by transferring cargo operations from Sultan Qaboos Port to 
Sohar Port. Also, the authorities enhanced labour regulations by reducing the 
working days per week and increasing paid annual leave. The government adopted 
new measures to enhance access to credit information, by initiating the Bank Credit 
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and Statistical Bureau System16, and giving the right to borrowers to review their 
personal data.  
 
Furthermore, Oman reduced the time required to start a business, from 7 days to 3 
days, by initiating a one-stop shop to register a business, in addition to facilitating 
licensing procedures. Moreover, the authorities launched a new law for income tax 
which reshaped the scope of taxation. 
 
In Qatar, the reform measures to make the business environment more attractive 
included taxation, trading across borders, starting a business, construction permits, 
and credit information system. The government speeded up the time for border 
compliance for importing by decreasing the days of storage at the port and 
consequently the required time for port handling. In addition, Qatar launched 
electronic submission of customs declarations for clearance of goods at the Doha 
seaport. Concerning starting a business the authorities created a one-stop shop in 
order to merge commercial registration and registration with the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. Qatar also facilitated its credit information system by 
distributing historical data and removing the minimum threshold for loans contained 
in the database, and paying taxes for firms by removing certain prerequisites linked 
with the corporate income tax return. However, Qatar’s authorities complicated 
construction permits by raising the time and cost to process building permits.    
 
                                                     
16 Bank Credit and Statistical Bureau system collects historical information on performing and nonperforming loans 
for both firms and individuals. 
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Saudi Arabia adopted several reform policies, to improve the business climate, in 
the areas of property transfers, trading across borders, taxation, enforcing contracts, 
getting electricity, starting a business, construction permits, access to credit, and 
investor protections. Concerning trading across borders, the authorities applied 
measures during 2008-2011 aimed at improving the process of exporting and 
importing, such as eliminating the prerequisite for a consular certificate, permitting 
the electronic transfer of data, and introducing a new container terminal, in addition 
to enhancing the facilities in the Jeddah Islamic Port. However, the authorities in 
2014 adopted measures that complicated trade across borders, by increasing the 
required documents for exporting and importing. The Saudi authorities simplified 
starting a business by launching a one-stop centre at the Ministry of Commerce, 
which combined registration procedures and eased publication requirements, and 
removed non-value-added procedures, in addition to removing the paid-in minimum 
capital prerequisite and making company registration faster. Concerning access to 
credit the government released a new law making secured lending more elastic, 
allowing out-of-court enforcement in the case of default, and initiated a commercial 
credit bureau to produce reports on firms, containing their credit exposure. 
 
Furthermore, the Saudi government eased construction permits by creating a new 
streamlined process, and facilitated paying taxes for firms by presenting online filing 
and payment systems for social security contributions. The authorities used the 
facilities of information technology to simplify the procedures required for property 
registration, applying a comprehensive electronic system for registering title deeds, 
enforcing contracts by increasing the computerization of its courts and launching an 
electronic filing system, and property transfers by presenting a new computerized 
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system at the land registry. However the country made the connection fees for 
getting electricity more expensive.   
 
The reform policies adopted in Tunisia to improve the business environment during 
2008-2016 addressed taxation, trading across borders, starting a business, investor 
protections, access to credit information, and registering property. Authorities tried 
to make taxation more attractive by cutting the corporate income tax rate and 
launching electronic systems for payment of corporate income tax and value added 
tax. Also the Tunisian government facilitated trading across borders by enhancing 
the infrastructure and efficiency of seaports, and speeding up the uploading of import 
documents by upgrading the electronic system for data interchange. Concerning 
starting a business, the reform procedures made it more expensive by raising the cost 
of firm registration, in spite of the government removing the paid-in minimum 
capital requirement in 2009. 
 
In order to enhance access to credit information in Tunisia, the public credit registry 
started to gather and distribute more detailed credit information from banks, ensuring 
by law the right of individuals and companies to review their data, in addition to 
removing the minimum threshold for loans contained within the database. With 
regard to investor protections, the measures included improving approval and 
disclosure prerequisites for related-party transactions, and letting investors ask in 
court for the rescission of related-party transactions that harm the firm. Also, Tunisia 
reduced the time required to register property, by computerizing the files of property 
registry. 
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Finally, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) improved the investment climate by 
adopting several reform policies over 2008-2016. These included construction 
permits, investor protections, enforcing contracts, getting electricity, transferring 
property, access to credit information, starting a business, taxation, and trading 
across borders. The authorities facilitated faster procedures for construction permits 
by enhancing the electronic system for obtaining no-objection certificates, building 
permits and completion certificates, in addition to simplifying the procedures for 
attaining the acceptance of civil defence. To protect the investor, the UAE 
government applied several measures such as initiating additional approval 
requirements for related-party transactions and more prerequisites for disclosure of 
such transactions to the stock exchange, preventing a subsidiary from acquiring 
shares in its parent company upon reaching 50% or more of the capital of a firm, and 
making a purchase offer to all shareholders.  
 
With regard to enforcing contracts, the adopted measures included applying 
electronic service of process, establishing a new case management office and by 
developing the “Smart Petitions” service, allowing litigants to file and track motions 
online. Getting electricity in the UAE was made simpler by creating an electronic 
“one window, one step” application process, letting customers submit and track their 
applications online and decreasing the required time for handling applications, in 
addition to removing the prerequisite for site inspections. Also, the UAE government 
facilitated transferring property by rising the working hours of the land registry, 
making the fees of transfer less costly, and presenting new service centres and a 
standard contract for property transactions.  
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Furthermore, the authorities enhanced access to credit information by establishing a 
federal credit bureau under the supervision of the central bank. Similarly, starting a 
business was simplified through combining the prerequisites to file company 
documents with the Department for Economic Development, removing the 
prerequisite for a firm to prepare a name board in English and Arabic upon receiving 
clearance on the use of office premises, eliminating the minimum capital prerequisite 
and easing documentation requirements for registration, in addition to removing the 
requirement to present proof of deposit of capital. Paying taxes was facilitated for 
firms by founding an online filing and payment system for social security 
contributions. Moreover, trading across borders was simplified by developing more 
capacity at the container terminal in Dubai, removing the prerequisite for a terminal 
handling receipt and enhancements in the banking sector, and reducing the cost of 
trade finance products. 
 
1.3.  FDI performance in Arab countries 
During the period 2000-2008 Arab countries devoted efforts to make the investment 
climate more attractive for inflows of FDI. These efforts were supported by the fiscal 
surpluses of Arab countries as a group, thanks to high oil prices. According to 
Dhaman (2005) these efforts included enhancing infrastructure, simplifying 
procedures related to starting a business, and improving transparency and the 
relevant database. In the previous subsection we also illustrated the efforts of Arab 
governments to improve the business and investment climate in all related areas such 
as starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. 
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The surge in oil prices during the period attracted more foreign investments to the 
oil sector in Arab oil exporting countries, which contributed to increasing the total 
inflows of FDI to the Arab region. These accumulated fiscal surpluses helped to 
improve the business and investment climate in these countries. In addition these 
surpluses helped to increase the flows of investments from Arab oil-exporting 
countries to Arab oil-importing countries. 
 
Many Arab countries launched economic cities projects which needed necessary 
infrastructure, airports, roads and railways. Also, high oil prices increased returns on 
investment in the Arab region compared to the rest of the world, and the adopted 
privatization programs in some Arab countries further contributed to the increase in 
inflows of FDI to the region in this period, (Dhaman, 2005). FDI inflows rose by 
41.8 % 17 to register about US$ 96.3 billion in 2009 against US$ 5.9 billion in 2000. 
These FDI inflows represented 0.4% of total world FDI inflows in 2000 but 5.4 % 
in 2008. In contrast, the FDI inflows to developing countries represented about 
18.2% of FDI inflows in 2000 and reached 36.3% in 2008. Therefore, inflows of 
FDI into the Arab countries were still extremely small compared to the human and 
natural resources held by this group of countries (Annex Table 3/2 and Figure 3). 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 Calculated on the basis of compound average during the period 2000-2008. 
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Figure (6) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat 
 
Considering the sectoral distribution of FDI inflows to Arab economies18 during 
2000-2008, Figure (4) indicates that the services sector received about 43 %. The 
improvement in infrastructure attracted more investment to the services sector, 
especially tourism, in addition to the startup of telecommunication and mobile 
network projects. The industrial sector received about 30% of FDI inflows, the 
majority of which went to the oil sector, thanks to high oil prices. 
 
 
                                                     
18 We calculated this from the database of  Dhaman for  eight Arab countries according to the available data. 
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Figure (7) 
 
 
With respect to the performance of FDI during the period 2009-2015, according to 
Dhaman (2010), FDI inflows to Arab countries were impacted severely by the 
effects of the global financial and economic crisis. These inflows registered a decline 
of 20.7 % to reach US$ 76.3 billion in 2009 against US$ 96.3 billion in 2008. The 
Arab region is not the only region that witnessed a decline in FDI inflows during the 
crisis. World FDI inflows decreased by 33.1% in 2009 from 2008, to reach US$ 
1197.8 billion. FDI inflows to Arab countries represented 6.4 % of total world FDI 
inflows in 2009 against 5.4 % during 2008 and represented 14.7 % of FDI inflows 
to developing countries, against 14.8 in 2008.  
 
 Source : The Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation (Dhaman) Database
Sectorial distribution of FDI inflows to Arab countries
2000-2008
Industry
30%
Services
43%
Agriculture
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Others
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According to Dhaman (2010), the impact of the financial and economic crisis on 
Arab countries was modest compared to other regions. For example FDI inflows to 
developed countries declined by 40.5%, and flows to transition economies decreased 
by 40.2%. The report added that Arab countries were able to attract more FDI 
inflows owing to pull / push internal and external factors. The internal pull factors 
are divided into economic conditions, legislative and institutional frameworks and 
Investment Promotions Agencies (IPAs). Economic growth in the Arab countries 
witnessed a significant increase in the last decade, helped by the increase of FDI by 
6 % annually during the last six years. In addition, Arab countries applied 
comprehensive reforms to improve the investment climate, including the 
institutional and legislative reforms outlined above. Concerning the external push 
factors, these included financial and economic uncertainty, and a lower rate of return 
on investment abroad.  
 
 
Dunning (1998) specified four motives for FDI: market, efficiency, resource, and 
asset seeking FDI. Concerning market and efficiency seeking investment, a trade-
off between closeness to market and economies of scale is revealed from FDI (Di 
Mauro, 1999). He also indicated the importance of market seeking FDI by showing 
the correlation between FDI flows and market size. Efficiency seeking FDI 
emphasises the factor of cost differences which play an important role in determining 
the location of investment (Loewendahl, 2001). Chakrabarti (2001) found that the 
relation between FDI and variables such as tax, wages, openness, exchange rate, 
tariffs, growth and trade balance are highly sensitive to small modifications in the 
conditioning information set and there is no specific prediction for the impact of a 
particular variable on FDI.  
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Moreover, Gressani and Kouame (2009) stated that, according to The World Bank 
(2008) and confirmed above, GCC countries exerted great efforts to ease starting 
business procedures to enable these countries to achieve a similar performance to 
OECD countries in this area. However, there are many Arab countries that still need 
to implement significant reforms in order to make the investment climate more 
attractive for FDI. 
 
All of these factors helped the Arab countries to improve their competitiveness in 
attracting more FDI compared to other regions.  In addition, the Arab investors 
directed part of their investments to the Arab region instead of investing abroad to 
avoid the economic uncertainty in the main developed markets, and to get benefits 
from a high rate of return in Arab countries and improved investment climate.  
 
By the end of 2010 the Arab countries witnessed unprecedented events with the Arab 
Spring. Some Arab countries changed their regimes 19 , while others witnessed 
political and security unrest. Moreover these events are still ongoing in some Arab 
countries20. These events affected FDI inflows, especially in those countries that 
have seen political unrest. Also, previous efforts made by these countries, during 
2000-2009, to improve their investment climate were undermined by these events. 
As a result, FDI inflows decreased by about 10.3 % on average21 during 2010-2015, 
to register about US$ 39.9 billion in 2015 compared with US$ 76.3 billion in 2009. 
FDI inflows to Arab countries represented 2.2% of total world FDI inflows in 2015, 
against about 6.4 % in 2009 (Annex Table 3/2 and Figure 3). 
                                                     
19 Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.  
20 Mainly, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. 
21 Calculated on the basis of compound average during the period 2010-2015. 
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With regard to the sectoral distribution of FDI inflows to Arab economies22 during 
2009-2015, Figure (5) shows that the services sector acquired about 57 % of these 
inflows. The industrial sector received about 32% of FDI inflows, the majority going 
to the oil sector, thanks to high oil prices. The sectoral distribution of FDI inflows 
to Arab economies, across the period 2000-2015, reveals the dependency of this 
group of countries on natural resources. 
Figure (8) 
 
The majority of FDI inflows directed to oil importing countries in this region are 
concentrated in the services sector, especially tourism. Many countries in this group 
have a lot of historical and natural places in addition to the very good weather all 
year in the majority of these countries. The majority of FDI inflows going to oil 
exporting countries in the region are concentrated in the industrial sector, mainly oil, 
which represents resource-seeking FDI. Therefore the Arab countries need to adopt 
                                                     
22 We calculated it from the database of Dhaman for five Arab countries according to the available data. 
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policies that encourage economic diversification, especially with the deterioration in 
global oil prices. The adoption of these policies will encourage FDI inflows to other 
industrial and services sectors, which will impact positively on the economic growth 
and competitiveness of Arab economies. 
 
In conclusion, FDI is one of the main streams affecting the economic performance 
of Arab countries. Moreover, pull/push internal and external factors all help to make 
the Arab countries able to attract more FDI flows. From these factors we see that 
Arab countries have implemented several measures in order to improve the 
investment climate and their competitiveness in attracting more FDI inflows among 
the other regions. Also, the external factors helped in improving the competitiveness 
of Arab countries in attracting FDI compared with other regions.  
 
1.4.  Trade performance in Arab countries 
 
Arab economies, as shown above, have witnessed a range of global and regional 
developments and transformations that affected the economic performance of this 
group of countries over the period 2000-2015. We have identified two different 
periods within these 15 years, each characterized by a major set of variables that 
pushed macroeconomic performance indicators for the Arab countries in varied 
directions. The first period spanned 2000 to 2008, while the second period covered 
2009 to 2015. During these two periods, the main economic indicators for the Arab 
Countries (economic growth, inflation, the general budget balance, the current 
account balance) embarked on different paths affected by international and regional 
economic changes, reflected in the internal and external balances of these countries. 
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We have also illustrated the impact of these changes on the internal balances of this 
region. In this part we will try to shed light on the impact of international and 
regional economic fluctuations on external balances, specifically the international 
trade of Arab countries over the last 15 years. 
 
During the first period, 2000-2008, the international trade performance of Arab 
countries was affected mainly by fluctuations in oil prices, especially in the first two 
years, in addition to changes in international economic conditions. The year 2000 
witnessed a continued upward trend in oil prices, which began during the previous 
year. Therefore the total exports of Arab countries as a group increased by 41 % 
from 1999, to reach US$ 263.5 billion in 2000. Imports of Arab countries increased 
by 5.6 % to register US$ 153.4 billion in 2000, thanks to the strong performance of 
US Dollar against other major international currencies. As a result, in 2000 Arab 
countries as a group recorded the highest trade surplus since 1981, about US$ 110 
billion, (AMF, 2001). 
 
Despite the slight decrease of oil prices in 2001, to US$ 23.10 against US$ 27.60 per 
barrel in 2000, the trade surplus still registered its second highest level since 1981 
to register about US$ 80 billion in 2001 for Arab countries as a group. This decline 
in trade surplus is attributed to the slowdown in global economic growth and lower 
global demand levels arising from the bursting of the “dotcom bubble”, in addition 
to the September 11 attacks. Also the adopted policies by OPEC23, to cut production 
levels of oil, contributed to shrinking the trade surplus (AMF, 2002).  
 
                                                     
23 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
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Starting from 2003 and for the remaining years of the first period, the trade surplus 
of Arab countries witnessed a gradual increase, of about 32 % on average during the 
period 2003-2008. This increase is attributed to the surging prices of primary 
commodities, led by oil, the global recovery and increasing external demand. Oil 
prices rose in this period by 27.3 % to reach US$ 94.40 during 2008 compared with 
US$ 24.30 in 2002. The continued recovery of the global economy during the period 
had a positive impact on the exports and trade balance. The exports and trade balance 
of Arab countries as a group reached US$ 1070 billion and US$ 441 billion 
respectively in 2008. These levels were the highest registered up to 2008, (Annex 
Table 3/1 and Figure 1).  
Figure (9) 
 
Source: AMF, Joint Arab Economic Report database. 
During the second period, 2009-2015, the international trade performance of Arab 
countries was impacted negatively by several factors. These included weak global 
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economic growth, reflecting the effect of the global financial crises on external 
demand. The report of AMF (2010, p.166) stated that the sharp decline in world 
trade flows in the wake of the global financial crisis impacted on Arab foreign trade 
in several respects. The contraction of global demand for oil and the decline in world 
oil prices, which began in the second half of 2008 and extended into 2009, led to a 
sharp reduction of oil exports from the Arab countries. Shrinking demand in the 
markets of the major trading partners of the Arab countries, which resulted from 
global economic recession, also brought about a decline in the Arab countries’ 
exports of manufactured goods, in addition to the consequences of the global 
financial crisis on the financing of foreign trade, exemplified by the strictness of the 
commercial banks in providing funding for foreign trade by requiring collateral from 
dealers to finance the commercial transactions, and by reducing the grace period for 
this funding and increasing funding costs. Therefore the trade surplus for Arab 
countries as a group deteriorated by about 57 %, to US$ 189.4 billion in 2009 
compared with the previous year. This deterioration came as a result of a sharp 
decline in exports, which fell by 31.1 %, to about US$ 736.9 billion during 2009, 
from about US$ 1070.2 billion in 2008, reflecting the sharp decline of oil prices 
(Annex Table 3/1 and Figure 1). 
 
Habibi (2009) considered the decline in oil prices and global demand for the non-oil 
exports of Arab countries as the major channels of transmission for the global 
financial crisis which affected the economies of the Arab region. He also added that 
the North African Arab countries suffered from the decline registered in their exports 
owing to the severe recession in Europe.   
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Moreover, Gressani and Kouame (2009) stated that countries such as Morocco, 
Tunisia and Egypt (partially) suffered from the severe effect of the crisis resulting 
in low demand for their exports. They added that oil exporting countries suffered 
from the consequences of the crisis such as lower oil exports due to lower global 
demand.  
 
The trade performance of the Arab countries was affected during the remaining years 
of the second period, especially the beginning of 2011, by the developments and 
unfavourable internal conditions of the Arab Spring. These negatively impacted the 
Arab countries witnessing these dramatic changes and led to a contraction of GDP 
in these economies. Production deteriorated and the proceeds from oil and non-oil 
exports declined markedly in these countries, (AMF, 2012).  
 
Despite these developments in Arab countries, the exports of this group recorded the 
highest levels ever, thanks to high oil prices during 2011-2014. Starting from the 
beginning of the fourth quarter of 2014 global oil prices witnessed a downturn. Oil 
prices declined by 49 % in 2015 compared with 2014, which resulted in a marked 
decline in Arab exports, to reach about US$ 865 billion during 2015 (AMF, 2016). 
 
Gressani and Kouame (2009) stated that the implemented trade policies are the most 
important element that can determine the success of any country in overcoming the 
consequences of any crisis. They added that the crisis affected severely those Arab 
countries most integrated into the world economy. Their study suggests that more 
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integration among Arab countries will help to overcome the consequences of the 
crisis. However, we think that there are limitations, such as the type of imports 
included in Arab trade, as 62 % of Arab imports are classified as intermediate and 
capital goods, which could not be fulfilled from intra Arab trade owing to lack of 
technology in the Arab region. In addition the major part of Arab exports largely 
consists of oil, about 74 %, which goes mainly to advanced and developing countries 
(China and India), could not be absorbed by Arab countries, (Figure 2). 
Figure (10) 
 
Source: AMF, Joint Arab Economic Report database. 
 
According to this analysis, the two most important factors affecting the 
competitiveness of Arab trade are oil prices and internal developments. From the 
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above presentation, it is clear that Arab oil exporters are heavily dependent on oil 
exports, therefore they need to adopt policies that encourage economic 
diversification. Some Arab countries in the Gulf area, with the deterioration of oil 
prices, started to adopt such economic policies that aim at encouraging the non-oil 
sector. 
 
On the other hand, international trade in Arab oil importing countries is suffering 
from internal developments, mainly security and political unrest. These 
developments have led to a severe deterioration in their production of goods, as 
many factories stopped production, which reflected on the exports of these countries. 
Therefore, the competitiveness ranking of these countries deteriorated massively 
during the last five years.  
 
To sum up, the main channels of transmission affecting the foreign trade of Arab 
countries were the decline in oil prices and global demand for the non-oil exports of 
Arab countries. In addition, total imports were affected mainly by the slowdown in 
the economic performance of this group of countries. 
 
We think that the above mentioned channels of transmission of the financial crisis 
impacted on the performance of the competitiveness of Arab trade. Oil and non-oil 
exports were squeezed by the decline in oil prices and the slow pace of growth in the 
global economy. In addition, the majority of the studies conducted to explore the 
relationship between international trade and competitiveness recommend that the 
liberalization of the trade regime has a significant impact on economic growth and 
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competitiveness. The studies of Edwards (1992), Wacziarg (2001), Yusuf and 
Emmanuel (2000), Sinha and Sinha (2000) and Ellahi et al. (2011) revealed that 
there is a positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth. These 
studies strengthen the hypothesis that economies grow faster with a more open trade 
regime, and grow slower with a more distorted trade regime.   
 
The next chapter will introduce the developments in competitiveness ranking of 
Arab countries worldwide, in order to reflect the effects of the adopted 
macroeconomic policies introduced in the very first paragraph of this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
The current competitiveness position of Arab economies 
 
During the last 15 years the macroeconomic performance of Arab countries has 
varied enormously. We mentioned in Document 3 of the DBA project, that many 
Arab countries exerted continuous efforts over the period 2003-2009 to enhance 
their global competitiveness. As a result, the competitiveness score of the majority 
of Arab countries had improved by 2009 (WEF, 2010). This improvement in 
competitiveness for these countries was reinforced by three factors: a favourable 
international economic environment, stable domestic macroeconomic and political 
environment and economic policy reforms.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, after 2010, a radical negative shift occurred for 
competitiveness-related factors, undermining the competitiveness of Arab countries: 
low oil prices and unfavourable internal developments resulting from the Arab 
Spring. The macroeconomic performance in these countries (especially those which 
witnessed political unrest), has deteriorated. As a result of these developments, there 
are no longer the same opportunities available for these countries to continue 
implementing the required economic reform policies, either in terms of availability 
of necessary resources or enough time given the current situation of political unrest. 
The reforms, which were to be implemented in order to support the competitiveness 
ranking of these countries, were aimed at reforming labour markets, improving the 
levels of education and health services, and the liberalization of goods and services 
markets. 
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In this chapter we will provide an assessment of the competitiveness rankings of 
Arab countries in 2014 compared with 200924. We will start with the countries from 
the Arab region covered in World Economic Forum (WEF) report of 2015 (for 
2014), compared with the report of 2010 (for 2009). Then we will present the 
distribution of Arab countries across the three stages of development (factor-driven 
stage, efficiency-driven stage and innovation-driven stage – see below for details). 
After that, the competitiveness performance of Arab countries will be considered. 
 
2.1. The covered Arab countries 
 
The report of WEF (2015), The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, covered 
13 Arab countries as part of the sample of 140 economies globally. These countries 
are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.  
 
In contrast, the report of WEF (2010) covered 14 Arab countries, namely Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. Thus Libya and Syria were 
excluded from the 2015 report, given the political and civil unrest in these countries 
in the last three years. In addition, the 2015 report included Mauritania, which was 
not included in the 2010 report. On the next page, Table 1 shows the competitiveness 
ranking of Arab countries. 
 
                                                     
24 We provided in Document 3 an assessment for the competitiveness ranking of Arab countries in 2009. 
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Table 1: The Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016 Rankings 
 
Source: WEF (2015), The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, p: xv. 
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2.2. The distribution of Arab countries among the three stages of development 
 
In The Global Competitiveness Report each year, the WEF distributes countries 
across three stages of development. These stages are the factor-driven stage, 
efficiency-driven stage and innovation-driven stage. This classification of world 
economies is based on GDP per capita and the importance of natural resources in the 
economy. For each stage of development, there are basic requirements or elements 
to enhance competitiveness. For the factor-driven stage, basic requirements such as 
institutions, infrastructure, and macroeconomic environment are the key elements of 
competitiveness. For efficiency-driven economies, efficiency enhancers such as 
higher education and training, goods market efficiency and labour market efficiency 
are more important. For the third and final stage of development, innovation-driven 
economies, there is a greater role for factors like business sophistication and 
innovation in enhancing competitiveness, (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Source: WEF (2013), The Arab World Competitiveness Report, p: 8. 
Figure 1: The requirements for each stage of development 
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Economies falling between two of these three stages are considered to be in a 
“transition stage”. Table 2 shows the distribution of the world economies across each 
stage of development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WEF (2015), The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, p: 38. 
Table 2: World countries categories at each stage of development 
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Table 3 shows that how the Arab countries are distributed and how they are spread 
across all 5 groupings in 2015 compared to 2010.  
 
Table 3: Arab countries distribution among stages of development 
Stage 1: 
Factor-driven 
Transition from  
Stage 1 to stage 2 
Stage 2: 
Efficiency-driven  
Transition from  
Stage 2 to stage 3 
Stage 3: 
Innovation-driven 
2010* 2015** 2010* 2015** 2010* 2015** 2010* 2015** 2010* 2015** 
 Mauritania Kuwait Kuwait Jordan Egypt Bahrain Lebanon  UAE Bahrain  
  Saudi 
Arabia 
Saudi 
Arabia  
Lebanon Jordan Oman Oman  Qatar 
  Algeria Algeria Tunisia Morocco    UAE  
  Morocco   Tunisia     
  Qatar        
  Egypt        
  Libya        
  Syria        
Source: * WEF (2010), The Arab World Competitiveness Review 2010. 
 ** WEF (2015), The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016. 
 
The Arab countries classified in the efficiency driven stage are characterized by solid 
institutional framework, stable macroeconomic environment, efficient markets, low 
levels of corruption and stronger corporate governance framework. The key 
strengths for the factor driven stage are stable macroeconomic environment, large 
market size, fairly well developed private institutions, good governance and 
satisfactory transport infrastructure. The countries classified in the innovation driven 
stage are characterized by good infrastructure, high penetration rates of new 
technology, efficient good markets and macroeconomic stability. 
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The civil unrest and political conflict conflicts which took place from the end of 
2010, in some Arab countries, deteriorated or stopped the reform policies aimed at 
improving the competitiveness situation and global ranking, which had started in the 
first decade of this century, as outlined in Chapter 1. We will provide more 
elaboration of this issue in the next part of this chapter.  
 
2.3. The competitiveness performance of Arab countries 
 
The competitiveness ranking of 2015, for the Arab countries, differed markedly 
compared to the ranking of 2010. We explain these changes by noting that over the 
last 15 years the macro economic performance of Arab countries witnessed dramatic 
changes. Many Arab countries exerted continuous efforts over the period 2003-2009 
to enhance their global competitiveness. As a result, the competitiveness score of the 
majority of Arab countries improved (WEF, 2010). This improvement is reinforced 
by three factors: favourable international economic environment, stable domestic 
macroeconomic and political environment and economic reform policies.  
 
Furthermore, we analysed in Document 3 the evolution of the competitiveness 
performance of Arab countries, based on their ranking in the GCI over the period 
2005-2010. This revealed that six Arab countries succeeded in improving their 
competitiveness ranking. These countries included all GCC countries except 
Kuwait, and one North African country (Tunisia). On the other hand, five other Arab 
countries did not achieve any progress in competitiveness (Kuwait, Morocco, 
Algeria, Syria and Egypt), while the competitiveness ranking of two other Arab 
countries (Jordan and Libya) declined during that period (figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Evolution of rankings of Arab countries from 2005 to 2010, by decile 
 
Source: World Economic Forum, (2010)
25
, The Arab World Competitiveness Review, p: 11. 
 
When looking at the major driving forces behind the above changes in 
competitiveness, we can highlight the role of some major driving forces that helped 
some Arab countries to achieve a notable improvement in the GCI; and also refer to 
other areas of interest (bottlenecks and challenges) that should attract more attention 
from policy makers to achieve a better competitive performance. 
 
After 2010, a radical transformation occurred for these factors, which harmed the 
competitiveness ranking of Arab countries. This included low oil prices and 
                                                     
25 Refers to the year of issuance the report which used the data of 2009. 
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unfavourable internal developments. The macroeconomic performance deteriorated 
in some countries which witnessed political instability. This affected also 
neighbouring countries. As a result of these developments, there were no longer 
opportunities available for these countries to continue with the required economic 
policy reforms, either in terms of availability of necessary resources or suitable time. 
These reforms, which were planned to support the competitiveness ranking of these 
countries, aimed at reforming the labour markets, improving the levels of education 
and health services, and the liberalization of goods and services market. As a result 
of these shocks, the competitiveness ranking of Arab countries was noticeably 
different in 2015. 
 
The majority of Arab countries took steps to enhance their global competitiveness, 
despite the region still being characterised by fragility and vulnerability to shocks; 
and given ongoing political unrest and security difficulties (WEF, 2015). 
 
In addition, WEF (2015) also noted that, in spite of the diversity of their economies, 
most Arab countries are facing the challenge of job creation and appropriate 
employment opportunities for youth. In order to create more jobs, these countries 
need to establish a more suitable environment for the private sector to grow. In 
addition, the recent low oil prices raise the need for economic diversification and, 
again, to create a robust private sector. 
 
Concerning sub regions, several GCC countries are now more competitive, thanks 
to fiscal surpluses accumulated and efforts exerted to improve their competitiveness 
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in earlier years. In 2015, the competitiveness ranking of Qatar improved to 14 out of 
140 countries, against 17 out of 139 countries in 2010. The competitiveness of the 
United Arab Emirates improved significantly in 2015, to reach 17 out of 140, 
compared with 25 out of 139 countries achieved in 2010. More details are in Table 
4. 
 
Table 4: The Competitiveness ranking of Gulf economies 
 2009* 2015** 
Economy Rank 
(out of 139) 
Score 
(1-7) 
Rank 
(out of 140) 
Score 
(1-7) 
Qatar 17 5.1 14 5.3 
Saudi Arabia 21 4.95 25 5.07 
United Arab 
Emirates 
25 4.89 17 5.24 
Oman 34 4.61 62 4.25 
Kuwait 35 4.59 34 4.59 
Bahrain 37 4.54 39 4.52 
*Source: WEF (2010). 
**Source: WEF (2015). 
 
Table 4 shows that Gulf countries are ranked in the top half of the world 
competitiveness league, except Oman, which is ranked near the top of the second 
half. Improving competitiveness has been, in recent years, one of the top priorities 
for Gulf countries (WEF, 2011). They have tried to improve several aspects of 
national competitiveness, applying various measures and increased investment 
expenditures to improve the investment climate, thanks to high oil prices and 
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accumulated reserves. These investment expenditures have been directed mainly to 
improve the infrastructure and adopting mega projects, such as establishing 
underground systems, modern road networks, and most recently technology in 
telecommunication.     
 
In addition, this group of countries has taken steps to diversify their economies. As 
a result, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are being sufficiently diversified 
to be classified as innovation driven in the 2015 WEF report. The rest of the 
economies in this group are less diversified as they still heavily dependent on oil and 
natural resources. Consequently, this group of countries needs more effort to 
diversify their economies in order to move into more advanced stages of 
development. 
 
In Document 3 we stated that, compared with some other regional groups like the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), GCC countries 
succeeded in enhancing their competitiveness and were forerunners among the Arab 
countries in many aspects of competitiveness. They even outperformed the OECD 
countries in terms of institutions, macroeconomic environment and goods market 
efficiency. The GCC governments have made great efforts to improve their 
competitiveness over the last decade. As well as upgrading the level of their 
institutions above the OECD, governments provided efficient and transparent 
structures, physical security and corporate governance compliance with the highest 
standards. Also, GCC achieved a similar performance to the OECD in terms of 
infrastructure, health and primary education, goods market efficiency, labour market 
efficiency and financial market development (Figure 3).                                            .
76 
 
Figure 3: Competitiveness performance in Gulf countries,  
North Africa, Levant and OECD 
 
Source: World Economic Forum, (2010), The Arab World Competitiveness Review, p: 10. 
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The GCC countries benefited a lot from the oil revenues accumulated during the 
period 2003-2008 as a result of high oil prices and rising growth rates. This enhanced 
their competitive performance, led by Qatar. In addition, the policy space26 created 
enabled GCC countries to enhance the macroeconomic environment and to have 
relatively solid financial systems. However, achieving an even higher 
competitiveness ranking will require GCC countries to make extended efforts to 
ensure the efficiency of labour markets, ensuring the soundness of financial sectors, 
fostering the use and absorption of new technology and encouraging innovation.  
 
Regarding Levantine and North African economies, these countries face a state of 
uncertainty because of political transition and the waves of social protests which 
started at the end of 2010 (WEF, 2011). These circumstances affected economic 
performance badly and accordingly the competitiveness ranking of these countries. 
In addition, WEF (2015) showed that these two groups of countries lagged 
significantly behind Gulf countries. The Levantine countries were affected by the 
conflict and political unrest in Syria, which influenced the security everywhere in 
the region. North African economies are suffering from terrorist incidents, and the 
spillovers from the Arab Spring affected the latest positive developments in these 
countries. 
 
                                                     
26 Policy space can be defined as the combination of de jure  policy sovereignty and de facto national policy autonomy 
(Cooper, 1968; Bryant, 1980). In the above context, it refers mainly to the accumulated public budget surpluses, which 
enable the governments of these countries to enhance economic growth by spending more on infrastructure projects 
and supporting non-oil activities.  
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In 2015 the competitiveness ranking for the Levantine economies improved very 
slightly in Jordan, but deteriorated significantly for Lebanon, compared to 2010. The 
competitiveness performance of Jordan improved, to 64 out of 140 countries in 2015, 
against 65 out of 139 countries in 2009. The competitiveness ranking of Lebanon 
declined markedly, from 92 out of 139 countries, in 2010, to 101 out of 140 countries 
in 2015 (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: The Competitiveness ranking of Levantine economies 
 
 2010* 2015** 
Economy 
 
Rank 
(out of 139) 
Score 
(1-7) 
Rank 
(out of 140) 
Score 
(1-7) 
Jordan 65 4.21 64 4.23 
Lebanon 92 3.89 101 3.84 
*Source: WEF (2010) 
**Source: WEF (2015) 
 
As for the North African countries, competitiveness deteriorated massively in 2015 
for the majority of countries, except for Morocco, which witnessed improvements, 
and Algeria, which declined one step back in the ranking. In 2015, the 
competitiveness performance of Tunisia and Egypt declined, to reach 92 and 116 out 
of 140 countries, compared with 32 and 81 out of 139 countries in 2010. This drop 
resulted from the political unrest which affected badly the economic performance of 
all economic sectors; and the influence of terrorism incidents on infrastructure and 
tourism. In addition, the competitiveness ranking of Algeria declined from 86 out of 
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139 countries in 2009, to 87 out of 140 countries in 2015. Low oil prices impacted 
investment expenditures, used to improve the infrastructure and business climate. 
However, the competitiveness performance for Morocco rose from 75 out of 139 
countries in 2009, to 72 out of 140 countries in 2015. This came as a result of the 
procedures adopted to improve the investment climate (see Chapter 1), which 
attracted multinational enterprises to invest in Morocco, especially in car 
manufacturing. Much further down, in 2015 Mauritania was ranked 138 out of 140 
countries (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: The Competitiveness ranking of North African economies 
 
 2009* 2015** 
Economy 
 
Rank 
(out of 139) 
Score 
(1-7) 
Rank 
(out of 140) 
Score 
(1-7) 
Tunisia 32 4.65 92 3.93 
Morocco 75 4.08 72 4.17 
Algeria 86 3.96 87 3.97 
Egypt 81 4.0 116 3.66 
Mauritania*** - - 138 3.03 
*Source: WEF (2010) 
**Source: WEF (2015) 
***Not included in the report which cover the year 2009. 
 
When we compare the competitiveness performance of the Levantine countries 
(Syria, Jordan and Lebanon) and North African countries  with OECD countries, we 
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find that the performance of these countries lagged behind the performance of the 
OECD in many aspects of competitiveness, but with a similar performance to each 
other in most of the twelve competitiveness indices, except for infrastructure, 
macroeconomic environment and market size, where the North African Arab 
countries outperformed the Levantine Arab countries (Figure 3). 
 
More details about the competitiveness performance for individual Arab economies 
is provided in Annex 2/1. This Annex provides more analysis for the 
competitiveness performance for each Arab country included in the WEF 2015 
report, compared with the report of 2010. In addition, it provides discussion of the 
policies and measures adopted, together with the advantages and disadvantages 
present in each Arab country.  
 
Overall, the macroeconomic performance of Arab countries over the last 15 years, 
varied enormously. Many Arab countries exerted continuous efforts over 2003-2009 
to enhance their global competitiveness. As a result, the competitiveness score of the 
majority of Arab countries had improved by 2010. This was underpinned by three 
factors: a favourable international economic environment, stable domestic 
macroeconomic and political environment and economic policy reforms. 
 
The competitiveness rankings of the Arab countries in 2010 were, however, 
influenced by high oil revenues in Arab oil-exporting countries and economic 
reforms in the Arab oil-importing countries, which enabled them to enhance their 
global competitiveness ranking. The main driving factors were high oil revenues 
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(especially the GCC countries) and stable macroeconomic environment. On the 
other hand, the negative factors impacting the ranking of some countries were high 
levels of public debt and inflation rates, underdeveloped infrastructure, inefficiency 
of goods, labour and financial markets and the low level of technological readiness. 
 
After 2010, low oil prices and unfavourable internal developments affected Arab 
countries’ competitiveness negatively. For some, macroeconomic performance was 
affected by political unrest. As a result, opportunities were lost for these countries 
to continue implementing the required economic reform policies, both in terms of 
availability of necessary resources or suitable time. The majority of Arab countries 
took steps to enhance their global competitiveness, despite the region being 
characterised by fragility and vulnerability to shocks, political unrest and security 
difficulties. 
 
In spite of the diversity of their economies, most Arab countries are facing the 
challenge of job creation and appropriate employment opportunities for youth. In 
order to create more jobs, these countries need to establish the suitable environment 
for the private sector to grow. In addition, recent low oil prices raise the need for 
economic diversification and a robust private sector. 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 have sought to provide motivation for the analysis later on, by 
introducing the macroeconomic policies adopted to improve the competitiveness of 
Arab countries; and by looking at the impact of these reforms, and exogenous 
economic factors, on the global competitiveness rankings of these countries. The 
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next chapter discusses competitiveness specifically, looking at various concepts and 
theories. This will include introducing competitiveness definitions, Competitiveness 
Indexes, competitiveness in economic theory, and empirical work conducted to 
measure the competitiveness of countries globally. The last part will complement 
this, by looking at theories of foreign direct investment. 
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Chapter 3 
Competitiveness: concepts and theories 
 
The study of competitiveness – in particular the notion of the relative 
competitiveness of nations – has recently seen renewed interest. This can be dated 
to 1990. In February 1993, American President Bill Clinton presented his first 
economic programme and spoke of “…. a global economy in which we must 
compete with people around the world” (Pederson, 2008, p.2). Moreover, Jacques 
Delors, the President of the European Commission, raised the issue of 
competitiveness between Europe and the USA in Copenhagen in June 1993. These 
came three years after Michael E. Porter had published The Competitive Advantage 
of Nations (1990), (Pederson, 2008). 
 
Since then, the term “competitiveness” has been used broadly and been subject to 
much debate. However, Krugman (1994) was strongly against the idea, describing 
all the discussion about the competitiveness of nations as “a dangerous obsession”. 
According to Krugman, the economic crisis facing any country is not necessarily 
one of competing on world markets. In other words, the competitiveness between 
USA and Japan is not like competitiveness between Ford and Toyota. Krugman 
thinks that it is incorrect to believe that the economic fortunes of any economy are 
dependent on its achievements on international markets. Another problem is that the 
term competitiveness tends to create the impression of a zero-sum game, but, in fact, 
there are shared benefits to be realized from each country becoming more 
competitive. 
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The first part of this chapter will present key competitiveness definitions published 
in the economic literature. The next part will focus on Competitiveness Indexes, and 
we will introduce one of the most well-known indexes of competitiveness in the 
economic literature, from the World Economic Forum (WEF) and called the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI). After that, the third part of this chapter will consider 
the presence (or not) of competitiveness in economic theory. Then, the empirical 
work conducted to measure the competitiveness of the world countries will be 
provided in the fourth part. The last part of this chapter will consider theories of FDI. 
 
3.1. Definitions of Competitiveness 
 
As the idea of the international competitiveness of nations has taken hold, so the 
challenge of defining it has arisen, along with attempts to measure it. The annual 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of World Economic Forum (WEF) is the 
best-known of these attempts. More details will be given below of the GCR 
indicators. The WEF (2011, p.4), has defined such competitiveness as: 
“the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of 
productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the 
sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy. In 
other words, more competitive economies tend to be able to produce 
higher levels of income for their citizens. The productivity level also 
determines the rates of return obtained by investments in an economy. 
Because the rates of return are the fundamental determinants of the 
growth rates of the economy, a more competitive economy is one that 
is likely to grow faster over the medium to long run. The concept of 
85 
 
competitiveness thus involves static and dynamic components: 
although the productivity of a country clearly determines its ability to 
sustain a high level of income, it is also one of the central determinants 
of the returns to investment, which is one of the central factors 
explaining an economy’s growth potential”. 
 
It is essential to note that according to this definition, productivity growth is the only 
determinant for growth in the standard of living of the people of a country, not its 
productivity growth compared with other countries. Specifically, real wages in a 
specific economy will be equal to its own labour’s marginal product, which reflects 
the absolute growth rate of its productivity. In other words, an increase of 
productivity in any country will not be related to another country’s standard of living 
(WEF, 2011). Instead, the difference between the growth of productivity in a specific 
country and other countries will be reflected in the exchange rate trend and, 
consequently, will be reflected in the competitiveness of this country (Krugman, 
1996). By and large, the growth rate of standard of living will not increase for a 
country that does not show an increase in its productivity compared to the rest of the 
world. A caution to this argument, however, is that if productivity in a particular 
economy grows more slowly than in other countries, in specific sectors where this 
country concentrates its exports, subsequently this productivity differential could 
lead to a harmful terms of trade effect on this country's real income levels (WEF, 
2011). 
 
Whilst the GCR is at the forefront of the study of international competitiveness, it is 
not the only body to have tried to define the concept. In the following table we 
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present a small sample of the available definitions of the competitiveness of a nation 
(Aiginger, 2006, pp.166-167): 
Source Definition 
Aiginger(1998) “Competitiveness of a nation is the ability to (i) sell 
enough products and services (to fulfil an external 
constraint); (ii) at factor incomes in line with the 
(current and changing) aspiration level of the 
country; and (iii) at macro-conditions of the 
economic, environmental, social system seen as 
satisfactory by the people.” 
Competitiveness 
policy council 
(USA, 1994) 
 “The ability to sell products on international 
markets, while incomes in the domestic markets 
increase in sustainable way.” 
European 
commission (1994) 
 “The ability to “combine growth with balanced 
trade”. 
European 
commission (1995) 
 “..ability to increase or to maintain the living 
standard relative to comparable economies (e.g., 
developed industrialised countries), without long 
run deterioration of external balance.” 
European 
commission (1998) 
 “An economy is competitive if its populations can 
enjoy high standards of living and high rates of 
employment while monitoring a sustainable external 
position.” 
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European 
commission (2001) 
 “The ability of an economy to provide its 
population with high and rising standards of living 
and high rates of employments on a sustainable 
basis.” 
IMD (1994)  “World competitiveness is the ability of a country 
or a company to, proportionally, generates more 
wealth than its competitors in the world markets.” 
Krugman (1996)  “It seems far too cynical to suggest that the debate 
over competitiveness is simply a matter of time-
honoured fallacies about international trade being 
dressed up in new and pretentious rhetoric.” 
OECD (1995a)  “Competitive policy …(is) supporting the ability of 
companies, industries, regions and nations or supra-
national regions to generate, while being and 
remaining exposed to international competition, 
relatively high factor income and factor employment 
levels on a sustainable basis.” 
OECD (1995b)  “ …the ability of companies, industries, regions, 
nations or supra-national regions to generate, while 
being and remaining opposed to international 
competition, relatively high factor income and factor 
employment levels.” 
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OECD/TEP (1992)  “To produce goods and services that meet the test 
of foreign competition while simultaneously 
maintaining and expanding domestic real income.” 
Oughton and 
Whittam (1997) 
 “Long run growth in productivity and hence rising 
living standards, consistent with increasing 
employment or the maintenance of near full 
employment.” 
Porter (2004)  “True competitiveness, then is measured by 
productivity …Here, we define competitiveness 
concretely, show its relationship to a nation’s living 
standard…The micro-economic foundations of 
productivity rest on… the sophistication of 
competition in the country… and the quality of 
micro-economic business environment in which 
they operate.” 
Porter (1990)   “The only meaningful concept of competitiveness 
at the national level is national productivity.” 
von Tunzelmann 
(1995) 
“Historians have tended to equate 
competitiveness… with political, technical, 
commercial leadership.”  
WEF (2000)   “Competitiveness is the set of institutions and 
economic policies supportive of high rates of 
economic growth in the medium term.” 
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The majority of these definitions agree that productivity is considered as one of the 
central determinants of competitiveness since productivity, in turn, will determine 
the growth rate of standard of living. In other words, an increase in productivity will 
lead to a higher growth rate in standard of living and employment. The GCR defined 
competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the 
level of productivity which, in turn, will set the level of income for the people of a 
country. On the other hand, the majority of definitions in the above sample have 
defined competitiveness by focusing on achieving higher standards of living, in 
addition to high employment rates on a sustainable basis, through producing and 
selling products and services in international markets.  
 
The definitions of GCR and OECD (1995a) place more attention on the supportive 
policies of governments that aim to create an attractive environment for firms to 
improve the competitiveness of nations. This improved competitiveness will be 
reflected in the economic growth rate and the standard of living of the people.  
 
On the other hand, von Tunzelmann (1995) emphasises different types of leadership 
(by governments) as the only determinant for competitiveness. We can consider 
leadership as one of the determinants of competitiveness along with other supportive 
policies, to generate a more attractive environment for firms to compete in. These 
policies will be reflected in the economic growth of the country.  
 
In addition, Krugman (1996) describes the linkages between competitiveness and 
international trade as a fallacy. He mentions in his work that he does not believe in 
90 
 
competitiveness and wonders why there are a lot of competitiveness councils around 
the world. Also, he wonders why people have linked international trade and 
competitiveness. However, higher levels of international trade will lead to more 
competitiveness and more economic growth for the country, the best examples of 
which are China and East Asian countries.  
 
The other definitions emphasise more the impacts of competitiveness which will 
impact on the economic growth rate, then through to the level of income of 
individuals. These definitions do not give attention to the supportive policies which 
should be taken by governments in order to construct an attractive environment for 
firms to improve the competitiveness of nations. 
 
3.2. Competitiveness Indexes  
 
There are many competitiveness indexes existing in the economic literature which 
are prepared by different international and private organizations. The main benefit 
of these indexes is that they give a detailed picture about the economic and social 
performance of each country. One of the most famous competitiveness indexes is 
published by the World Economic Forum (WEF): the Global Competitiveness Index 
(GCI). Every year WEF prepares this index and publishes it in “The Global 
Competitiveness Report”. This index consists of 12 pillars of competitiveness. The 
weighted average of these 12 pillars provides the GCI. We consider these 12 pillars 
briefly here – for more details see The Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2011, 
pp.4-8).  
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1. Institutions 
 
There is no doubt that the economic performance and competitiveness of any country 
is related to the existence of robust legal and administrative frameworks. Within the 
context of of the GCI, the institutional environment is determined and, consequently 
people, companies, and governments act together to create income and wealth in 
order to increase the economic growth of the country.  
 
2. Infrastructure 
 
A high level of infrastructure plays a key role in the performance and efficiency of 
business operations. In addition, good quality infrastructure decreases the costs of 
doing business, such as the cost of transportation, communication, and energy, in 
order to increase the competitiveness and economic growth of the country. 
 
3. Macroeconomic stability  
 
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that macroeconomic stability is one 
of the main elements required for economic growth. Competitiveness is further 
enhanced as macroeconomic stability is important for business. The volatility of 
prices and interest rates raise credit costs and lead to uncertainty.  
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4. Health and primary education 
 
Healthy and educated workers are considered essential for a country’s 
competitiveness and productivity, across all economic sectors. The quantity and 
quality of basic education received by the people are taken into account in this pillar.  
 
5. Higher education and training  
 
The existence of a highly qualified labour force is seen as a prerequisite for attracting 
advanced technology, which is very important for improving the business 
environment and economic growth. The availability of higher education and good 
training is essential for countries that would like to move up the value chain beyond 
simple production processes and products. Secondary and tertiary enrolment rates, 
together with the quality of education, are measured in this pillar. 
 
6. Goods market efficiency 
 
Market efficiency is one of the main factors affecting business productivity, 
requiring healthy market competition. In this context firms will produce goods 
required by customers of high quality. The most efficient use of factors such as 
labour and financial resources are assessed within this pillar.  
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7. Labour market efficiency 
 
It is important to make sure that labour force is allocated in the most efficient way 
in the economy, and motivated to do their best in their work. This also requires 
labour market flexibility. Further, the relationship between labour motivations and 
their efforts must be clear. 
 
8. financial market sophistication 
 
The financial crisis has highlighted the fundamental role a sound and well-
functioning financial sector plays for economic activity. An efficient financial sector 
assigns a nation’s resources in the most productive way. It distributes financial 
resources to those projects with the highest returns. As a result, countries need 
sophisticated financial markets that can make capital available for private-sector 
investment from such sources as loans from a sound banking sector, properly 
regulated securities exchanges, venture capital, and other financial products. This 
requires a dependable and transparent banking sector. 
 
9. Technological readiness 
 
This pillar measures the ability of a country to adopt existing technologies, to 
improve industrial productivity, especially information and communication 
technologies (ICT).  
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FDI plays an important role as a major source of foreign technology. It is essential 
to differentiate between the level of technology available to firms in a country and 
the ability of the country to innovate and expand the frontiers of knowledge. This is 
why technological readiness is separated from innovation, which is introduced in the 
12th pillar. 
 
10. Market size 
 
Productivity is affected by the size of the market, since large markets allow firms to 
exploit economies of scale. Further, the borders of countries limit the size of markets, 
but globalization has helped to overcome this limitation. There are many empirical 
studies demonstrating that openness of trade is positively linked with economic 
growth.  
 
In order to measure market size in this pillar, domestic and foreign markets are 
included. Credit is given to export-driven economies and geographic areas (such as 
the European Union) that consist of multiple countries in a single common market. 
 
11. Business sophistication 
 
Sophistication of business leads to greater efficiency in the production of goods and 
services. This, consequently, increases productivity and improves the 
competitiveness of a country. This pillar is concerned with the quality of a country’s 
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overall business networks and the quality of individual firms’ operations and 
strategies.  
 
12. Innovation 
 
In spite of the considerable benefits to be gained by improving institutions, building 
infrastructure, reducing macroeconomic instability and improving human capital, all 
of these factors exhibit diminishing returns. So too do factors of efficiency of labour, 
financial, and goods markets. Technological innovation is required to improve 
standards of living in the long term. Developing countries can enhance their 
productivity by applying new technologies. 
 
In conclusion, we can see that all 12 criteria are related to domestic conditions and 
are thus under the influence of a nation’s government. Thus the government can 
adopt suitable policies to generate a competitive environment able to attract 
domestic and international investors which can lead to a more competitive economy. 
It is important to note that the determinants of competitiveness have been derived 
from definitions of competitiveness. Macro and micro economic indicators are the 
main determinant for the competitiveness of nations. Macroeconomic indicators 
included in the above definitions of competitiveness comprise GDP growth, GDP 
per capita, productivity, and other macroeconomic policies which can improve the 
competitiveness of nations, reflecting also on the other competitiveness indicators. 
Moreover these definitions included microeconomic policies adopted to construct an 
attractive environment for firms to operate, as reflected in microeconomic indicators. 
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3.3. Competitiveness in economic theory 
3.3.1. Trade theories 
 
In this part a brief overview of trade theories will be presented, including their 
implications for competitiveness as defined above. These theories include classical 
theory, neoclassical theory, and new trade theory. Each contains implications for the 
idea of competitiveness.  
 
Classical theory. In this theory. specialisation in the manner of Adam Smith’s 
‘division of labour’ provides for economies of scale and differences in productivity 
across countries. Smith argued that capital investment, in the form of machines, and 
trade, in the form of increasing market size, facilitates this specialisation and 
increases productivity and growth. In addition, the increase in growth leads to more 
division of labour and consequently more growth. Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) 
argued that Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage in 1776 was the first one to 
clarify why nations give attention to international trade. Adam Smith explained the 
benefits from trade to be gained when countries move from a closed economy 
situation to an open economy (free trade) when nations have an absolute advantage 
in the manufacture of different goods. These benefits could be achieved when 
countries produce goods using fewer inputs. In this case, the countries with an 
absolute advantage in the production of certain goods will thus export them. 
Similarly, nations should import commodities that other countries can export at 
lower prices than they can produce at. Therefore the absolute productivity 
differences among countries create international trade. This was seen as a direct 
challenge to the mercantilists of the 16th century. Mercantilists regarded trade as a 
zero sum game. They thought that countries should increase their exports and 
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minimise imports to be more rich and powerful. This was because exports would 
bring in gold and silver, increasing the wealth of a country. Mercantilists supported 
strict government control and preached economic nationalism (Salvatore, 2002). 
 
Moving away from Adam Smith’s concept of absolute advantage , David Ricardo 
(1817) explained that two countries could gain from trade, even if one has an 
absolute advantage in the production of both, if they each concentrate in producing 
goods for which they have a comparative advantage. Within the model of David 
Ricardo, the differences among industries and nations in production technology 
increase the differences in comparative labour productivity. Consequently in 
accordance with comparative advantage, a country ought to specialise in producing 
those goods that it can produce more efficiently compared to other goods (Krugman 
and Obstfeld, 2003). This theory is therefore underpinned by the concept of 
opportunity cost. 
 
Krugman (1990) argues that the theory of comparative cost advantage has received 
widespread support in explaining the benefits from trade, in spite of it being based 
on a set of severe assumptions. Also, the majority of World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) principles are derived from the law of comparative advantage (Root, 2001). 
The general validity of the theory is not affected by the easing of the majority of the 
assumptions in any substantial way (Harkness, 1983; Balassa, 1965). These 
theoretical considerations are supported by the availability of much empirical 
evidence (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). 
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The usefulness of comparative advantage is revealed from the notable amount of 
valuable information that it provides clearly and concisely. Salvatore (2002) 
mentions that comparative advantage demonstrates the conditions of production, the 
autarky point of production and consumption, the equilibrium relative commodity 
prices in the absence of trade, the comparative advantage of each country, the degree 
of specialisation in production with trade, the volume of trade, the terms of trade, 
and the gains from trade. In addition Krugman (1992) states that the theory shows 
clearly why trade is a positive sum game. 
 
On the other hand, the theory of comparative advantage does not explain the location 
or source of these advantages. Nor does it therefore clarify the direction of trade. For 
this reason economists needed a model which developed comparative advantage, in 
order to clarify these issues. 
 
The main assumptions of neo-classical theory explain the required conditions for 
perfect competition in the world. Salvatore (2002) presents Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) 
theory as an essential theory to clarify the causes of comparative advantage 
differences between countries. The H-O model (or factor-proportions model) 
extended Ricardo’s model by including two factors of production. The model 
included capital and labour as with Ricardo. The Ricardian model supposes that 
there are technological differences between nations, whereas the H-O model 
supposes that technologies are the same between nations and that comparative 
advantages are derived from differences in the relative abundance of production 
factors. 
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Leontief (1953) was the first who conducted empirical studies to test H-O theory. 
He could not confirm the United States as an exporter of capital intensive goods and 
an importer of labour intensive goods; indeed the results suggested the opposite. 
Baldwin (1971) has helped explain the paradox later. He showed that the capital ratio 
was higher than labour ratio for imports compared with exports. Similar results were 
found for analyses of trade by Japan, Germany, India and Canada (Baldwin, 1979). 
 
The Leontief Paradox motivated economists to search for other clarifications of H-
O theory. Baldwin (1971) presented one of the most important of these clarifications, 
by introducing differences in human capital. Also, the product cycle theory (Vernon, 
1966) and technology gap theory (Gold, 1981) include time as a dynamic extension 
to the basic H-O theory. In product cycle theory, Vernon stated that the majority of 
manufactured goods have a product cycle: introduction, growth, maturity, and 
decline. The comparative advantage of these products moves between countries over 
time. Whereas, according to technology gap theory, the technology level of an 
economy is linked to its level of innovation. New products are manufactured in the 
country that has high level of technology and innovation, until other countries can 
be trained to manufacture these products. Therefore there is a time-lag before 
imitation of the new products becomes possible. 
 
New trade theory. Traditional trade theory -classical and neo classical-could not 
clarify why two-way trade in similar goods occurs between similar nations, 
especially rich countries. It assumed instead that trade will happen between 
dissimilar countries, based on different technology or factor endowments. Since the 
second world war, however, trade occurred increasingly between industrialised 
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countries, with similar production structures and factor endowments (Krugman, 
1990). Such “intra-industry trade” (IIT)27 between industrialised countries could not 
be explained by theories derived from comparative advantage (Krugman, 1986). 
This led to the appearance of new trade theory. This explained IIT with reference to 
scale economies, product differentiation and imperfect competition.  
 
Grubel and Lloyd (1975) showed the importance of IIT between industrialised 
countries with similar factor endowments. In addition, they created an index by 
which the degree of IIT could be measured. They confirmed in their study that the 
H-O model was unable to provide sufficient explanation for the phenomenon of IIT. 
Therefore the authors concentrated on “preference diversity” as a source of trade. 
Grubel and Lloyd argued that the existence of local demand for different varieties of 
the required products encouraged the import of different varieties of the same basic 
product in order to satisfy differences in consumers’ tastes and preferences. 
 
Two further important contributions to the empirical studies of the IIT came from 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Lancaster (1979). Dixit and Stiglitz constructed a 
model for “product variety” when the economy is described as monopolistic rather 
than perfectly competitive. They argued that the variety of products is determined 
by the consequences of the free entry process. Therefore, people will enjoy unlimited 
gains from product variety. Lancaster (1979) developed another model for “product 
                                                     
27 Intra-industry trade is two-way trade in products that belong to the same industry. As it has been noted, “intra-
industry trade (IIT), that is trade of similar products, has been a key factor in trade growth in recent decades. These 
trends have mostly been attributed to the fragmentation of production (outsourcing and offshoring) as a result of 
globalisation and new technologies” (Handjiski et al, 2010, p.15). 
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variety”, based on the characteristics of the products and the preferences of each 
consumer. Lancaster argued that the preferences of consumers are different 
regarding bundles of characteristics present in similar, but not identical, goods – as 
a result of which they prefer some products than others. Within this context, low cost 
and free entry for different specifications and varieties are seen as vital motivations 
for trade. 
 
In the literature the degree of IIT is determined by the income levels of trading 
partners. High income raises the demand for differentiated goods. On the supply 
side, IIT will increase with income if we assume differentiated goods, in general, to 
be more capital intensive than homogeneous goods and interpret a high per capita 
income as a high capital labour ratio, (Hellvin, 1996, p.18). Moreover, there are two 
“types” of IIT, horizontal intra industry trade (HIIT) and vertical intra industry trade 
(VIIT). HIIT model occurs between countries with high and similar per-capita 
incomes (north-north IIT). VIIT occurs between countries with different levels of 
per-capita income (north-south IIT) (Hellvin, 1996). The difference between HIIT 
and VIIT is that HIIT takes place under conditions of scale economies and imperfect 
competition, whereas VIIT can clarify IIT without recourse to economies of scale 
and imperfect competition (Tharakan and Kerstens, 1995).  
 
There are three models for HIIT, the neo-Chamberlinian, neo-Hotelling and Eaton 
and Kierzkowski models. The first two models are similar as they exist under the 
condition of monopolistic competition, but they differ in the treatment of consumer 
preferences (Krugman, 1980; Helpman 1981). The third model was constructed by 
Eaton and Kierzkowski (1984) under conditions of oligopoly. The authors 
102 
 
considered oligopolistic markets as a distinct market within HIIT. Greenaway (1987) 
states that the Eaton and Kierzkowski model assumed entry into the market is open 
for differentiated goods. Moreover, if any producer believes in making gains, he can 
enter the market. 
 
There are two models existing for VIIT. The first is the “neo-Hecksher-Ohlin model” 
constructed by Falvey (1981). In this model, Falvey demonstrated that VIIT  may 
exist in conditions of many companies producing different products with different 
varieties and qualities under perfectly competitive markets. The second VIIT model 
was developed by Shaked and Suttan (1984). The model of Shaked and Suttan 
provide an illustration that VIIT may exist in markets which are characterized by the 
existence of a small number of companies under natural oligopoly. 
 
3.3.2. Micro Economic Theories 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the understanding of regional competitiveness also 
requires insights in complementary perspectives that can be derived from 
microeconomics. The following three concepts will be presented:  
A. Urban growth theory  
B. Business strategy economics 
C. Schumpeterian / evolutionary economics 
 
Urban growth theory: Jane Jacobs’ theory of urban growth is a very important 
contribution from an economic and sociological viewpoint. Jacobs (1969) 
considered the urban system (city-regions) as the most essential field for the 
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formation and accumulation of economic wealth. Urban systems create increasing 
profits which reduce search expenses. The empirical studies that supported this 
theory concluded that higher growth rates are linked with more economic 
diversification in the economy (Feldman, 2002).  
 
Business strategy economics: The cluster theory of Michael Porter is regarded as 
the most influential contribution for business strategy economics. Porter (1990) 
stated that for firms to be more competitive, they must develop and adopt an effective 
way in their operations, in addition to following distinctive strategic positions. Porter 
argued that these requirements for firm competitiveness could be encouraged by 
geographical clusters or by the creation of regionally-based relational assets external 
to individual firms but of main gain to their competitive performance (Porter, 1990). 
 
Schumpeterian/evolutionary economics: The entrepreneurship theory of Joseph 
Schumpeter (1911) argued that entrepreneurs are driven to make technical and 
financial innovations and that the spurts of activity resulting from these innovations 
create economic growth. Through emphasizing innovation and change in technology 
as important factors producing economic growth, Schumpeterian theory shows a 
new set of areas for policy intervention beyond the very limited range of neo-
classical theory. 
 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) stated that within the context of Schumpeterian 
theory, firms have a motivation to apply innovative activities in the hope that new 
technologies will create profits. In order to connect innovation with the development 
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of new products that are of higher quality, the authors introduced the idea of the 
“quality ladder”: by a process of product improvement and imitation, developed and 
then less developed countries climb up the quality ladder. Therefore firms and 
nations that climb up the quality ladder can afford higher wages by offering higher 
quality. It is interesting to note that reference to, respectively, diversification, 
technological innovation and quality differentiation, all three of these theories 
include elements consistent with intra-industry trade – both horizontal and vertical. 
 
Innovation, in a wider view, involves developing new products and processes, but 
also using technology to enhance the performance of logistics, distribution and 
marketing. In addition, innovation could similarly be used for changes that are new 
to the domestic economy. Therefore, innovation is considered as a part of economic 
development, (Fagerberg et al., 2010). They also considered access to knowledge as 
a key component for economic development in developing countries. 
 
He also stated that economists have concentrated on accumulated capital per worker 
to describe the changes in income or productivity of the economy, starting over two 
hundred years ago with “classical political economy”. Moreover, Fagerberg et al. 
(2010) stated that Solow (1956), in his theory of neoclassical growth, derived 
productivity growth results from increases in the amount of capital per worker. 
Solow also used technological progress as an exogenous variable to explain long run 
growth in GDP per capita. The results of Solow’s model indicated that GDP per 
capita will increase in the long run in all countries by the same ratio, as he assumed 
that technology was a public good that was available everywhere. But Fagerberg et 
al. (2010) stated that the only variable absent from the Solow model which can 
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explain the differences in GDP per capita growth between countries is transitional 
dynamics, as the initial conditions vary from one country to another. 
 
Fagerberg et al. (2010) have argued that economic historians were the first who tried 
to relate differences in economic development with differences in technology or 
knowledge. They stated that some economists used the term “absorptive capacity” 
to refer to the ability of the economy to absorb new investments. They also added 
that “technological capability” consists of production capability, investment 
capability and innovation capability. All of these aspects are required: to adjust 
production according to changing market circumstances, to create new productive 
facilities and adapt project strategies to suit the investment circumstances, and  to 
create new technology in order to develop new products or services that better fulfil 
market requirements. Fagerberg et al. (2010) stated that Lall (1992) claimed that 
technological capability depends on domestic technological efforts and foreign 
technology acquired through imports or FDI.  
 
Moreover, Fagerberg et al. (2007) assumed that technology is cumulative, but also 
context-dependent in terms of how it is able to spread in each country. This then 
affects the spread of the benefits from innovation. In addition they stated also this 
does not mean that the transfer of technology from developed countries cannot serve 
as a powerful factor behind growth and competitiveness in low-income countries. 
Economic historians have argued that the transfer of knowledge and technology will 
enable developing countries to imitate the developed countries in using more 
advanced technologies. Fagerberg et al.(2007) built a model based on Schumpeterian 
logic and assumed that the exports of the economy depended on four aspects: (1) its 
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technological competitiveness (its knowledge assets relative to competitors); (2) its 
capacity to exploit technology commercially (again relative to competitors); (3) its 
price competitiveness (relative prices on tradeables in common currency); and (4) 
world demand. 
 
Fagerberg et al. (2007) also identified four factors that affect economic performance: 
technology competitiveness, capacity competitiveness, price competitiveness, and 
demand competitiveness. Technology competitiveness is the ability of the economy 
to compete successfully in international markets for new goods and services. This 
kind of competitiveness is associated with the innovativeness of the nation. The 
second factor, capacity competitiveness, is the ability to exploit new technology to 
sustain the competitiveness of the country. They explained this variable highlighted 
by three general aspects: technical/organizational competence, availability/quality 
of financial institutions/markets, and quality/efficiency of governance. The third 
factor, price competitiveness, emphases mainly price and/or cost comparisons. A 
commonly-used indicator for price competitiveness is the growth of unit labour costs 
in manufacturing. The last factor, demand competitiveness, means that the 
composition of world demand affects the production and trade structure of the 
economy. 
 
3.4. Competitiveness: the empirical literature 
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) and the Institute for Management Development 
(IMD) are the most well-known sources for measures of national competitiveness. 
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In their studies they rely on existing data, primarily gathered by government, and 
dedicated large-scale global surveys of senior executives: 
 
• World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report: 
 
The complexity of measuring national competitiveness is demonstrated by the WEFs 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), which has two sets of indices:  
(a) The Current Competitiveness Index uses microeconomic indicators to measure 
the set of institutions, market structures, and economic policies supportive of high 
current levels of prosperity. 
(b) The Growth Competitiveness Index focuses on global competitiveness as the set 
of institutions and economic policies supportive of high rates of growth in the 
medium term (next five years). 
 
The Current Competitiveness Index is an aggregate measure of microeconomic 
competitiveness. The index is divided into two sub-indices. One sub-index measures 
company sophistication and the other measures the quality of the national business 
environment. The Growth Competitiveness Index focuses on measures relating to 
technology, public institutions and the macroeconomic environment. For details on 
how each of these measures is quantified, please see the GCR. 
 
• IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 
 
The IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCYB) argues that competitiveness 
needs to balance economic imperatives with the social requirements of a nation as 
they result from history, value systems and tradition. The study places emphasis on 
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GDP per capita as an indicator of overall competitiveness. The WCYB ranks and 
analyses the ability of nations to provide an environment in which enterprises can 
compete. The research focuses on the competitiveness of the economic environment 
and not a nation’s overall economic competitiveness (performance). A total of 249 
measures are grouped into eight input factors: domestic economy; 
internationalisation; government; finance; infrastructure; management; science and 
technology; and people. Economies are ranked according to their performance 
against each of these measures. The data are standardised and weighted in a 
consistent fashion and are used to compute rankings and indices of the 
competitiveness environments of national economies. The yearbook identifies 47 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, sub-divided by 8 input factors, that it 
contends are the most important for a competitive environment. It also identifies the 
20 strongest factors for a competitive environment in each country. For more details 
on the actual measurement of these indicators, please see the World Competitiveness 
Year Book. 
 
3.5. Theories of Foreign Direct Investment  
 
In the economic literature, the term “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)” has been 
tackled through two approaches: 
- The traditional theory of multinational enterprises. 
- Models of new trade theory. 
 
We provide a brief review of these two approaches, which are central to any 
literature review on FDI and the business environment. 
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The traditional theory of multinationals 
 
The pioneer of multinational firms theory was Hymer, who prepared his doctoral 
dissertation on this topic in 1960, and which was published in 1976 (Yamin, 1991). 
Hymer was the first to write about the idea that an enterprise whose operations are 
located in more than one economy faces additional costs compared with an 
enterprise located in just one economy. The enterprise, to overcome these extra 
costs, must have specific advantages it holds over its competitors. He argued that 
these advantages are mainly represented by economies of scale or superior 
production technology. 
 
Two years earlier (in 1958), the second important work, by John Dunning was 
published. Hymer (1976) cited Dunning’s work in his PhD thesis. Dunning (1958) 
conducted empirical analysis on the manufacturing operations of US enterprises in 
the UK. The results revealed that these manufacturing enterprises in general paid 
higher wages and had higher rates of labour productivity and new product innovation 
than their UK competitors. 
 
Since then, many empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the firm-
specific advantages that promote FDI. Buckley and Casson (1976) observed that 
multinational enterprises move from their home country according to the advantages 
and opportunities provided. In addition, internalisation advantages must exist to 
attract FDI (like market opportunity) beyond alternatives such as exporting or 
licensing. Dunning stressed that internalisation advantages must be related to both 
firm-specific and locational advantages in order to clarify those factors attract FDI 
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(Dunning, 1988). The author used the “OLI paradigm” (Ownership, Locational, 
Internalisation advantages) or “eclectic theory” as the preferred name. The “OLI 
paradigm” has been widely used and many of the theoretical and empirical studies 
conducted on the multinational enterprises used this theory as a reference. 
 
In line with Dunning (1988), the OLI paradigm’s major hypothesis is that an 
enterprise will engage in foreign value-adding activities if and only if three factors 
are fulfilled. Firstly, the enterprise should possess net ownership (O) advantages in 
comparison with other enterprises serving specific host markets. Ownership 
advantages can take the form of trademark or production technique, entrepreneurial 
skills or returns to scale. Secondly, the enterprise itself should get benefit from these 
advantages, rather than producing through a joint venture arrangement such as 
licensing. These advantages are entitled internalisation (I) advantages. Third, there 
must be some factor inputs which do not exist in the national economy of the 
enterprise such as raw materials, low wages or special taxes or tariffs. These 
advantages are called locational (L) advantages of economies or countries. 
 
Moreover Dunning (1998) reported four motives for FDI: market, efficiency, 
resource, and asset seeking. Concerning market and efficiency seeking investment, 
a trade off between closeness to market and economies of scale is revealed from FDI 
(Di Mauro, 1999). Dunning’s classification of the motives for FDI is based on 
Behrman’s (1972) work for MNCs’ (Multinational Corporations) incentives. 
Behrman stated that the motives for MNCs are resources, markets, efficiency, and 
strategic assets (Vasyechko, 2012). 
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Di Mauro (1999) also indicated the importance of market seeking FDI by showing 
the correlation between FDI flows and market size. Efficiency seeking FDI 
emphasises factor cost differences, which play an important role in determining the 
location of investment (Loewendahl, 2001).  
 
The next part will present the attempts to embed theories of FDI in formal models 
of international trade  
 
New trade theory 
 
Multinational enterprise theory focuses on single firms and their motives to integrate 
activities across countries. It has been separated rather from international trade 
theory. International trade theory was refurbished from a general-equilibrium 
tradition which depends on the assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition. 
 
Building on the above discussion, international trade theory has been widened 
significantly in recent decades. Therefore the industrial-organisation approach to 
trade has been indicated by new trade theory. Consequently this has improved the 
recognition of the reasons for and consequences of trade by taking into consideration 
the elements of increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and product 
differentiation, relative to the more traditional comparative-advantage models of 
international trade. Trade gains appear separately from any pattern of comparative 
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advantage as enterprises realize scale economies and followed strategies of product 
differentiation in an imperfect competitive market (Markusen, 1995). 
 
Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984) offered the first attempts to merge 
multinational enterprise theory with trade theory. The authors proposed general 
equilibrium models to present multinational enterprises in the theories of general 
equilibrium of international trade. The importance of general equilibrium theory 
becomes clear when we try to understand the relationship between the theory of 
international trade and multinational enterprises by connecting FDI to its 
determinants. Markusen (1984), argued that when there are high levels of entry 
barriers in the target markets, multinational enterprises avoid the costs of trade by 
establishing affiliate companies, by investing abroad. Helpman (1984) argued that 
varied factor endowment (such as labour) levels between countries motivated FDI 
and multinational enterprises to establish more affiliates in different economies. In 
this model, trade between multinational enterprises and their foreign affiliates is 
created. Moreover, the main concern of Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984) was 
to connect their treatments of FDI to international trade theory and not to the OLI 
paradigm. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have shed light on definitions of competitiveness, and the main 
components that go into calculating competitiveness indexes – especially the Global 
Competitiveness Index from the World Economic Forum (WEF). This consists of 
12 indicators reflecting both the macroeconomic and microeconomic environment. 
After that we saw how economic theory has sought to tackle the concept of 
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competitiveness through trade and microeconomic theories. We followed this by a 
consideration of how FDI has been brought into economic theory. In Chapter 4 we 
shed light on the relationship between FDI, foreign trade and competitiveness 
through a systematic literature review. These will then be utilised in Chapter 5, when 
we estimate empirically the links between these three variables for Arab countries. 
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Chapter 4 
The role of FDI and foreign trade in enhancing the competitiveness 
of Arab countries: evidence from the literature 
 
 
In spite of the increasing importance of FDI, empirical studies have not given much 
attention to its relationship with trade and competitiveness, (Cantwell, 1991). 
Therefore we have tried throughout our research to find links between FDI, foreign 
trade and competitiveness. We have done this by providing evidence from the 
literature. In addition, our empirical analysis adopted in Document 4 tested the 
relationships between FDI, foreign trade and competitiveness in Arab countries 
using panel data techniques – a region of the world particularly underrepresented in 
the literature. In this thesis, the results presented in Chapter 5, estimated using a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model support the findings from 
Document 4. Our work provides an important contribution to the economic 
literature, because the majority of empirical studies analysing the effect of foreign 
trade and FDI on competitiveness, use numerical indicators only, not the available 
econometric techniques. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there are no 
other studies conducted to analyse the relationship between these variables for Arab 
countries as a group.   
 
In general, we can say that inflows of FDI could produce a number of positive 
economic effects for the recipient economy. These effects consequently will 
stimulate economic growth by creating a number of positive externalities and 
spillovers. In particular, FDI inflows are positively linked with employment, 
technology, skills of the local labour force and the environment, which in turn will 
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improve exports and enhance the competitiveness of the host economy. Ozawa 
(1992) described the links between economic development and competitiveness that 
generate foreign trade and FDI. The author argued that an increase in trade flows 
takes place as a result of enhanced comparative advantage which, in turn, is 
influenced by FDI. In addition, Hernádi (2005) stated that using the advantages of 
exports and FDI inflows are the most two efficient ways to improve the international 
competitiveness for nations. In this Chapter we thus seek to answer the research 
question “can Arab economies competitiveness be boosted by improving foreign 
trade and foreign direct investments (FDI)?” 
 
The first part of this chapter will analyse the impact of trade openness on economic 
growth and competitiveness, and seek evidence from the empirical literature. The 
second part provides a critical review of empirical studies conducted to explain the 
economic impact of FDI on the business environment. The third part of this chapter 
will demonstrate the linkage between foreign trade and FDI. Finally, we will 
elaborate the relationship between foreign trade, FDI and competitiveness. 
 
4.1. The impact of foreign trade on the economic growth: evidence from the 
empirical economics literature 
 
As discussed in Document 1, competitiveness is crucial for maintaining productivity 
growth and raising living standards, particularly in small open economies, based on 
international trade and to a great extent on FDI. It is understood that more 
competitiveness will lead to more economic growth, therefore we will emphasise 
here the relationship between economic growth and foreign trade, especially trade 
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openness or liberalization. The link between trade liberalization and economic 
growth is a much-discussed topic. The majority of the following studies argue that 
the liberalization of the trade regime has a positive impact on the growth of GDP.  
 
Yanikkaya (2003) applied two types of trade openness measure to estimate the 
impact of trade openness on the growth rate of per capita income for 120 countries 
over the period 1970-1997. The first trade openness measure used trade volumes 
which contain different ratios of trade variables with GDP: exports, imports, exports 
plus imports and trade with developed countries. The second measure was derived 
from trade restrictiveness and estimated by calculating the impact of foreign 
exchange restrictions on bilateral payments and current transactions. The GMM 
estimation for first measure of openness suggested that the relation between trade 
volumes and per capita growth is significant and positive. The results for the second 
measure revealed that the relation between trade restrictions and per capita growth 
is significant and positive. As a result the author concluded that trade restrictions in 
developing countries may cause faster GDP growth. 
 
Edwards (1992) analysed the relationship between trade openness (trade 
intervention and distortions) and GDP growth by using a cross country data set of 
30 developing countries for the period 1970-1982. The author used in his model two 
basic sets of trade policy indicators, constructed by Leamer (1988). The first set 
referred to openness and measures of trade policy which restrict imports. This set 
included tariff and non tariff barriers (NTBs). The second set measured trade 
intervention and captured the extent to which trade policy distorted trade. The 
findings of the model, estimated by OLS, revealed that all four openness indicators 
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were positively related with real per capita GDP growth, whereas trade intervention 
indexes were found to be significantly negatively associated with GDP growth. 
These studies strengthen the hypothesis that economies grow faster with a more open 
trade regime, and grow slower with a more distorted trade regime. 
 
Santos-Paulino (2002) used a sample of 22 developing countries for the period 1972-
1998 to investigate the effect of trade openness on export growth. The author applied 
a typical export growth function, which assumes that export volume relies on the 
real exchange rate and world income. He used two ways to measure trade openness. 
The first measured the degree of anti-export bias by using the ratio of export duties 
to total exports; and the second was a dummy variable of timing of the introduction 
of trade liberalization measures. The conclusion of the author was that exports grow 
faster in open economies, as the results of the model estimated by OLS found export 
duties significant and negative. The dummy variable was also significant, with a 
positive sign. 
 
Edwards (1998) applied nine indexes of trade policy on comparative data for 93 
countries, to analyse the relation between trade policy and Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth over the period 1980-1990. Three of the nine indexes were related to 
openness, a higher value of which indicated a lower degree of policy intervention in 
international trade. The other indexes were related to trade distortions, for which 
bigger values indicated a greater departure from free trade. The OLS estimates 
suggested that trade openness indexes were significant and positive, and trade 
distortion indexes were significant and negative. These results suggest faster 
productivity growth is linked with more openness. 
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Harrison (1996) investigated the relation between openness and GDP growth by 
applying a general production function. The author used GDP as a function of capital 
stock, years of primary and secondary education, population, labour force, 
agricultural land and technological change. In addition the author applied seven 
measures for openness in order to test the statistical relationship between openness 
and GDP growth. The findings of cross-section estimation showed that only the 
black market rate was significant, with a negative sign. Also the findings of a country 
time series panel revealed that tariff and NTBs had positive signs, the black market 
rate and price distortion index used, in dollar, had negative signs, and were 
significant. Results of annual data estimation revealed that tariffs and NTBs, and the 
black market rate, were significant and negative. As a result the author recommended 
that the choice of time period for investigating the relationship between trade 
openness measures and GDP growth is critical. 
 
Wacziarg (2001) used a panel of 57 countries over 1970-1989 to examine the links 
between trade policy and GDP growth. The author used a simultaneous equation 
model to assess the impact of trade policy on several determinants of growth. 
Openness was evaluated by an index which included three trade policy variables: 
tariff barriers, identified by share of import duties to total imports; NTBs, identified 
by an un-weighted coverage ratio for the pre-Uruguay Round time period; and a 
dummy variable (liberalization status). The findings illustrated that there is a positive 
relationship between trade openness and GDP growth.  
 
Iscan (1998) examined the impact of trade openness on TFP growth for Mexican 
manufacturing industries for 1970-1990. The author used two measures to specify 
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the effect of trade liberalization on TFP. The first was foreign trade variables, 
identified by export share; the second was the effective rate of protection. In addition 
the author identified the start date of trade liberalization (1986) as a dummy variable. 
The findings of the GMM estimations revealed that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between growth of productivity and exports, whereas the impact of the 
change in effective rate of protection was found to be negative and significant. The 
author concluded that trade openness has a positive impact on productivity growth.  
 
Yusuf and Emmanuel (2000) used foreign trade data (exports plus imports) for 
selected East Asian countries (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand) to examine the relationship between GDP growth and trade openness for 
1960-1997. Results from Johansen estimation rejected the hypothesis that there is 
no cointegration between GDP growth and trade openness. 
  
Sinha and Sinha (2000) used a sample of 15 Asian countries over 1950-1992 to 
investigate the impacts of openness and investment on the growth of GDP. The 
authors developed a model linking the growth of GDP to the growth rates of 
openness (export plus import), domestic investment and population. The results of 
the model showed that the coefficient on the growth of openness for China, Hong 
Kong, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan and Singapore, were positive and 
significantly different from zero. Also, the coefficient of the growth of domestic 
investment for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Philippines, 
Singapore and South Korea, was positive and significantly different from zero. On 
the other hand the coefficient of the growth of population in some cases was 
negative, but in all cases was not significantly different from zero. Overall, the 
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authors found evidence supporting the hypothesis that the growth rate of GDP is 
positively linked to the growth rates of openness and domestic investment. On the 
other hand, the relationship between the growth rate of GDP and the growth rate of 
population is vague. 
 
Leyaro and Morrissey (2010) used a panel data for up to 133 developing countries 
for 1970-2008 in order to evaluate if the relationship between trade openness and 
growth was conditional on structural variables. The authors argued that the harmful 
impact of primary commodity export dependence on Sub-Saharan African countries’ 
growth can be captured by two structural variables; natural barriers to trade (trade 
costs) and natural resource endowments (primary commodity dependence). They 
applied cross-section, dynamic panel data regressions and the Hansen endogenous 
threshold technique. The results suggested that high trade costs and natural resource 
endowments have a negative impact on growth. Therefore the impact of trade 
openness on growth is affected by structural variables in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Sakyi (2011) examined the impact of trade openness and foreign aid on the economic 
growth of Ghana during the period 1984-2007. The author used the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test and found that the impact of trade openness and 
foreign aid on economic growth was positive and statistically significant in the short 
term and long term, although reduced by their interaction. In addition, economic 
growth in Ghana since 1983 and the implementation of liberalisation policies, have 
benefited from both trade openness and foreign aid. 
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Ellahi et al. (2011) used annual time series data for 1980-2009 to investigate the 
connections among trade openness, industrial value added and economic growth in 
Pakistan. The authors applied a unit root test to determine the time series properties, 
while OLS and Granger causality tests were used to establish causality. The results 
suggested that trade openness (growth of imports and exports) was not the only 
determinant of economic growth, but a positive and significant contribution can be 
realized by taking into account industrial value added as well. Moreover the 
outcomes of the study recommended that developing countries must apply trade 
openness and liberalisation to support their economies and accordingly boost the 
living standards of their people. 
 
To sum up, from this literature review we can conclude that the majority of these 
studies find that the liberalization of the trade regime has a significant positive 
impact on economic growth. The studies of Edward (1992), Wacziarg (2001), Yusuf 
and Emmanuel (2000), Sinha and Sinha (2000), Ellahi et al. (2011) and Daniel 
(2011) found a positive relationship between trade openness and economic growth. 
These studies strengthen the hypothesis that economies grow faster with a more open 
trade regime, and grow slower with a more distorted trade regime. Santos-Paulino 
(2002) concluded that exports grow faster in open economies. Moreover, Iscan 
(1998) Edwards (1998) found that trade openness has a positive impact on 
productivity growth.  
 
 
4.2. The economic impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
In this section, we provide a critical review of empirical studies conducted to explain 
the economic impact of FDI on growth and competitiveness. After that, critical 
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review of empirical studies on the economic impact of business environment on 
attracting FDI will be provided.  
 
4.2.1. Critical review of empirical studies on the economic impact of FDI 
 
There are a great many empirical studies testing the effect of FDI on the economic 
growth of the host country. These studies reveal that there are key factors (such as 
market size and trade policy) that affect inward FDI flows to the host economy as 
well as the influence of FDI on economic growth. 
 
The study of Borensztein et al. (1998) provides evidence regarding the effect of FDI 
on economic growth, in a cross-country regression framework. The sample covers 
data of FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries over two 
decades. The authors found that FDI is an important tool for the transfer of 
technology, contributing relatively more to growth than domestic investment. 
Furthermore, their results suggest that FDI is more useful than domestic investment 
only when the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital or when 
there is sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced technologies available in the 
host economy. In addition their results revealed that an increase of one dollar in the 
net inflow of FDI is linked with an increase of more than one dollar in total 
investment in the host economy. 
 
Alfaro and Charlton (2007) re-examined the relationship between FDI and growth 
by distinguishing between different qualities of FDI. The authors used the word 
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‘quality’ to refer to the impact of a unit of FDI on economic growth. They used 
industry level data for 29 countries for the period 1985-2000 to test the various links 
between different “types” of FDI and economic growth. The results showed that FDI 
at the industry level is related to higher growth in value added. In addition the 
relation is stronger for industries with higher skill requirements and for industries 
more dependent on external capital. 
 
De Mello (1999) indicated to what extent FDI improves the economic growth which 
relies on the degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic 
investment. FDI enhances economic growth in the long term, through transfer of 
knowledge and the accumulation of capital stock representing newer technologies. 
Therefore the effect in the host economy will be higher than technological leaders. 
Accordingly, the effect of FDI on growth appears to rely inversely on the 
technological gap between leaders and followers. The level of substitutability 
between capital stocks embody old (domestic) and new technologies related to FDI 
appears to be larger in technologically advanced recipient economies and the level 
of complementarity between old and new technologies found in developing 
economies. 
 
The study of de Soysa and Oneal (1999) provided strong evidence that FDI grants 
significant direct and indirect benefits to the recipient economy. The authors focused 
on a sample of 97 developing countries for the period 1980-1991 to study the growth 
in per capita income for 114 countries. In order to illustrate the two sources of 
investment as complementary they applied Granger causality tests. Domestic 
investment was encouraged significantly by an increase in FDI. In addition new 
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domestic investment attracts new foreign investment as well, but the impact is much 
smaller. 
 
Rothgeb (1984) tested the effect of foreign investment on growth in the third world 
and found that the impacts are different for different types of third world state. The 
author examined a sample representing all third world countries. He concluded that 
the relationship between total stocks and overall growth is negative in the long term. 
Flows in manufacturing and domestic trade and total flows had an initial disruptive 
impact that was followed by a later period of growth. 
 
Barry and Collins (1999) tested the effect of capital inflows on domestic investment 
for 58 developing countries (from Latin America, Asia and Africa) for the period 
1978-95. The authors differentiated among three types of inflows: FDI, portfolio 
investment, and other financial flows (primarily bank loans). The study revealed that 
an increase in capital inflows by one dollar is linked with a 50 cent increase in 
domestic investment. This finding hides the considerable difference among types of 
inflow, however. The impact of FDI on domestic investment appears to be one for 
one; but there is virtually no visible association between portfolio inflows and 
investment (little or no impact); the effect of loans lies between these. 
 
Agosin and Mayer (2000) attempted to assess to what extent FDI in developing 
countries crowds in or crowds out domestic investment, for the period 1970–1996. 
The authors found that the positive effects of FDI on domestic investment are not 
assured. In some cases, total investment may increase much less than FDI, or may 
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even fail to rise when a country experiences an increase in FDI. In this paper the 
results of the econometric exercises recommend that crowding in has been strong in 
Asia, and crowding out has been the norm in Latin America. In Africa, FDI has 
enlarged overall investment one-to-one. 
 
Loungani and Razin (2001) indicated possible risks of FDI on developing host 
economies when they studied the preference for FDI over other types of private 
capital inflows. The authors refer to some risks of FDI, such as it being reversible 
through financial transactions; its benefits can be limited by leverage; and a high 
share of FDI in a country's total capital inflows may reflect its institutions' weakness 
rather than their strength. 
 
Blonigen and Wang (2004) found that the nature, volume and impact of FDI in 
Developed Countries (DCs) and Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are very 
different. The results suggest that determinant factors for the location of FDI activity 
across countries differ systematically across LDCs and DCs. The aggregate data 
show that the impact of FDI on growth is one that is only supported for LDCs, not 
DCs. Moreover, FDI is much less likely to crowd out (more likely to crowd in) 
domestic investment for LDCs than DCs.  
 
In spite of the bulk of empirical studies suggesting that FDI is related to the economic 
environment of the host economy, there is no generally accepted set of explanatory 
variables that could be considered as the determinants of FDI. Chakrabarti (2001) 
attempted to study the large number of determinant variables of FDI that have taken 
126 
 
the attention of economists in the literature. The author proposed a structural model 
designed to assess the role of various potential determinants of the spatial 
distribution of FDI. The results suggested that the relation between FDI and 
variables such as tax, wages, openness, exchange rate, tariffs, growth and trade 
balance, are highly sensitive to small modifications in the conditioning information 
set. Moreover the underlying theory does not provide a specific prediction for the 
impact of a particular variable on FDI.  
 
The empirical studies analysing the effect of FDI on Arab countries Is considered 
now. Moosa and Cardak (2005) examined the determinants of FDI inflows in Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) countries (mainly Arab). The author applied extreme 
bounds analysis to a sample of cross-sectional data covering 18 countries. The 
results suggested that countries that are more successful in attracting FDI are those 
countries that have growing economies. In addition those countries give more 
attention to education, research and have low country risk, as well as higher returns 
on capital due to the lack of domestic investment in fixed capital. 
 
Sadik and Bolbol (2001) tested the impact of FDI through technology spillovers on 
overall TFP for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia for a 
period of 20 years. The authors found that there are no clear positive spillovers for 
FDI on technology and productivity in addition to those of other types of capital 
formation. On the other hand, during the period of study the results revealed that 
there are some signals that the impact of FDI on TFP is lower than domestic 
investments in some countries, illustrating a possibly dominating negative crowding 
out impact. 
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Haddad and Harrison (1993) investigated the impact of FDI on the economic growth 
of Morocco. The authors linked the productivity of Moroccan enterprises with the 
degree of foreign ownership of the enterprise, in addition to the degree of foreign 
ownership of the sector to which the enterprise belongs, by using the data of industry 
level survey on Moroccan enterprises. The results revealed that an increase in overall 
level of productivity of enterprises is linked with a greater degree of foreign 
ownership. The results also suggested that enterprises in sectors with a higher ratio 
of foreign ownership have higher levels of productivity, separately from the 
enterprises’ degree of foreign ownership. In spite of these results, FDI flows to 
sectors and enterprises are linked with higher overall productivity. The authors 
observed that it is not possible to determine that the existence of FDI should have 
improved the growth rate, and not just the level, of productivity in enterprises owned 
domestically in sectors with a higher level of foreign ownership.  
 
In conclusion, we have focused in this part on the empirical studies testing the effect 
of FDI on the economic growth of the host country. The studies of Borensztein et al 
(1998), Alfaro and Charlton (2007) and De Mello (1999) found that there is a 
positive impact for FDI on economic growth. Rothgeb (1984) investigated the effect 
of FDI on growth in the third world and found that the impacts of FDI are different 
for different types of third world state. The study of de Soysa and Oneal (1999) 
provided strong evidence that FDI grants significant direct and indirect benefits for 
the recipient economy. Loungani and Razin (2001) indicated possible risks of FDI 
on the developing host economy.  
 
Barry and Collins (1999) found that the impact of FDI on domestic investment 
appears to be one for one, with virtually no visible association between portfolio 
inflows and investment. Agosin and Mayer (2000) illustrated that the positive effects 
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of FDI on domestic investment are not assured. Blonigen and Wang (2004) found 
that the nature, volume and impact of FDI in DCs and LDCs are very different. 
Chakrabarti (2001) found that the relation between FDI and variables such as tax, 
wages, openness, exchange rate, tariffs, growth and trade balance are highly 
sensitive to small modifications in the conditioning information set and there is no 
specific prediction for the impact of a particular variable on FDI. 
 
Empirical studies conducted to investigate the economic impact of FDI on Arab 
countries revealed that growing economies are more successful in attracting FDI 
(Moosa and Cardak, 2005). But Sadik and Bolbol (2001) did not find a significant 
relationship between FDI and productivity in Arab countries. However, Haddad and 
Harrison (1993) found in their study of Morocco that an increase in overall level of 
productivity of enterprises is linked with greater degree of foreign ownership. 
 
4.2.2. Critical review of empirical studies on the economic impact of the 
business environment on attracting FDI 
 
There are a great many empirical studies testing the effect of the business 
environment and investment climate on attracting FDI. These studies reveal that 
there are some factors (such as market size and trade policy) which affect inward 
FDI to the host economy, as well as the affecting the impact of FDI on economic 
growth. Studies such as that of Urata and Kawai (2000), find links with domestic 
market size. Daniels and Quigley (1980) showed that GDP, a proxy for market size, 
is one of the key significant factors that can influence the inflows of FDI. In spite of 
the bulk of empirical studies suggesting that FDI is related to the economic 
129 
 
environment of the host economy, there is no generally accepted set of explanatory 
variables that could be considered as definitive determinants of FDI. 
 
The IMF (2001) identified a list of determinants for FDI: distance and transport cost, 
market size, agglomeration effects, factor costs, fiscal incentives, business climate, 
economic stability, and trade openness. Also, according to Benassy-Quere et al. 
(2005), public efficiency factors (including tax systems, easiness to create a new 
business, lack of corruption, transparency, contract law, security of property rights, 
efficiency of justice and prudential standards) are important determinants of FDI 
inflows. Sekkat and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2007) classified the factors affecting 
FDI inflows into three groups. The first group is basic economic factors, which 
include the rate of return difference on capital across countries, portfolio 
diversification strategy of investors and market size. The second group is trade 
liberalization and exchange rate movements. The third group includes other aspects 
of the investment climate, such as, labour cost, skilled labour, political risk, transport 
and communication.   
 
When investigating the effect of political stability on FDI inflows in the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries, Jafari et al. (2011) found that 
there is a positive effect of GDP, trade openness and population on FDI inflows. 
However, political unrest has a negative impact on FDI inflows in this group of 
countries. Similarly, Schneider and Frey (1985) examined the effect of social and 
political determinants on the FDI inflows in 80 less developed countries. The results 
again revealed that political instability is significant and negative on FDI inflows. 
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Dhakal et al. (2007) investigated the factors that determine the inflows of FDI in 
Central and Eastern European countries. The authors used FDI inflows as a function 
of real GDP, the inflation rate, the current account balance, the real exchange rate, 
openness, and government regulation. The results revealed that the variables of 
openness and government regulation positively affect the inflows of FDI in the host 
economies. On the other hand, the real exchange rate is found negatively to affect 
the inflows of FDI in this group of countries. However the effect of market size, 
proxied by real GDP, was found to be insignificant on FDI inflows.  
 
The study of Asiedu (2002), investigated the determinants of FDI inflows to 
developing countries, and inspected the reason behind the low performance of sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) in attracting FDI, in spite of policy reforms in this group of 
countries. The results revealed that the factors that attract FDI inflows to developing 
countries in general do not have the same effect on SSA countries, in particular 
infrastructure developments, higher return on capital, and trade openness. Therefore, 
the outcomes showed that Africa is different and perceived as a very risky region.   
 
There are great number of empirical studies conducted to measure the effect of 
business environment on economic developments, especially for property rights, 
infrastructure, entry regulations, tax burden, and labour (World Bank, 2010). 
Concerning property rights, Acemoglu et al. (2004) state that reliable institutions 
are considered as the main element required to protect and secure property rights. 
Kanak and Keefer (1995) argue that economies characterized by a low level of 
property rights will receive less foreign investment and consequently experience 
weaker economic growth. Cull and Xu (2005) investigate from a large company-
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level data set in China that property rights are statistically and economically 
significant in predicting company reinvestment. In order to measure the relative 
importance of property rights and finance in the economies in transition, Johnson et 
al. (2002) used a sample of companies from eastern European countries. The results 
revealed that the degree of property rights relies on the phase of transition. Moreover 
they found that in the initial stages of transition, the property rights effect is 
significant. 
 
Infrastructure, such as roads, power supply, communications, and customs, is 
considered from the stand point of policy makers as a very important element for 
economic development (World Bank, 2010). In addition, Dollar et al. (2005) found 
that company performance could be explained mainly by the existence of good 
infrastructure. The authors investigated in their study the effect of infrastructure on 
factors which reflect the performance of the company, such as TFP, growth rates of 
output, wages, employment, and profits on fixed assets. Also, Fernandes (2008) 
found that infrastructure in Bangladesh improve the performance of companies in 
that country. 
  
Concerning the effects of entry regulation, Barseghyan (2008) confirmed that entry 
deregulation enhances macroeconomic performance and productivity. In addition, 
this positive impact varies according to the primary level of regulation (World Bank, 
2010). The empirical study of Gorgens et al. (2003) showed that deregulation from 
high to medium levels of regulation increased the growth rate by 2.5%. Deregulation 
has a remarkable impact on the economies of India and China, but the effect is not 
the same on the OECD economies (World Bank, 2010). 
132 
 
The studies conducted to examine the effect of labour regulation on developing 
countries suggest that labour flexibility improves company performance (World 
Bank, 2010; Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2006). Dong and Xu (2009) found that 
increased labour flexibility in China led to remarkable economic growth. In addition, 
Besely and Burgess (2004) found that cities with more flexible labour regulations 
are able to adapt their labour requirements according to circumstance. Almeida 
(2005) investigated the effect of labour regulations on informality, and labour 
productivity. The results indicated that stricter labour regulations have a positive 
effect on informality, but lead to lower levels of productivity and investment. 
 
For tax burden, Woodward and Rolf (1993) showed the positive impact of tax 
incentives on attracting FDI. But, Shah (1995) argued that foreign investors are not 
benefiting from tax incentives, as it shifts tax revenues from the host country to a 
foreign country treasury. Moreover, Shah added that incentives granted to a specific 
industry may generate pressure from other sectors looking for similar treatment. 
Reuber et al. (1973), stated that tax incentives may create prospects for increasing 
tax rates in the future. 
 
Concerning the empirical studies looking at the effect of FDI on Arab countries, 
Moosa and Cardak (2005) examined the determinants of FDI inflows in MENA 
countries (mainly Arab). The authors applied extreme bounds analysis to a sample 
of cross-sectional data covering 18 countries. The results suggested that countries 
that are more successful in attracting FDI are those countries that have growing 
economies. In addition, those countries give more attention to education, research 
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and have low country risk, as well as high return on capital due to the lack of 
domestic investment in fixed capital. 
 
Sadik and Bolbol (2001) tested the impact of FDI through technology spillovers on 
overall TFP in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, for a 
period of 20 years. The authors found that there are no clear positive spillovers for 
FDI on technology and productivity, beyond those of other types of capital 
formation. On the other hand, during the period of study the results revealed that 
there are some signs that the impact of FDI on TFP is lower than domestic 
investment in some countries, illustrating a possibly dominating negative crowding 
out impact. Moreover, Chan and Gemayel (2004) found that the low levels of 
political unrest and economic performance in MENA region may clarify the decline 
of FDI inflows in this group of countries. 
 
Onyeiwu (2003), indicated that FDI inflows in MENA countries are different 
compared with other developing countries. The results revealed that the significant 
factors of corruption and limited trade openness, can explain the low levels of FDI 
inflows to this region. Also, Habash (2006) stated that improved political rights and 
human capital impact significantly the inflows of FDI in the MENA countries. The 
positive effect of nominal exchange rate depreciation on FDI inflows is small in this 
group of countries.  
 
Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) examined the main determinants of FDI in 
MENA countries over the period 1975-2006. The results indicated that the main FDI 
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determinants in MENA countries include economy size, government size, natural 
resources and institutional variables. The authors concluded that the countries 
receiving low levels of FDI inflows can improve their performance by enhancing the 
investment climate to make it more attractive. Therefore, MENA countries’ 
authorities are required to remove all barriers to trade, develop their financial system 
and build appropriate institutions. 
 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) investigated the impact of FDI on the economic growth 
of Morocco. The authors linked the productivity of Moroccan enterprises with 
enterprises’ degree of foreign ownership, in addition to the degree of foreign 
ownership in the sector to which the enterprise belongs, using data from an industry 
level survey of Moroccan enterprises. The results revealed that an increase in the 
overall level of productivity of enterprises is linked with a greater degree of foreign 
ownership. The results also suggested that enterprises in sectors with a bigger ratio 
of foreign ownership have higher levels of productivity, separately from the 
enterprises’ particular degree of foreign ownership. In spite of these results 
indicating that FDI flows to sectors and enterprises are linked with higher overall 
productivity, the authors observed that it is not possible to claim that the existence 
of FDI should have improved the growth rate, as well as the level, of productivity in 
enterprises owned domestically in sectors with higher levels of foreign ownership.  
 
Hasen and Gianluigi (2009) investigated the determinants of FDI inflows to Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) countries. The results revealed that the determinants of FDI 
inflows in this group of countries are different from other developing countries. For 
example the variables of trade openness and foreign market are insignificant for FDI 
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inflows to AMU countries, whereas other variables, like growth in market size and 
existing stock of FDI, are significant. In addition, the sign on the exchange rate is 
against the expected sign according to similar previous empirical studies. Also the 
results indicated that there are two elements which explain why this group of 
countries achieved lower FDI inflows compared with other countries at the same 
phase of development, as the large government sector may create corruption, 
bureaucratic red tape and inflation. 
 
The study of Soumia and Abderrezzak (2013) highlighted the positive effect of FDI 
inflows on the economic growth of AMU countries. They stated that inflows of FDI 
could bring essential benefits to Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), 
such as capital inflows, technology, human capital formation, international trade 
integration, job creation and the enhancement of enterprise development. The study 
emphasized the importance of political stability in attracting FDI inflows and the 
need to include policies aimed at improving the legal environment, infrastructure 
and governance. 
 
After discussing the importance of a suitable business environment in attracting FDI 
inflows, from the standpoint of the theoretical and empirical literature, we now move 
to consider the policy reforms adopted by Arab countries, in order to create a more 
attractive business environment in the region. 
 
During the period 2008-2016, Arab countries exerted a lot of effort to improve the 
business and investment climate, as detailed in earlier chapters. These efforts have 
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been aimed at improving the investment climate for the private sector, in order to 
create more jobs to absorb the increasing number of unemployed in the Arab region 
during recent years. According to World Bank (2013), the private sector creates 
about 90% of jobs in developing countries. People will find more opportunities when 
the adopted policies by the governments create a dynamic investment climate for the 
private sector to increase investments, create jobs and boost productivity. The study 
added also that policy makers should pay attention to the private sector, beside 
macroeconomic factors, therefore they should strengthen the quality of laws, 
regulations and institutional arrangements which create the conditions for 
strengthened daily economic life. 
 
4.3. Foreign Trade, FDI and Competitiveness: 
 
In this part we aim to shed light on the relationship between foreign trade, FDI and 
competitiveness, in order to answer the research question “can Arab economies 
competitiveness be boosted by improving foreign trade and foreign direct 
investments (FDI)?” 
 
Above, we have discussed the economic impact of foreign trade and FDI 
independently. Therefore we will start this part by demonstrating the linkage 
between foreign trade and FDI. We will then elaborate the relationship between 
foreign trade, FDI and competitiveness.  
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4.3.1. Links between foreign trade and FDI: evidence from the literature 
 
In the economic literature, the issue of complementarity or substitutability between 
FDI and foreign trade has had attention in several empirical studies. Hailu (2010) 
found that when trade between two nations is built on their comparative advantages, 
the relationship between foreign trade and FDI is complementary. On the other hand, 
when trade between two countries is built on their absolute advantages, the 
relationship between trade and FDI is one of substitution. The degree of 
complementarity between foreign trade and FDI is, however, an empirical rather 
than a theoretical question. Wei, et al. (1999) argued that foreign trade and FDI are 
complements, as companies get benefits from the differences in factor price through 
cross-border vertical production integration. In addition, Andersen and Hainaut 
(1998) concluded that there is evidence for the complementarity relationship 
between exports and outward FDI. Their results confirmed the complementarity 
relationship for the USA, Japan, and Germany, but not for the UK. Blomstrom, et 
al. (1988) used trade equations for company level data in the US and Sweden. The 
authors concluded that there is a complementary relationship between FDI and 
exports. 
 
Brainard (1997) found that the increase in transactions cost, as a result of higher 
trade barriers and transportation costs, encourages horizontal cross border 
production expansion and accordingly international investment. Therefore, 
according to Brainard, the relationship between foreign trade and FDI is one of 
substitution. Mundell (1957) argued that high trade barriers encouraged factor 
movements, whilst restrictions to factor movements, when increased, will encourage 
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trade. Mundell concluded that the movement of goods is considered to some extent 
as a substitute for factor movements. 
 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) argued that, when economies are asymmetric, the 
movements of FDI to labour intensive countries will generate a good variety of 
finished products. Therefore the authors concluded that FDI creates complementary 
trade flows in the form of labour intensive products. In addition, the authors 
mentioned that the relationship between trade and FDI will be one of substitution, 
when economies are symmetric, and consequently capital intensive goods will 
replace labour intensive goods. 
 
Kojima (1975) discussed the impact of FDI source on exports. The work of Kojima 
indicated that the American type of FDI is a substitute for trade; however the 
Japanese type of FDI boosts trade in the host country. Kojima thus described the 
Japanese type as “pro-trade FDI” (complements) and the American type as “anti-
trade FDI” (substitutes). The author introduced this notion within the framework of 
what he termed “a macroeconomic approach to FDI”. Within this approach Kojima 
tried to present the essential difference in trade orientation between the overseas 
investments of Japan and the USA. Kojima described the main objective of the 
Japanese investments abroad as exploiting natural resources in countries which are 
rich in natural resources, or produce labour intensive products in countries which are 
rich in labour. These products were exported back to Japan or on to another country. 
On the other hand the main purpose of American investments abroad is to 
manufacture sophisticated, technology based, and capital intensive goods for local 
markets.  
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4.3.2. The relationship between FDI, foreign trade and competitiveness: a 
literature review  
 
Cantwell (1991) stated that in spite of the increasing importance of FDI, empirical 
studies did not give attention to its relationship with trade and competitiveness. 
Therefore we will try to find linkage between these variables through the available 
literature, before undertaking our own analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
In general, we can say that inflows of FDI will produce a number of positive 
economic effects on the recipient economy. These effects consequently will 
stimulate economic growth. Specifically, FDI inflows are positively linked with 
employment, technology, skills of the local labour force and the environment, which 
in turn will improve exports and enhance the competitiveness of the host economy. 
Ozawa (1992) described the links between economic development and 
competitiveness that generate foreign trade and FDI. The author argued that an 
increase in trade flows takes place as a result of enhanced comparative advantage, 
which, in turn, is influenced by FDI. In addition, Hernádi (2005) stated that using 
the advantages of exports and FDI inflows are the most two efficient ways to 
improve the international competitiveness for nations. 
 
Moreover, Chaisrisawatsuk and Chaisrisawatsuk (2007) stated that the benefits from 
trade will be increased by improving the country's competitiveness if trade and FDI 
are complementary. The authors mentioned that the country's competitiveness will 
be enhanced by FDI inflows which, in turn, are expected to increase the efficiency 
and productivity of production factors. 
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In addition to the above empirical studies, our earlier empirical analysis persented 
in Document 4 showed that there is a positive relationship between FDI, foreign 
trade and competitiveness in Arab countries. To estimate the effect of FDI and 
foreign trade on the competitiveness of Arab countries, we obtained annual data, for 
17 Arab countries, spanning the period 1998-2009 on the relevant variables. We 
adopted in our econometric model panel data methodology by applying a 
Generalized Least Square Estimator allowing for both fixed effects and random 
effects. The results of the empirical model reveal that FDI inflows and foreign trade 
have a positive impact on the competitiveness of Arab economies. In addition, 
control variables reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries such as 
domestic credit to the private sector, corruption and inflation are found to be 
significantly and positively related to competitiveness. 
 
The results obtained from our empirical work in Document 4 will be tested further 
in Chapter 5, below, by applying another econometric technique within a panel data 
analysis. We adopt Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a dynamic panel 
data model with fixed effects. The results of the empirical model will confirm the 
earlier findings, that FDI inflows and foreign trade have a positive impact on the 
competitiveness of Arab economies. 
 
To sum up, the majority of empirical studies conducted to investigate the 
relationship between FDI and foreign trade focussed on whether this relationship is 
complementary or substituting. These studies concluded that, when trade between 
two nations is built on their comparative advantages, the relationship between 
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foreign trade and FDI is complementary. In contrast, when trade between two 
countries built on their absolute advantages, the relationship between trade and FDI 
is considered as substitution (Hailu, 2010). Regarding the relationship between FDI, 
foreign trade and competitiveness, we can conclude that an increase in trade flows 
takes place as a result of enhanced comparative advantage, which, in turn, is 
influenced by FDI (Ozawa, 1992). In addition, exports and FDI inflows are 
considered the most two efficient ways to improve the international competitiveness 
for nations (Hernádi, 2005). Finally, the benefits from trade will be increased by 
improving the country's competitiveness if trade and FDI are complementary 
(Chaisrisawatsuk and Chaisrisawatsuk, 2007). 
 
 In Chapter 5 we investigate further the relationship between competitiveness, 
foreign trade and FDI in Arab countries. 
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Chapter (5) 
Quantitative Analysis: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Model 
 
 
In the context of trying to answer the broad research question “can Arab economies 
competitiveness be boosted by improving foreign trade and foreign direct 
investments (FDI)?” we provided, in Document 4, an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI for Arab economies. 
We adopted in our econometric model panel data methodology, by applying a 
Generalized Least Square Estimator allowing for both fixed effects and random 
effects. This came after providing in Document 3 a descriptive analysis of recent 
economic developments of Arab countries, in order to relate the results of the 
empirical analysis and the economic performance of these countries in 2009. In 
addition, we have tried in the previous chapters of this Document, 5, to shed light on 
the macroeconomic policies adopted in order to enhance the investment climate, to 
attract more FDI and thus to increase exports of Arab countries, within the strategic 
objective of improving the competitiveness of these economies. The empirical 
analysis in this chapter will try to answer the following questions: 
• What is the relationship between competitiveness, FDI and foreign trade in 
Arab countries? 
• Can FDI flows affect the competitiveness of Arab countries? 
• Does foreign trade affect the competitiveness of Arab countries?  
• Are there any other factors that could affect the competitiveness of Arab 
countries? 
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The answer to these questions will assist in answering the broad question of our 
research, mentioned above, in order to investigate to what extent competitiveness of 
Arab economies could be boosted by improving foreign trade and FDI inflows, 
through adopting appropriate macroeconomic policies. Also, the answer to these 
questions means that foreign trade and FDI have a positive spillover on the 
competitiveness of Arab countries. 
 
We provide in this chapter an econometric model to explore the relationship between 
competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI for Arab economies applying panel data 
techniques, for 1998-2009. We confirmed in Document 2 that nobody has done this 
kind of empirical work for Arab countries, to the best of our knowledge.  
 
In this Document, we adopt panel data methodology, by applying Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) in a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects. Panel 
data models are considered as the most appropriate technique for regional modelling, 
(Melecký and Nevima, 2011). To estimate the effect of FDI and foreign trade on the 
competitiveness of Arab countries, we obtained annual data, for 17 Arab countries28, 
spanning the period 1998-2009.  
 
The results of the empirical model reveal that FDI inflows and foreign trade have a 
positive impact on the competitiveness of Arab economies. In addition, control 
variables reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries, such as 
                                                     
28 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
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domestic credit to the private sector, corruption, inflation, labour productivity and 
nominal exchange rate are found to be significantly and positively related to 
competitiveness. The findings of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
model, applied in this chapter, confirm the results of the EGLS model with fixed 
effects, presented in Document 4.  
 
In the following sections of this chapter, we will start by presenting the theoretical 
framework for our empirical analysis and methodology. Then we will present the 
model specification and descriptive analysis for the model variables and data. After 
that we will display the previous empirical work conducted in this respect. Next we 
will demonstrate our panel estimation, which will be followed by the discussion and 
conclusion. 
 
5.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
We made the case above that there is no generally accepted definition for 
competitiveness in the economics literature. From reviewing these definitions, we 
conclude that the majority agree that productivity is considered to be one of the 
central determinants of competitiveness. Productivity, in turn, will determine the 
growth rate of standard of living. In other words, an increase in productivity will 
lead to a higher growth rate in the standard of living and employment. In this context, 
the report of WEF (2010, p.4) defined competitiveness as the set of institutions, 
policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity which, in turn, will set 
the level of income for the people of a country. On the other hand, some definitions 
of competitiveness focused on achieving high standards of living, in addition to high 
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employment rates on a sustainable basis, through producing and selling products and 
services in international markets. 
  
The definitions of WEF (2000, 2010) and OECD (1995a) gave more attention to the 
supportive policies taken by governments in order to create an attractive competitive 
environment, for firms to improve the competitiveness of nations. This improved 
competitiveness will be reflected in the economic growth rate and people’s standard 
of living. The other definitions emphasised more the impacts of competitiveness, 
which will be reflected in the economic growth rate and a higher level of income for 
individuals, (Aiginger, 1998; European Commission, 1995, 1998, 2001; Fagerberg, 
1988; Hatsopoulos et al., 1988; Scott and Lodge, 1985). 
 
Moreover, Stanculescu (2013) stated that GDP is the most widely accepted indicator 
for competitiveness. Also, Melecký and Nevima (2011a) considered GDP as the 
most suitable indicator for a competitiveness assessment for countries.  
 
From the above analysis of competitiveness, we take GDP as an indicator for 
competitiveness. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we proxy the competitiveness 
of Arab countries by the GDP of these countries, in order to assess the relationship 
between competitiveness, FDI and foreign trade.  
 
Melecký and Nevima (2011a), citing Garelli (2003), consider competitiveness as the 
ability of a country to produce goods and services in an open and fair trading 
environment in order to increase the income of people. Garelli (2003) borrowed this 
idea from the competitiveness definition of the OECD, therefore trade openness is 
considered to be one of the main determinants of competitiveness. In addition, this 
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idea is supported by the definition of the European Commission (1999) for 
competitiveness, which stresses the importance of trade openness for the increased 
competitiveness of countries. Rowthorn (2000) also emphasises that openness to 
trade leads to increased competitiveness and prosperity. Therefore, we can also 
conclude that a deterioration in the country’s foreign trade is considered as an 
indicator of competitiveness decline.  
 
Lengyel (2003) constructed a pyramid in which he determined the factors that affect 
a country’s competitiveness. Lengyel classified these factors into three groups. The 
first group included basic factors such as labour productivity, employment, and 
economic openness. The second group comprised growth factors such as research 
and development (R&D), small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), FDI, 
infrastructure and human capital, institutions and social capital. He stressed that the 
growth factors are very important for improving a country’s competitiveness. The 
third group consists of success factors, which include economic structure, 
innovation, regional accessibility, qualified labour, social structure and regional 
identity. Stanculescu (2013) considered FDI as one of the main indicators which 
affect the country’s competitiveness performance. In the same context, Lengyel 
(2003) stated that FDI is very important to improve the level of competitiveness. He 
specified that FDI generates new sectors, markets, technologies and new jobs. 
 
Despite the importance of productivity, which is considered as one of the main 
indicators of competitiveness, we do not include this variable in our empirical model 
for two reasons. First, the purpose of our empirical work is to investigate the 
relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI. Second, and crucially, 
there are limitations in the data availability for productivity in the majority of Arab 
countries during the period of analysis. Data availability is also an obstacle to 
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collecting data on the real effective exchange rate (REER) for the majority of Arab 
countries. REER is considered by some to be a key indicator for measuring a 
country’s competitiveness. 
 
In spite of these concerns, we have included in our quantitative analysis adding 
proxies the variables we are unable to include directly in our model. We added labour 
productivity as a proxy for productivity. Ths has been calculated variable according 
to International Labour Organization (ILO) methodology29.  The following equation 
is used to calculate the labour productivity: 
 
Also, we used the nominal exchange rate (each Arab currency vis a vis the US $ 
dollar) as a proxy for the REER variable. 
 
5.2. Empirical Methodology 
 
Our empirical analysis involves adopting panel data methodology, applying GMM 
in a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects in our specification. The term panel 
data refers to “the pooling of observations on a cross-section of households, 
countries, firms, etc. over several time periods”, (Baltagi, 2005: p.1). Moreover 
Hsiao (2005: p.1) states that “panel data or longitudinal data typically refer to data 
containing time series observations of a number of individuals. Therefore, 
observations in panel data involve at least two dimensions; a cross-sectional 
dimension, and a time series dimension”. 
                                                     
29  Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilostat-files/Documents/description_PRODY_EN.pdf 
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Concerning the benefits of panel data, such models are seen as one of the most 
innovative in econometrics because they provide a rich environment for the 
development of estimation techniques and theoretical results. Panel data techniques 
allow researchers to study issues they could not investigate before, such as labour 
supply, (Ben-Porath, 1973) and the analysis of production functions, (Greene, 2003). 
 
Moreover, Baltagi (2005) stated that the benefits of panel data have been listed by 
Hsiao (2003) and Klevmarken (1989). In addition, Melecký and Nevima (2011a) 
listed the benefits of panel data compared to other conventional linear regression 
models. We summarize these benefits as follows:  
 
• Panel data are used for controlling for individual heterogeneity, because 
individuals, firms and countries are heterogeneous. In addition Moulton 
(1986) states that the techniques of time series and cross section studies cannot 
control for heterogeneity, and can lead to biased results.   
• Baltagi (2005) also mentions that panel data provide more informative data, 
more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency. 
• It is better to use panel data to study the dynamics of adjustment. Panel data 
are recommended to be used to investigate spells of unemployment, job 
turnover, residential and income mobility. 
• It is recommended to use panel data to recognize and measure effects which 
are not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data.  
• Models of panel data are better than pure cross-section or time-series data in 
enabling economic researchers to construct and test more complicated 
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behavioural models. In addition, fewer restrictions can be imposed in panels 
on a distributed lag model (Baltagi, 2005; Hsiao, 2003). For instance, it is 
recommended to use panel data models to study technical efficiency (Baltagi 
and Griffin, 1988b; Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000; Baltagi, Griffin and Rich, 1995; Koop and Steel, 2001). 
• Using panel data models enables researchers to affect the dynamics of change 
for each individual variable.Using panel data models enables researchers to 
detect fixed and random effects. 
• Capability to design and test complex models using an appropriate number of 
degrees of freedom. 
• Panel data models eliminate variations caused by using aggregated data sets. 
Moreover, panel data models are suitable to be used in the areas of both 
microeconomics and macroeconomics.  
• Finally and relevant for this study, panel data models are well-suited to the 
study of competitiveness. 
 
5.3. Model Specification 
 
Given the central objective of our empirical investigation to estimate the relationship 
between competitiveness, FDI and foreign trade in Arab countries, panel data 
regression provides a natural approach for our analysis as explained above. Our 
model specification for the dynamic panel data regression will be based on the 
following equation (1):  
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Where: 
 
itGDP                      Gross Domestic Product 
itFDI                       Foreign Direct Investment 
itOPENESS              Trade Openness 
itCORR                   Corruption 
itINF                      Inflation 
itDCPS                  Domestic Credit to private Sector 
itPROD ………….Labour Productivity 
itNEXCH ………..Nominal Exchange Rate 
0                         Constant 
12.,,.........1                  Slope parameter of regression model 
it                         Random error 
i                          Indexes for cross- sectional characteristics, 
    where,  i =1,2,……..,17 of Arab countries. 
t                         Indexes time; t =1998, 1999,………2009. 
 
 
5.4. Description of the Model Variables and Data 
 
As mentioned above, GDP is the most widely accepted indicator for competitiveness 
in the economics literature. Therefore, according to our model specification for the 
panel data regression, we select GDP as the dependent variable and proxy for 
competitiveness. Concerning the independent variables (foreign trade and FDI), the 
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purpose of our empirical analysis is to investigate the impact of foreign trade and 
FDI on the competitiveness of Arab countries. Document 3 confirmed that the 
economic performance of Arab economies was severely affected by the deterioration 
of foreign trade and FDI inflows during the financial crisis. In other words, this 
initial economic analysis suggested a positive relationship between competitiveness, 
foreign trade and FDI, which we shall now test formally.  
 
 
As for the other independent variables, we select domestic credit to the private 
sector, corruption, inflation, labour productivity and nominal exchange rate to be 
control variables, reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries. We find 
these variables to be significantly and positively related to competitiveness as 
mentioned in Document 2 and earlier in this document, when we analysed the 
competitiveness indicators measured by international organizations like the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) and Institute for Management Development (IMD). It is 
also worth mentioning that we would have liked to include productivity and REER 
as independent variables, but we could not, given a lack of data availability. We have 
thus done the next best thing in the circumstance, by including proxy variables: 
labour productivity and the nominal exchange rate.  
 
To estimate the effects of FDI and foreign trade on the competitiveness of Arab 
countries, we obtain annual data spanning the period 1998-2009 on the relevant 
variables. These data are collected from domestic and international sources, as set 
out in Table 1, along with the expected signs on the variables as derived from 
economic theory. 
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Table (1): details of Data 
Variables Data Sources 
Data 
Description 
Period 
Covered 
Expected 
Sign 
GDP AMF US$ 1998-2009 Dependent 
variable 
GDP (lagged one 
year) 
AMF US$ 1998-2008 Positive 
FDI inflows 
(net) 
UNCTAD US$ 1998-2009 Positive  
Trade Openness WB Percentage 1998-2009 Positive  
Domestic Credit 
to private Sector 
WB Percentage of 
GDP 
1998-2009 Positive  
Inflation IMF Ratio change 1998-2009 Negative  
Corruption Economic 
Freedom 
Indicator 1998-2009 Negative  
Labour 
Productivity 
Calculated by 
Author 
US$ 1998-2009 Positive 
Nominal 
Exchange Rate 
IMF Local 
Currencies 
1998-2009 Positive 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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5.5. Statistical Description of the Model Variables 
 
In this part, we provide a descriptive analysis of the variables used in the model. Our 
discussion includes trend analyses for each variable over the period 1998-2009. In 
particular, we provide statistical analyses including median, minimum value, 
maximum value and standard deviations of the variables, (Appendices A&B). We 
perform the econometric and statistical analyses using EViews 7 software.  
 
Gross Domestic Product  
Median GDP for Arab countries over 1998-2009 was US$ 29,133 million. The 
maximum value is US$ 476,305 million (Saudi Arabia in 2008); the minimum value 
is US$ 1,081 million (Mauritania in 2000). 
 
The standard deviation for GDP in Arab countries over 1998-2009 was 72,859 
indicating a very high level of variability between Arab countries. This reflects the 
different economic structures in these countries, as some of them have large and 
diversified economies such as KSA, UAE, Kuwait and Egypt, compared to others 
that have small economies, such as Mauritania and Jordan. 
 
Net Foreign Direct Investment  
The median value of FDI in Arab countries is US$ 531 million and the maximum 
value is US$ 38,515 million achieved by Saudi Arabia in 2008. The minimum value 
for the variable is a net outflow of US$ 985 million registered by the United Arab 
Emirates in 1999. 
154 
 
The standard deviation of FDI is US$ 4,359 million reflecting a very high level of 
variability between different Arab countries in attracting FDI inflows. Large 
countries like KSA, UAE, Kuwait and Egypt are likely to attract a large amount of 
FDI inflows compared to small countries, such as Mauritania and Jordan. 
 
Corruption30 
The median value for the corruption indicator is 56.5 for Arab countries and the 
maximum value is 90, recorded by Qatar in 1998. The minimum value for the 
indicator is 10 registered by Yemen, Syria and Libya during the period 1998-2004 
and Lebanon during the periods 1998-2000 and 2002-2004. 
 
The standard deviation for the corruption indicator is 22.25 reflecting a high level of 
variability between different Arab countries. This is attributable to diversity in 
characteristics of each country and in procedures taken against corruption in these 
countries. 
 
Inflation 
The median value during the period 1998-2009, is 3.35 per cent. The maximum 
value is 132.82 per cent registered by Sudan in 1998 whereas the minimum value is 
-9.8 recorded by Libya in 2002. 
                                                     
30 Corruption indicator ranges between the values 0 and 100, where the number 100 refers to the presence of very low 
degree of government corruption. While the number 0 indicates the high level of government corruption. 
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The standard deviation for the inflation rate in Arab countries during the period 
1998-2009 is 10.72, indicating a high level of variability between in these countries 
due to variations in macroeconomic management. 
 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
The median value of domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP in Arab 
countries is 63.9 per cent and the maximum value is 93 per cent, achieved by the 
United Arab Emirates in 2009. The minimum value for this variable is 0.0 per cent 
recorded by Mauritania during the period 1998-2004.  
 
The standard deviation for domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP in 
Arab countries is 25.2 per cent, indicating a very high level of variability between 
Arab countries. This variation is due to variations in liquidity levels as some 
countries have enough liquidity to lend their private sectors, whereas other countries 
may suffer from the lack of liquidity. 
 
Trade Openness 
The median value in Arab countries is 69 percent and the maximum value is 159.2 
percent achieved by the United Arab Emirates in 2008. The minimum value is 12.8 
percent, recorded by Sudan in 1998.  
 
The standard deviation of trade openness indicator in Arab countries is 30.1 percent, 
indicating a very high level of variability across Arab countries. This is related to 
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the significance of the trade sector in GDP composition for each country, as some 
Arab countries, notably oil exporters, have a large volume of trade such as KSA, 
UAE, Kuwait and Egypt, compared to other small countries such as Mauritania and 
Jordan. 
 
Labour Productivity 
The median value of Labour Productivity in Arab countries is US$ 11485.8. The 
maximum value is US$ 99529, achieved by Qatar in 2008. The minimum value for 
the variable is US$ 2303.8, registered by Syria in 1995. 
 
The standard deviation of Labour Productivity is US$ 23486 reflecting a very high 
level of variability between different Arab countries in labour productivity. This 
reflects the high values of labour productivity, as a result of high values for GDP (in 
constant prices) and a small number of workers in some countries such as KSA, 
UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, compared to other Arab countries.  
 
Nominal Exchange Rate (each Arab currency vis a vis the US $ dollar) 
The median value in Arab countries is 3.7 and the maximum value is 1621.4 
achieved by Lebanon in 1995. The minimum value is 0.3, recorded by Kuwait (under 
a fixed exchange rate regime).  
 
The standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate in Arab countries is 357.3, 
indicating a very high level of variability across Arab countries. 
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5.6. Previous Empirical Studies 
 
As mentioned earlier, and previously in Documents 2 and 3, hardly anybody has 
done this kind of empirical work, to the best of our knowledge – in general, but for 
Arab countries in particular. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship 
between competitiveness, foreign trade and foreign direct investment, using a panel 
data model. We have found some working papers conducting panel data analysis to 
measure the competitiveness of the Visegrad Four (V4) countries31. These are 
discussed below. The similarity between our work and their work is in using a panel 
data model to interpret the effect of independent variables on competitiveness. They 
therefore confirm our choice of independent variables, as set out above. In addition, 
they used GDP per capita as a proxy for competitiveness (dependent variable) and 
also computed independent variables on a per capita basis. The wider literature also 
suggests other relevant variables, such as R&D, innovation and infrastructure. The 
present analysis is unable to include such variables, because of lack of data 
availability for the majority of Arab countries. 
 
Melecký and Nevima (2011a) conducted panel data analysis to assess regional 
competitiveness in 15 European countries over the period 2000-2008. They applied 
a non-linear regression model of panel data using the technique of dummy variables. 
Average GDP is the dependent variable and they selected three arbitrary independent 
variables: gross fixed capital formation, gross domestic expenditures on research and 
development, and net disposable income. They considered the average value of 
EU27 GDP as an ideal region (the most competitive region). They found that the 
                                                     
31 Is an alliance of four Central European states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
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contributions of each statistically significant 22 NUTS 232 regions to the average 
level of whole EU27 performance, approximated by GDP per inhabitant in 
purchasing power standards (PPS). They ranked regions according to the positive 
score of parameter γr in their model, which means that region has a positive impact 
on the overall competitiveness of the EU27. 
 
Also, Melecký and Nevima (2011b) applied that same model to evaluate regional 
competitiveness of the V4 countries. The empirical part of the paper utilised a panel 
nonlinear regression model for 35 V4 regions at NUTS level 2. Average GDP is the 
dependent variable and they selected five arbitrary independent variables: gross 
fixed capital formation, gross domestic expenditures on research and development, 
net disposable income, employment rate by age and number of students in tertiary 
education. They ranked the most competitive regions according to the highest 
contribution to average growth of the EU27. In addition, regions with the lowest 
contribution are considered the least competitive. 
 
Nevima (2012) used a linear panel data regression model for 35 regions at NUTS 
level 2 of selected V4 countries. The competitiveness level is analysed by selected 
indicators evaluating the performance of the EU growth strategy objectives. Average 
GDP is the dependent variable and he selected three arbitrary independent variables: 
gross fixed capital formation, gross domestic expenditures on research and 
development, and net disposable income. He considered the average value of EU 
27GDP as an ideal region (the most competitive region). He found that the 
                                                     
32 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of 
countries for statistical purposes. 
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contributions of each statistically significant 22 NUTS 2 regions to the average level 
of the whole EU27 performance approximated by GDP per inhabitant in PPS. 
Regions are ranked according to the positive score of parameter γr in their model, 
which means that the region has a positive impact on the overall competitiveness of 
the EU27. 
 
Melecký (2011) applied two methodological approaches in order to evaluate 
competitiveness: macro econometric modelling and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) in V4 NUTS 2 regions. Average GDP is the dependent variable and he 
selected five arbitrary independent variables: gross fixed capital formation, gross 
domestic expenditures on research and development, net disposable income, 
employment rate by age and number of students in tertiary education. He ranked the 
most competitive regions according to the highest contribution to average growth of 
the EU27. In addition, regions with lowest contribution are considered to be the least 
competitive. In addition, he found by applying the DEA method, the rate of 
efficiency in V4 NUTS 2 regions within the whole referred time period. 
 
5.7. Panel Estimation 
 
We performed this econometric analysis by using EViews 7. The results of the 
estimation will be presented as follows: 
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  
 
We adopt the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for a dynamic 
panel data model with fixed effects to estimate equation (1) for the period 
1998-2009. In this specification, the dependent variable is regressed on its 
lagged valued and five other explanatory variables. We select a first 
difference transformation to remove the cross-section fixed effect. Also we 
employ dynamic period-specific (predetermined) instruments and the 
remaining regular instruments. Moreover, we adopt White period robust 
standard errors in our specification of the GMM weighting and coefficient 
covariance calculation choices.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the dynamic panel estimation. The table 
indicates that the dependent variable, GDP (in log form), is regressed on 
nine variables. These variables are foreign direct investment (FDI) in logs, 
trade openness (OPENESS) in logs, corruption (CORR) in logs, inflation 
rate (INF), domestic credit to the private sector (DCPS) and the lagged 
values of GDP, corruption, inflation and credit to private sector. 
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From specification (1), in Table 2, competitiveness in Arab countries is 
explained by LGDP(-1), LFDI, LOPENESS, DCPS, INF(-1), and DCPS(-
1). However, INF and LCORR, are found to be insignificant. Therefore in 
the second specification in Table 2 we added the lagged value of the 
corruption variable and omitted the inflation variable in levels.  
 
Specification (2) reveals that competitiveness in Arab countries is highly 
associated with LGDP(-1), LFDI, LOPENESS, INF(-1) and DCPS(-1). 
However, the corruption variable is still insignificant, despite using the 
Dependent Variable: LGDP
Explantory Variables Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3)
LGDP(-1) 0.8871 0.8106 0.8164
(20.5077) (20.7539) (21.6620)
LFDI 0.0222 0.0256 0.0257
(3.0370) (2.9310) (2.9398)
LOPENESS 0.4248 0.4115 0.4175
(5.1989) (5.5962) (5.8513)
LCORR -0.0383
(-0.9784)
LCORR(-1) 0.0360
(1.2246)
DCPS -0.0137
(-5.0596)
DCPS(-1) 0.0148 0.0058 0.0053
(6.8186) (3.2327) (2.9953)
INF -0.0007
(-0.2549)
INF(-1) 0.0027 0.0019 0.0020
(2.8863) (2.8807) (3.1869)
Total panel (balanced) observations 204 204 204
Number of Countries 17 17 17
Note: - absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10,5 and 1% respectively.
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package.
Table (2): Panel Estimation results: GMM
***
*** ***
*** ***
*** *** ***
*** ***
***
***
***
***
***
***
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lagged value of the variable. We adjusted the model by changing the 
lagged value for the corruption variable but in vain. Therefore, in the third 
specification we reran the regression excluding insignificant variables. 
 
From specification (3), the results of the dynamic model confirmed the 
EGLS results with fixed effects, presented in Document 4, but excluding 
the corruption variable. The findings show that competitiveness, proxied 
by GDP, is positively and highly associated with the inflows of FDI in 
Arab countries, which means that FDI increases the competitiveness of 
these countries. In addition, competitiveness is positively and significantly 
associated with trade openness or trade liberalization, which means that 
trade liberalization increases competitiveness. 
 
Control variables reflecting macroeconomic management in a country, 
such as domestic credit to the private sector and the inflation rate, are 
found to be significantly and positively related to competitiveness. 
Moreover, the results showed that the lagged value of domestic credit to 
the private sector can boost competitiveness in Arab countries. 
Furthermore, we find in the dynamic model that lagged inflation is 
positively related to competitiveness, which also confirms the results of 
EGLS model in document 4. However, in theory, this variable is expected 
to be negatively correlated with competitiveness. The positive sign in our 
regression can be explained in terms of low levels of inflation in Arab 
countries. In fact, the region has the lowest average rate of inflation in the 
world (about 3.5%). In theory, low inflation (less than 10%) can be 
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conducive to high economic growth in developing countries (Thirlwall, 
1999) and hence a high level of competitiveness.  
 
The significance of the dynamic model is demonstrated by the probability 
of the J-statistic, which recorded (0000) as shown in the model results. 
 
Above, we presented the results of the model run only with the variables 
we were able to obtain as desired. We now run the model including two 
proxy variables in place of data we would like ideally to include, but 
cannot given the absence of such data for the countries studied in this 
research. The proxy variables are labour productivity and the nominal 
exchange rate, standing in for productivity and the real effective exchange 
rate (REER). We reran the model with these two variables added. The 
model was otherwise run exactly as before.  
 
Table 3 shows the results of the dynamic panel estimation of the extended 
model. The table indicates that the dependent variable, GDP (in log form), 
is regressed on eleven variables. These variables are foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in logs, trade openness (OPENESS) in logs, corruption 
(CORR) in logs, labour productivity (LPROD) in logs, nominal exchange 
rate (NEXCH) in logs, inflation rate (INF), domestic credit to the private 
sector (DCPS) and the lagged values of GDP, corruption, inflation and 
credit to private sector. 
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The results of the extended model confirm the significance of and signs on the 
variables as determined previously. In addition, the two new variables were also 
found to be significant (and, as expected a priori, with positive signs). Thus 
competitiveness is positively and significantly associated with labour productivity 
in Arab countries. In addition, competitiveness is positively and significantly 
associated with the nominal exchange rate. Thus a depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate of Arab local currencies against the US$ Dollar increases the 
Dependent Variable: LGDP
Explantory Variables Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3)
LGDP(-1) 0.8236 0.7169 0.7050
(16.8797) (12.7550) (12.4295)
LFDI 0.0173 0.0173 0.0148
(2.2910) (1.8985) (2.1695)
LOPENESS 0.4778 0.4895 0.3761
(5.6024) (5.0449) (5.3859)
LCORR -0.0395
(-0.8466)
LCORR(-1) 0.0182
(0.3862)
DCPS -0.0114
(-5.1222)
DCPS(-1) 0.0158 0.0105 0.0075
(6.6351) (3.9573) (2.9005)
INF -0.0013
(-0.5586)
INF(-1) 0.0030 0.0022 0.0036
(5.1723) (2.7006) (3.3902)
LPROD 0.0000 0.00002 0.4941
(3.5717) (2.6753) (5.1724)
LNEXCH -0.0009 -0.0016 0.1443
(-0.6913) (-0.4856) (2.1187)
Total panel (balanced) observations 204 204 204
Number of Countries 17 17 17
Note: - absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10,5 and 1% respectively.
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (9) software package.
Table (3): Panel Estimation results: GMM
***
*** ***
*** ***
*** *** ***
*** ***
**
***
**
***
***
*
*** *** ***
**
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competitiveness of Arab economies. The probability of the J-statistic confirmed the 
significance of the second model  
 
In addition, we added an interaction term between FDI and economic 
freedom index (and trade openness and the economic freedom index) in 
order to bring out the channel as to whether some Arab countries with 
greater economic freedom are able to benefit more (if the interaction term 
is positive and significant). The results found that both of these interaction 
terms were insignificant. 
 
5.8 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In Document 4 we adopted EGLS allowing for fixed effects, using the 
same variables as the GMM model, plus the corruption variable but 
without labour productivity and nominal exchange rate variables. The 
results indicated that the competitiveness of Arab countries, proxied by 
GDP, is positively and highly associated with GDP lagged one year, which 
confirm that GDP growth in the previous year has a positive impact on the 
competitiveness of Arab countries. Also, competitiveness is positively and 
highly associated with the inflows of foreign direct investment (lagged one 
year), which means that a rise in FDI inflows of the previous year 
increases the competitiveness of these countries. In addition, 
competitiveness is positively and significantly associated with the lagged 
value of trade openness, which means that trade liberalization increases 
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competitiveness. However, the effect occurs after a one year lag. Control 
variables reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries, such 
as domestic credit to private sector, corruption and inflation, are found to 
be significantly and positively related to competitiveness.  
 
We mentioned earlier that the expected sign for each variable, according to the 
economic theory, is positive for GDP (lagged one year), FDI inflows, trade 
openness, domestic credit to the private sector, labour productivity and the nominal 
exchange rate, whereas the expected sign for inflation and corruption is negative. 
 
When we compare the expected sign with the actual sign for each variable, we find 
that the signs for the variables GDP (lagged one year), FDI, trade openness, domestic 
credit to private sector, labour productivity and the nominal exchange rate, go on 
with the expected sign according to economic theory. However, the actual signs for 
the variables corruption and inflation are positive and not according to the expected 
signs for these variables. 
 
The results indicate that an improvement in the provision of domestic credit to the 
private sector (lagged one year), labour productivity and the nominal exchange rate 
are the main factors that can boost competitiveness in Arab countries. However, the 
existence of corruption (lagged two years) in these countries increases 
competitiveness. Concerning the positive relationship between corruption and 
competitiveness in Arab economies, in spite of this result being against standard 
economic theory, we found in the economic literature evidence that corruption can 
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improve economic growth, especially in economies characterised by low levels of 
governance or a high degree of regulation (Hodge et al., 2009). This result is 
confirmed by Meon and Weill (2008), who found that there is a negative effect of 
corruption in countries with effective institutions, but a positive effect in countries 
with ineffective institutions. In addition, Rock and Bonnett (2004) found that, in 
most developing countries, corruption reduces growth and investment, whereas they 
found that, in large East Asian countries (such as China, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Thailand, and Japan), corruption positively supports economic growth.  
 
The positive relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI 
confirms the main findings of Document 3. The economic analysis 
conducted in Document 3 indicated that FDI and foreign trade are the 
main channels affecting the competitiveness of Arab countries. The 
consequences of the financial crisis hit GDP hard and, accordingly, the 
competitiveness of Arab economies. The transmission channels of the 
crisis to the real sectors in Arab countries were mainly the decline in oil 
and non-oil exports, due to weak global demand, and the deterioration of 
foreign direct investment inflows from the main trade and investment 
partners, which represent the sectors impacted most by the crisis. 
Moreover, the empirical analysis in this Document had shown that control 
variables, reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries, such 
as domestic credit to the private sector, corruption, inflation, labour 
productivity and the nominal exchange rate are found to be significantly 
and positively related to competitiveness. Regarding domestic credit to the 
private sector, the economic analysis in Document 3 showed that the 
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consequences of the financial crisis put many pressures on the liquidity 
conditions in many Arab countries, as a result of the drastic decline in net 
foreign assets, which affected negatively the domestic liquidity and 
accordingly domestic credit to the private sector. Therefore, most Arab 
central banks intervened to alleviate the liquidity constraints using 
different monetary tools. Within this context, interest rates have been 
reduced, legal reserve ratios have been decreased and the level of 
government deposits in banking sectors has been increased. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
In this thesis, we have undertaken an empirical analysis to explore the relationship 
between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI for Arab economies. To the best of 
our knowledge this work, as we showed in Document 233, is something that has 
received little attention in the literature. Econometrics is used in this novel analysis 
in order to interpret the findings of the economic analysis conducted in Document 3 
and in the previous chapters of this thesis. We adopt an econometric model panel 
data methodology, by applying a GMM model for dynamic panel data with fixed 
effects. To estimate the effect of FDI and foreign trade on the competitiveness of 
Arab countries, we use annual data, for 17 Arab countries34, spanning the period 
1998-2009.  
 
The results of the dynamic model applied in this thesis confirmed the results of 
Generalized Least Square Estimator (EGLS) allowing for fixed effects which was 
adopted in Document 4, for all variables other than the corruption variable. The 
findings show that competitiveness proxied, for reasons explained above, by the 
GDP of Arab countries, is positively and strongly associated with the inflows of FDI, 
which means that FDI increases the competitiveness of these countries. In addition, 
competitiveness is positively and significantly associated with trade openness or 
trade liberalization which means that trade liberalization increases competitiveness. 
                                                     
33 From our DBA project. 
34 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
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Control variables reflecting macroeconomic management in a country, such as 
domestic credit to the private sector, inflation rate, labour productivity and the 
nominal exchange rate are found to be significantly and positively related to 
competitiveness. Moreover, the results showed that the lagged value of domestic 
credit to private sector can boost competitiveness in Arab countries. Furthermore, 
we find in the dynamic model that the lagged value of inflation is positively related 
to competitiveness in Arab countries, which confirms the results of the EGLS model 
adopted in document 4. 
 
The positive relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI 
confirms robustly the main findings of Document 3 and the previous 
chapters in our thesis. The economic analysis conducted in Document 3 
and earlier chapters indicate that FDI and foreign trade are the main 
channels affecting the competitiveness of Arab countries. The 
consequences of the financial crisis hit GDP hard and, accordingly, the 
competitiveness of Arab economies. The transmission channels of the 
crisis to the real sectors in Arab countries were mainly the decline in oil 
and non-oil exports, because of weak global demand, and the deterioration 
of FDI inflows from the main trade and investment partners, which 
represent the sectors impacted most by the crisis. 
 
The empirical analysis above has also shown that control variables, 
reflecting macroeconomic management in Arab countries, such as 
domestic credit to the private sector, inflation, labour productivity and the 
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nominal exchange rate are found to be significantly and positively related 
to competitiveness. Regarding domestic credit to the private sector, the 
economic analysis in Document 3 showed that the consequences of the 
financial crisis put many pressures on the liquidity conditions in many 
Arab countries, as a result of the drastic decline in net foreign assets, 
which affected negatively the domestic liquidity and accordingly domestic 
credit to private sector. Therefore, most Arab central banks intervened to 
alleviate the liquidity constraints using different monetary tools. Within 
this context, interest rates have been reduced, legal reserve ratios have 
been decreased and the level of government deposits in banking sectors 
has been increased. 
 
The work conducted in Document 4 and in this thesis represent a key part 
of our novel story, shown in the literature review in Document 2 and in 
Chapter 1 here, that to the best of our knowledge nobody else has done 
similar work to explore the relationship between competitiveness, foreign 
trade and FDI for Arab economies. We have used the macroeconomic 
analysis provided in Document 3 and the earlier chapters here to underpin 
the quantitative analysis. This has included an econometric model using 
panel data for the period 1998-2009, in order to investigate the relationship 
between competitiveness, foreign trade and foreign direct investment. In 
other words, we link in this Document the analysis of macroeconomic 
performance of Arab countries from earlier DBA documents with the 
results of the quantitative analysis for Arab countries. 
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Notwithstanding the identification above of key factors that address boost 
competitiveness, Arab countries still face several challenges in delivering 
improved competitiveness. These challenges include economic 
vulnerabilities, labour market distortions, fiscal sustainability, and the need 
to create a more attractive business environment.  
 
Concerning economic vulnerabilities, our analysis in the previous chapters showed 
the dependency of Arab economies on oil and other natural resources which 
increases the exposure of these countries to external shocks. Arab oil exporting 
countries have suffered since the end of 2014 from low oil prices, which obliged 
these economies to shrink their public expenditures and remove subsidies gradually. 
These low oil prices raise the importance of adopting policies that could encourage 
economic diversification for these economies in the coming years. Arab oil 
importing countries face the challenge of low prices for the exports of primary 
goods, which affect the proceeds of foreign exchange. In addition, the poor 
performance of the international economy impacted the competitiveness of exports, 
proceeds of tourism and FDI inflows in these countries. Moreover, the mentioned 
sectors also were affected by the internal developments resulting from the Arab 
spring. Despite low oil prices helping to decrease the imports of petroleum products, 
these countries were affected by low levels of labour remittances in the gulf area. 
 
Improving Arab economies’ competitiveness must address labour market 
distortions, because the qualifications of labour do not match the qualifications 
required in the market. The competitiveness indicators, presented in Chapter 2, 
showed that Arab countries are ranked lower than their peers from other regions in 
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the fields of education and labour market efficiency. The education systems in these 
countries are not developed enough to provide the required skilled labour. Therefore 
the competitiveness of Arab countries still faces the challenge of inefficiency of 
labour markets. 
 
Moreover, Arab countries are facing the challenge of maintaining fiscal 
sustainability, as a result of low oil prices. Oil revenues constitute over 90% of public 
revenues for oil exporting countries. Therefore these countries have adopted 
multiple measures in recent years in order to diversify their revenues and create the 
fiscal space required to spur the economic growth of these countries. Despite these 
efforts, Arab oil exporting countries will face the challenge of fiscal sustainability 
with a lack of financial resources, given low oil prices. Arab oil importing countries, 
however, do not have the fiscal space that can be used to spur the economic growth 
and competitiveness. Public revenues in these countries were affected negatively by 
the level of economic activity. 
 
In addition the Arab Spring led to growing social demands and the trend of 
governments to increase spending to increase workers' salaries in the government 
sector, and to raise social spending. Consequently, these developments forced many 
Arab countries to borrow, which increased public debt. There is no doubt that the 
large increase in the levels of public debt for the Arab countries have many negative 
repercussions on macroeconomic performance and the competitiveness of Arab 
countries, across a number of channels. The main channels include the effect of 
crowding out caused by increased borrowing from the domestic market, which 
negatively affects the credit granted to the private sector, raising its cost. The high 
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burden of domestic debt service in some Arab countries drains a large portion of 
public revenues annually. This does not allow room for more spending on 
infrastructure, education, health and other sectors, as drivers of economic growth in 
the future. In addition, high external public debt service affects the levels of available 
foreign exchange and generates pressures on the value of domestic currency. 
 
Also, Arab countries are facing the challenge of improving the business environment 
to be more attractive, in order to spur the competitiveness of this group of countries. 
The limited fiscal space, in both Arab oil exporting and importing countries, is the 
main obstacle confronting improving the business environment in Arab countries. 
This limited fiscal space will limit the capabilities of these economies to improve 
the business environment in future years. 
 
The findings of the econometric analysis and the discussion above highlight the 
positive effects that FDI, trade, productivity and exchange rates can have on 
competitiveness. Given this, we offer the following recommendations to improve 
the competitiveness of Arab countries in the coming years: 
• Improve the investment climate in Arab countries that can attract more FDI to 
the region. This require enhancing the following: 
▪ Create a suitable macroeconomic environment through adopting 
suitable fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. 
▪ Central Banks should adopt policies to encourage banks to 
facilitate access to finance. 
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▪ Adopt policies that can improve economic governance, 
accountability, transparency and institutional performance in the 
Arab region. 
▪ Improve infrastructure, including transportation, electricity and 
communications, as well as to other factors such as property 
rights, entry regulations, tax burden, and labour. All these factors 
are needed to improve the competitiveness ranking of the Arab 
economies.  
▪ The importance of political stability and security in fostering the 
economic performance, to increase foreign investors’ confidence 
and competitiveness in Arab countries. 
• Enhancing labour productivity is crucial to promote competitiveness in Arab 
economies. Therefore, there is a need to pay attention to micro-economic 
reforms, especially labour and product market reforms aiming at increasing 
the levels of flexibility of these markets to increase productivity and 
competitiveness levels. Equally important is the need to reform education, 
health, and vocational training sectors to improve labour skills and to increase 
the return on investment in human capital. 
• Encouraging women’s participation in the labour market to increase 
productivity, especially as women’s participation in the labour force in Arab 
countries is amongst the lowest globally. 
• Adopting more flexible exchange rate regimes in Arab countries will help 
these economies to ensure the optimal allocation of economic resources, 
increase economic resilience and improve competitiveness. In this context, it 
is very important for Arab countries, especially those with more diversified 
economies, to shift towards more flexible exchange rate regimes, in order to 
enhance the competitiveness of their non-oil exports to the rest of the world. 
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• Infrastructure in all ports should be improved and computerized in order to 
facilitate trade between Arab countries and with the rest of the world. 
• Enhance trade negotiations between Arab countries and the rest of the world, 
in order to reinforce trade agreements and facilitate trade, both between Arab 
countries and with the rest of the world. 
• To take advantage of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements to reduce 
trade barriers between Arab countries and the rest of the world, that hinder the 
flow of goods and services. These include tariff and non-tariff barriers, such 
as import quotas, export restrictions, export subsidies, technical 
specifications, environmental requirements and sanitary standards. 
• Reduce the continued control of the government sector on a large proportion 
of raw materials, production elements, employment of national labour in Arab 
countries. Enhance the involvement of the private sector in bilateral and 
multilateral trade negotiations of Arab countries with the rest of the world. 
• To create more diversified Arab economies and improve competitiveness of 
Arab countries, we recommend the following strategy: 
▪ Oil exporting countries, should be encouraged to establish 
petrochemical industries, and energy intensive industries such as 
aluminium. This is in order to benefit from their comparative 
advantages in natural resources (mainly oil and gas). 
▪ Oil importing countries should encourage labour intensive 
industries such as textiles, garments, shoes, and simple 
electronics assembly. This is in order to benefit from 
comparative advantages in natural resources and labour. 
▪ Arab countries should adopt policies that encourage developing 
these industries mentioned above, to move to more sophisticated 
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industries such as automobiles shipbuilding, steel, and 
semiconductors. 
▪ The improved business and investment climate will help to 
attract multinational companies to collaborate with Arab 
countries, in starting both kinds of industries mentioned above 
(basic and sophisticated industries). 
▪ These recommendations will help to increase the exports of Arab 
countries via improved competitiveness of this region. 
 
Limitations and Areas for Future Research, One of the main limitations we faced 
during our DBA journey is that, to the best of our knowledge, nobody else has done 
similar work to explore the relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade and 
FDI for Arab economies. Finding similar work will give us reference guidelines and 
experience in tackling the same issue; therefore not finding any similar work 
conducted on the Arab region is seen as one of the obstacles during our journey. 
 
In addition, despite the importance of productivity, which is considered as one of the 
main indicators of competitiveness, we do not include this variable in our empirical 
model for two reasons. First, the purpose of our empirical work is to investigate the 
relationship between competitiveness, foreign trade and FDI. Second, there are 
limitations in data availability for the productivity variable in the majority of Arab 
countries during the period of analysis. In addition, data availability is also an 
obstacle to collecting data for the real effective exchange rate (REER) for the 
majority of Arab countries. REER is considered also as a key indicator for measuring 
a country’s competitiveness. 
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As a result, we were able only to include a proxy variable for each of 
productivity and the REER: labour productivity as a proxy for productivity 
(calculated according to International Labour Organization methodology); 
and the nominal exchange rate as a proxy for the REER variable. 
 
Therefore, in future research, when data are available, I would like to 
investigate the effect of productivity and REER on the competitiveness of 
the Arab region.  
 
Moreover, in the future I would like to study the effects of corruption on 
FDI inflows and economic growth in Arab countries, given the different 
findings from the models presented in Document 5 and this thesis. Also, I 
would like to investigate the determinants of FDI in Arab region. Finally, 
concerning foreign trade, I would like to conduct gravity model analysis in 
to measure the determinant of foreign trade flows for the Arab countries. 
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2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
W
orld economic growth rate
4.83
2.49
2.92
4.29
5.40
4.86
5.49
5.65
3.02
-0.05
5.41
4.22
3.46
3.28
3.41
3.09
Arab economic growth rate
6.32
2.44
2.49
7.07
14.04
5.73
7.01
5.63
6.11
1.75
3.94
4.99
4.60
3.59
2.53
2.90
W
orld trade growth rate
12.33
0.262
3.754
5.679
11.351
7.725
9.254
7.969
3.011
-10.452
12.371
7.063
2.779
3.388
3.489
2.831
W
orld inflation rate
4.77
4.62
3.64
3.85
3.76
4.05
4.00
4.27
6.31
2.67
3.68
5.05
4.08
3.66
3.23
2.78
Arab inflation rate
2.60
2.10
2.60
3.70
5.80
5.50
6.60
8.40
10.10
3.90
4.40
5.80
7.00
9.40
6.00
6.10
The youth unemployment rate of Arab countries
..
..
..
28.40
28.20
27.10
25.70
24.40
23.90
23.50
23.70
27.20
27.90
27.90
..
..
Domestic liquidity growth rate of Arab countries
9.25
11.93
13.76
13.38
16.26
18.36
20.03
24.06
18.81
11.61
10.67
12.02
11.48
13.69
10.16
4.17
The balance of the general budget of the GDP 
of the Arab countries
0.87
-3.09
-4.72
0.20
4.00
8.90
11.30
7.10
12.70
-2.60
0.40
3.90
5.80
2.40
1.90
-8.30
The balance of current account balance to GDP 
of the Arab countries
7.70
3.80
11.20
14.50
16.20
22.20
24.30
19.90
16.10
2.60
7.30
14.60
15.60
12.10
7.90
-4.20
Official foreign reserves of the Arab countries 
(M
illion US dollar)
105330.38
119965.82
136369.07
166193.69
205572.18
250434.53
321993.13
754178.27
918522.95
923321.93
1008235.12
1123316.49
1282581.18
1384788.48
1358610.15
1196064.35
change in formal  reserves  of the  Arab countries
..
13.89
13.67
21.87
23.69
21.82
28.57
134.22
21.79
0.52
9.20
11.41
14.18
7.97
-1.89
-11.96
Oil prices (OPEC basket) (US dollar per barrel)
27.60
23.10
24.30
28.01
36.05
50.64
61.08
69.08
94.45
61.08
77.45
107.46
109.45
105.87
96.20
49.49
Source: 
            Data of Global Economy -  International M
onetary Fund, W
orld Economic Outlook Database, (IM
F, 2016).
            Data of Arab Economy - Arab M
onetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report Database, (AM
F, 2016).
Annex Table (1/1)
Economic indicators for Arab countries compared to the world
(2000-2015)
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(%)
Average Average
 2000-2008 2009-2015 
World economic growth rate 4.33 3.26
Arab economic growth rate 6.32 3.47
World trade growth rate 6.82 3.07
World inflation rate 4.36 3.59
Arab inflation rate 5.27 6.09
The youth unemployment rate of Arab countries 26.28 26.04
Domestic liquidity growth rate of Arab countries 16.20 10.54
The balance of the general budget of the GDP of the 
Arab countries
4.14 0.50
The balance of current account balance to GDP of 
the Arab countries
15.10 7.99
Official foreign reserves of the Arab countries 
(Million US dollar)
330951.11 1182416.82
change in formal  reserves of the Arab countries 34.94 4.20
Oil prices (OPEC basket) (US dollar per barrel) 46.03 86.71
Source: Annex Table (1/1)
Economic indicators for Arab countries compared to the world
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Annex (3/1) 
Business Reforms in Middle East & North Africa35 
=Doing Business reform making it easier to do business. =Change making it more difficult to do business. 
 
 
Algeria 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Algeria made starting a business easier by eliminating the requirement to obtain 
managers’ criminal records.  
 
Algeria made dealing with construction permits easier by eliminating the legal 
requirement to provide a certified copy of a property title when applying for a 
building permit.  
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
Algeria made trading across borders easier by upgrading infrastructure at the 
port of Algiers.  
 
 
DB 2013:  
 
Algeria improved access to credit information by eliminating the minimum 
threshold for loans to be included in the database.  
 
 
DB 2012:  
 
Algeria improved its credit information system by guaranteeing by law the right 
of borrowers to inspect their personal data.  
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
Algeria enhanced its construction permitting process by introducing new 
                                                     
35 Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/Overview/Region/middle-east-and-north-africa 
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regulations aimed at improving the administration of the process and at ensuring 
the safe and timely completion of construction projects.  
 
Algeria made registering property easier and less costly by reducing notary fees 
and eliminating the capital gains tax.  
 
Algeria made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate for tourism, construction and public works, and the production of 
goods.  
 
Algeria improved contract enforcement by introducing a new civil procedure 
code that reduces the steps and time required and by fully computerizing the 
courts, including by setting up an electronic case management system.  
 
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Algeria made trading across borders more difficult by increasing the number of 
inspections carried out.  
 
 
Bahrain 
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
Bahrain made registering property easier by reducing the registration fee.  
 
Bahrain improved access to credit information by approving the credit bureau’s 
collection of data on firms.  
 
 
DB 2014:  
 
Bahrain made starting a business more expensive by increasing the cost of the 
business registration certificate.  
 
Bahrain reduced the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts, made 
third-party notification mandatory for redundancy dismissals and increased paid 
annual leave.  
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Bahrain improved access to credit information by starting to collect payment 
information from retailers.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Bahrain made registering property more burdensome by increasing the fees at 
the Survey and Land Registration Bureau.  
 
Bahrain made it easier to trade by building a modern new port, improving the 
electronic data interchange system and introducing risk-based inspections.  
 
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
Bahrain made dealing with construction permits easier by further consolidating 
preliminary approvals for building permits in the one-stop shop and reducing the 
time needed to obtain a building permit.  
 
 
Djibouti 
 
 
DB 2015: 
 
Djibouti made dealing with construction permits less time-consuming by streamlining the 
review process for building permits.  
 
 
DB 2014:  
 
Djibouti made starting a business easier by simplifying the company name search and by 
eliminating the minimum capital requirement as well as the requirement to publish a notice of 
commencement of activities.  
 
Djibouti strengthened its secured transactions system by adopting a new commercial code, 
which broadens the range of movable assets that can be used as collateral.  
 
Djibouti made resolving insolvency easier through its new commercial code, which allows an 
insolvent debtor to file for preventive settlement, legal redress or liquidation and sets out clear 
rules on the steps and procedures for each of the alternatives available.  
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DB 2012: 
 
Djibouti made dealing with construction permits costlier by increasing the fees for 
inspections and the building permit and adding a new inspection in the preconstruction phase.  
 
Djibouti made trading across borders faster by developing a new container terminal.  
 
 
DB 2010: 
 
Djibouti made paying taxes easier for companies by replacing the consumption tax with a 
value added tax on the supply of goods and services.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Djibouti reduced documentation requirements for exporting and importing, and time for 
importing, by improving port administration and eliminating some health and technical 
formalities.  
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Djibouti made property registration faster by improving efficiency at the Service des 
Domaines.  
 
Djibouti made trading across borders easier by implementing an electronic manifest system.  
 
 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
The Arab Republic of Egypt strengthened minority investor protections by barring 
subsidiaries from acquiring shares issued by their parent company.  
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
The Arab Republic of Egypt strengthened minority investor protections by introducing 
additional requirements for approval of related-party transactions and greater requirements for 
disclosure of such transactions to the stock exchange.  
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DB 2014:  
 
Egypt made paying taxes more costly for companies by increasing the corporate income tax 
rate.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Egypt reduced the cost to start a business.  
 
Egypt made trading easier by introducing an electronic system for submitting export and 
import documents.  
DB 2010: 
 
Egypt made starting a business easier by eliminating the minimum capital requirement.  
 
Egypt made dealing with construction permits easier by issuing executive articles 
implementing its new construction law and by eliminating most preapprovals for building 
permits.  
 
In Egypt the private credit bureau I-score added retailers to its database, improving access to 
credit information.  
 
Egypt made enforcing contracts easier by creating commercial courts.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Egypt made starting a business easier by reducing the paid-in minimum capital requirement, 
abolishing bar association fees and automating tax registration.  
 
Egypt made dealing with construction permits easier through a new building code 
establishing a single window for processing construction-related approvals.  
 
Egypt speeded up property registration by simplifying administrative procedures, 
reorganizing the business workflow between the real estate registry and the Egyptian Surveying 
Authority and introducing time limits for several procedures.  
 
Egypt improved access to credit information by guaranteeing borrowers’ right to inspect their 
own data in the private credit bureau.  
 
Egypt strengthened investor protections by introducing a requirement that an independent 
auditor assess related-party transactions before approval.  
 
Egypt made trading across borders easier by upgrading port facilities at Alexandria and 
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speeding up customs clearance, while greater competition in the banking sector led to a reduction 
in the time to open a letter of credit.  
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Egypt made starting a business easier by lowering registration fees, improving the process at 
the one-stop shop and reducing the minimum capital requirement.  
 
Egypt made dealing with construction permits less costly by reducing the fee for registering a 
new building.  
 
Egypt reduced the cost of registering property by introducing a low fixed fee.  
 
Egypt improved access to credit information by creating a new private credit bureau, which 
will distribute negative data on both individuals and firms and, as guaranteed by law, allow 
borrowers access to their credit information.  
 
Egypt made trading across borders easier by improving customs administration.  
 
 
Iraq 
 
 
DB 2012:  
 
In Iraq starting a business became more expensive because of an increase in the 
cost to obtain a name reservation certificate and in the cost for lawyers to draft 
articles of association.  
 
 
 
 
Jordan 
 
 
DB 2015: 
 
Jordan made trading across borders easier by improving infrastructure at the 
port of Aqaba.  
 
 
DB 2012: 
 
Jordan made starting a business easier by reducing the minimum capital 
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requirement from 1,000 Jordanian dinars to 1 dinar, of which only half must be 
deposited before company registration.  
 
Jordan made trading across borders faster by introducing X-ray scanners for 
risk management systems.  
 
 
DB 2011: 
 
Jordan improved its credit information system by setting up a regulatory 
framework for establishing a private credit bureau as well as lowering the 
threshold for loans to be reported to the public credit registry.  
 
Jordan abolished certain taxes and made it possible to file income and sales tax 
returns electronically.  
 
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
Jordan made starting a business easier by offering a single reception service for 
company registration at the company registrar.  
 
Jordan made dealing with construction permits easier by extending the services 
of the one-stop shop in Greater Amman to midsize commercial construction 
projects.  
 
Jordan made registering property easier by reducing the property transfer fees.  
 
Jordan made paying taxes easier for companies by introducing an online filing 
and payment system and simplifying tax forms.  
 
Jordan reduced the time for exporting and importing by implementing a risk-
based inspection system with postdestination clearance for preapproved traders, 
reducing the number of containers subject to physical inspection and allowing 
online submission of customs declarations by fully implementing the ASYCUDA 
World electronic data interchange system.  
 
Jordan improved its contract enforcement system by setting up a specialized 
commercial court division, equipping its courts with a computer-aided case 
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management system and raising the ceiling for cases heard by the lower court to 
improve the distribution of the caseload.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Jordan made starting a business easier by reducing the paid-in minimum capital 
requirement by more than 96%.  
 
 
DB 2008: 
 
Jordan reduced the time and number of procedures to start a business by 
enhancing the operations of the one-stop shop at the company registry and adding 
the presence of a representative of the municipality of Amman.  
 
 
 
Kuwait 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Kuwait made starting a business easier by reducing the minimum capital requirement.  
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
Kuwait made starting a business more difficult by increasing the commercial license fee.  
 
 
DB 2014:  
 
Kuwait made starting a business more difficult by increasing the minimum capital 
requirement.  
 
Kuwait strengthened investor protections by making it possible for minority shareholders to 
request the appointment of an auditor to review the company’s activities.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Kuwait increased the number of days of paid annual leave and increased the notice period 
applicable in case of redundancy dismissals.  
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DB 2010:  
 
Kuwait reduced the time required for customs clearance by improving administrative 
procedures and staff training.  
 
Kuwait enhanced its insolvency process by introducing a new legal procedure that enables 
financially distressed companies on the verge of insolvency to restructure.  
 
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Kuwait reduced the time required for dealing with construction permits by introducing an 
automated system for issuing technical approvals for utility connections.  
 
Kuwait’s private credit bureau expanded its coverage by adding retailers to those supplying it 
with credit information.  
 
 
 
Lebanon 
 
 
DB 2016: 
 
Lebanon made transferring property more complex by increasing the time 
required for property registration.  
 
 
DB 2012: 
 
Lebanon made getting electricity less costly by reducing the application fees and 
security deposit for a new connection.  
 
 
DB 2011: 
 
Lebanon increased the cost of starting a business.  
 
Lebanon improved its credit information system by allowing banks online 
access to the public credit registry’s reports.  
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DB 2010:  
 
Lebanon made starting a business easier by eliminating the requirement to have 
company books stamped—though it also made it more difficult by reversing a 
previous reform combining tax and company registration at LibanPost.  
 
Lebanon made paying taxes easier for companies by eliminating the requirement 
to obtain permission to use accelerated depreciation and by introducing electronic 
payment.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Lebanon reduced the time required to start a business by streamlining the 
business registration process.  
 
 
 
 
Morocco 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Morocco made starting a business easier by eliminating the need to file a 
declaration of business incorporation with the Ministry of Labour.  
 
Morocco made dealing with construction permits more difficult by requiring 
architects to submit the building permit request online, along with supporting 
documents, and to follow up with a hard-copy submission. On the other hand, 
Morocco reduced the time required to obtain an urban certificate.  
 
1) Morocco implemented an unemployment insurance scheme. 2) Morocco 
increased the minimum wage increased from 12.24 to 12.85 DH/hour as of July 1, 
2014, according to decree n° 2.14.343 of June 2014, published in the official 
bulletin 5292.  
 
Morocco made property transfers faster by establishing electronic 
communication links between different tax authorities.  
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Morocco made paying taxes easier for companies by improving the electronic 
platform for filing and paying corporate income tax, VAT and labour taxes. On the 
other hand, Morocco increased the rate of the social charge paid by employers.  
 
The utility in Morocco reduced the time required for getting an electricity 
connection by providing fee estimates more quickly.  
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
Morocco made trading across borders easier by reducing the number of export 
documents required.  
 
 
DB 2014:  
 
Morocco made starting a business easier by reducing the company registration 
fees.  
 
Morocco made transferring property easier by reducing the time required to 
register a deed of transfer at the tax authority.  
 
Morocco made paying taxes easier for companies by increasing the use of the 
electronic filing and payment system for social security contributions.  
 
 
DB 2013: 
 
Morocco made starting a business easier by eliminating the minimum capital 
requirement for limited liability companies.  
 
Morocco made registering property more costly by increasing property 
registration fees.  
 
 
DB 2012: 
 
Morocco made dealing with construction permits easier by opening a one-stop 
shop.  
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Morocco strengthened investor protections by allowing minority shareholders to 
obtain any nonconfidential corporate document during trial.  
 
Morocco eased the administrative burden of paying taxes for firms by enhancing 
electronic filing and payment of the corporate income tax and value added tax.  
 
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Morocco strengthened investor protections by requiring greater disclosure in 
companies’ annual reports.  
 
 
DB 2010: 
 
Morocco improved access to credit information through a new private credit 
bureau that started operations.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Morocco improved access to credit information by guaranteeing borrowers’ 
right to inspect their own data in the public credit registry.  
 
Morocco made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate, exempting gains made from the sale of certain buildings from the 
capital gains tax and abolishing fixed registration duty rates on deeds—though it 
also increased the tax rates on insurance contracts.  
 
Morocco reduced the time for exporting and importing by eliminating the 
container identification card.  
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Morocco made dealing with construction permits easier by introducing a one-
stop shop, which reduced the time required for permit applications.  
 
Morocco made registering property more complicated by implementing a 
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requirement to check several tax agencies—rather than just one—in order to obtain 
a tax clearance certificate.  
 
Morocco made trading across borders easier by introducing a risk-based 
inspection system.  
 
 
 
Oman 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Oman reduced the time for border compliance for both exporting and importing by 
transferring cargo operations from Sultan Qaboos Port to Sohar Port.  
 
Oman improved the regulation of outages by beginning to record data for the 
annual system average interruption duration index (SAIDI) and system average 
interruption frequency index (SAIFI).  
 
DB 2013:  
 
Oman reduced the maximum number of working days per week and increased the 
paid annual leave applicable for employees with one year of service.  
 
Oman improved access to credit information by guaranteeing borrowers’ right 
to inspect their personal data.  
 
DB 2012:  
 
The one-stop shop in Oman introduced online company registration and sped up 
the process to register a business from 7 days to 3 days.  
 
Oman improved its credit information system by launching the Bank Credit and 
Statistical Bureau System, which collects historical information on performing and 
nonperforming loans for both firms and individuals.  
 
Oman enacted a new income tax law that redefined the scope of taxation.  
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
Oman made starting a business easier by introducing online name registration 
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and payment at the registry with a prepaid card.  
 
Oman made paying taxes easier for companies through a new tax law 
modernizing the tax regime and simplifying procedures.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Oman reduced the time and number of procedures to start a business by putting 
the one-stop shop into operation and simplifying licensing procedures.  
 
 
Qatar 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Qatar reduced the time for border compliance for importing by reducing the 
number of days of free storage at the port and thus the time required for port 
handling.  
 
 
DB 2014: 
 
Qatar made paying taxes easier for companies by eliminating certain 
requirements associated with the corporate income tax return.  
 
 
DB 2013:  
 
Qatar reduced the time to export and import by introducing a new online portal 
allowing electronic submission of customs declarations for clearance at the Doha 
seaport.  
 
 
DB 2012:  
 
Qatar made starting a business easier by combining commercial registration and 
registration with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the one-stop shop.  
 
Qatar made dealing with construction permits more difficult by increasing the 
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time and cost to process building permits.  
 
Qatar improved its credit information system by starting to distribute historical 
data and eliminating the minimum threshold for loans included in the database.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Qatar made starting a business more difficult by adding a procedure to register 
for taxes and obtain a company seal.  
 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Saudi Arabia made property transfers faster by introducing a new computerized 
system at the land registry.  
 
 
DB 2014:  
 
Saudi Arabia made trading across borders more difficult by increasing the 
number of documents needed to export and import.  
 
 
DB 2013:  
 
Saudi Arabia made paying taxes easier for companies by introducing online 
filing and payment systems for social security contributions.  
 
Saudi Arabia made enforcing contracts easier by expanding the computerization 
of its courts and introducing an electronic filing system.  
 
Saudi Arabia made getting electricity more expensive by increasing the 
connection fees.  
 
 
DB 2012:  
 
Saudi Arabia made starting a business easier by bringing together 
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representatives from the Department of Zakat and Income Tax and the General 
Organization of Social Insurance at the Unified Center to register new companies 
with their agencies.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Saudi Arabia made dealing with construction permits easier for the second year 
in a row by introducing a new, streamlined process.  
 
An amendment to Saudi Arabia’s commercial lien law enhanced access to credit 
by making secured lending more flexible and allowing out-of-court enforcement in 
case of default.  
 
Saudi Arabia reduced the time to import by launching a new container terminal 
at the Jeddah Islamic Port.  
 
Saudi Arabia speeded up the insolvency process by providing earlier access to 
amicable settlements and putting time limits on the settlements to encourage 
creditors to participate.  
 
DB 2010: 
 
Saudi Arabia made starting a business easier by introducing a one-stop center at 
the Ministry of Commerce that merged registration procedures and simplified 
publication requirements.  
 
Saudi Arabia made dealing with construction permits less time consuming by 
introducing a 1-day permitting procedure that enables builders to obtain a 
temporary building permit allowing them to begin construction after 1 day and a 
final building permit after 1 week.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Saudi Arabia reduced the time and cost to start a business by eliminating non-
value-added formalities.  
 
Saudi Arabia made property registration faster and easier by adopting a 
comprehensive electronic system for registering title deeds.  
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Saudi Arabia strengthened investor protections by prohibiting interested parties 
from voting on the approval of related-party transactions and by increasing 
sanctions against directors found liable for harm to a company resulting from a 
transaction in which they had a personal interest.  
 
Saudi Arabia introduced strict deadlines for bankruptcy procedures, with the 
result that auctions of debtors’ assets now take place more quickly than before.  
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Saudi Arabia made starting a business easier by eliminating the paid-in 
minimum capital requirement and speeding up company registration.  
 
Saudi Arabia’s private credit bureau launched a commercial credit bureau that 
issues reports on companies, including on their credit exposure.  
 
Saudi Arabia made importing easier by abolishing the requirement for a consular 
certificate, allowing the electronic transfer of data (and therefore eliminating the 
requirement for hard copies of documents) and improving the capacity of facilities 
in the port of Jeddah.  
 
 
 
Syrian Arab Republic 
 
DB 2013:  
 
Syria improved access to credit information by establishing an online system 
for data exchange between all banks and microfinance institutions and the central 
bank’s credit registry.  
 
DB 2011:  
 
Syria eased business start-up by reducing the minimum capital requirement for 
limited liability companies by two-thirds. It also decentralized approval of the 
company memorandum.  
 
Syria eliminated the severance payment obligation but increased the notice 
period applicable in case of redundancy dismissals. Implemented a 100% pay 
premium for weekly holiday work and decreased the total term limit of fixed-term 
contracts.  
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Syria enhanced access to credit by eliminating the minimum threshold for loans 
included in the database, which expanded the coverage of individuals and firms to 
2.8% of the adult population.  
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
Syria made starting a business easier by reducing the paid-in minimum capital 
requirement and making standard incorporation forms available online.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Syria reduced the time and number of procedures to start a business through a 
new company law and commercial code simplifying the registration process, 
ending the involvement of the court and lawyers in the process and further 
simplifying tax registration.  
 
The entry of private banks into the Syrian market led to faster issuance of letters 
of credit, making it easier to trade across borders.  
 
 
DB 2008:  
 
Syria made starting a business more difficult by enforcing the requirement for 
limited liability companies and joint stock companies to publish their 
memorandum of association in the official gazette and show proof of payment of 
the publishing fees.  
 
Syria made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate—and also made it easier for large businesses by setting up a large-
taxpayer unit.  
 
 
Tunisia 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
Tunisia made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate.  
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Tunisia reduced border compliance time for both exporting and importing by 
improving the efficiency of its state-owned port handling company and investing in 
port infrastructure at the port of Rades.  
 
DB 2015:  
 
Tunisia made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate.  
 
In Tunisia trading across borders became more difficult because of a 
deterioration in port infrastructure (for example, in loading and unloading 
equipment) and inadequate terminal space.  
 
DB 2014:  
 
Tunisia made starting a business more difficult by increasing the cost of 
company registration.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
Tunisia introduced the use of electronic systems for payment of corporate income 
tax and value added tax.  
 
Tunisia upgraded its electronic data interchange system for imports and exports, 
speeding up the assembly of import documents.  
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
Tunisia strengthened investor protections by enhancing approval and disclosure 
requirements for related-party transactions.  
 
Tunisia made paying taxes more costly for companies by increasing employers’ 
social security contribution rate.  
 
Tunisia reduced the time required for trading across borders by enabling traders 
to electronically submit most documents required to clear cargo through the 
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TradeNet single-window system—though traders must still bring the original 
copies to customs for verification.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
Tunisia made starting a business easier by eliminating the paid-in minimum 
capital requirement.  
 
Tunisia improved access to credit information by beginning to collect and 
distribute more detailed credit information from banks (including both positive and 
negative information) and guaranteeing by law the right of individuals and firms to 
inspect their credit data in all central bank offices.  
 
Tunisia strengthened investor protections by allowing minority investors to 
request in court the rescission of related-party transactions that harm the company.  
 
Tunisia made paying taxes easier for companies by introducing the option of 
téléliquidation, in which companies complete an online declaration of taxes while 
paying the taxes at a tax office.  
 
Tunisia increased the time for importing by introducing a requirement for 
freight arriving at the port to be accompanied by a unit of the customs authority.  
 
DB 2008:  
 
Tunisia reduced the time needed to register property by computerizing property 
registry files.  
 
Tunisia’s public credit registry eliminated the minimum threshold for loans 
included in its database, improving access to credit information.  
 
Tunisia made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the corporate 
income tax rate.  
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United Arab Emirates 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
The United Arab Emirates made dealing with construction permits easier by 
streamlining the process for obtaining the civil defense approval.  
 
The United Arab Emirates strengthened minority investor protections by barring 
a subsidiary from acquiring shares in its parent company and by requiring that a 
potential acquirer, upon reaching 50% or more of the capital of a company, make a 
purchase offer to all shareholders.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made enforcing contracts easier by implementing 
electronic service of process, by introducing a new case management office within 
the competent court and by further developing the “Smart Petitions” service 
allowing litigants to file and track motions online.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made getting electricity easier by reducing the time 
needed to provide a connection cost estimate.  
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
The United Arab Emirates made transferring property easier by introducing 
new service centers and a standard contract for property transactions.  
 
In the United Arab Emirates the credit bureau improved access to credit 
information by starting to exchange credit information with a utility.  
 
The United Arab Emirates strengthened minority investor protections by 
introducing additional approval requirements for related-party transactions and 
greater requirements for disclosure of such transactions to the stock exchange; by 
introducing a requirement that interested directors be held liable in a related-party 
transaction that is unfair or constitutes a conflict of interest; and by making it 
possible for shareholders to inspect the documents pertaining to a related-party 
transaction, appoint auditors to inspect the transaction and request a rescission of 
the transaction if it should prove to be unfair.  
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DB 2014:  
 
The United Arab Emirates made transferring property easier by increasing the 
operating hours of the land registry and reducing transfer fees.  
 
The United Arab Emirates strengthened investor protections by introducing 
greater disclosure requirements for related-party transactions in the annual report 
and to the stock exchange and by making it possible to sue directors when such 
transactions harm the company.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made getting electricity easier by eliminating the 
requirement for site inspections and reducing the time required to provide new 
connections.  
 
 
DB 2013:  
 
The United Arab Emirates made starting a business easier by eliminating the 
requirement for a company to prepare a name board in English and Arabic after 
having received clearance on the use of office premises.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made paying taxes easier for companies by 
establishing an online filing and payment system for social security contributions.  
 
In the United Arab Emirates the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority made 
getting electricity easier by introducing an electronic “one window, one step” 
application process allowing customers to submit and track their applications 
online and reducing the time for processing the applications.  
 
 
DB 2012: 
 
The United Arab Emirates made starting a business easier by merging the 
requirements to file company documents with the Department for Economic 
Development, to obtain a trade license and to register with the Dubai Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry.  
 
The United Arab Emirates improved its credit information system through a 
new law allowing the establishment of a federal credit bureau under the 
supervision of the central bank.  
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DB 2011: 
 
The United Arab Emirates enhanced access to credit by setting up a legal 
framework for the operation of the private credit bureau and requiring that 
financial institutions share credit information.  
The United Arab Emirates streamlined document preparation and reduced the 
time to trade with the launch of Dubai Customs’ comprehensive new customs 
system, Mirsal 2.  
 
 
DB 2010: 
 
The United Arab Emirates made starting a business easier by abolishing the 
minimum capital requirement and simplifying documentation requirements for 
registration, including by eliminating the requirement to show proof of deposit of 
capital.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made dealing with construction permits less time 
consuming by improving its online system for obtaining no-objection certificates, 
building permits and completion certificates.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made trading across borders easier through greater 
capacity at the container terminal in Dubai, elimination of the requirement for a 
terminal handling receipt and improvements in the banking sector reducing the cost 
of trade finance products.  
 
 
DB 2009: 
 
The United Arab Emirates improved access to credit information by 
establishing a new private credit bureau that collects information on all loans and 
by guaranteeing borrowers’ right to inspect their own credit data in the new 
bureau.  
 
The United Arab Emirates made enforcing contracts easier by introducing 
electronic filing for court documents.  
 
 
DB 2008:  
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The United Arab Emirates made starting a business easier by allowing 
publication of the company records at the Department of Economic Development.  
 
The United Arab Emirates abolished the requirement for severance payments.  
 
 
West Bank and Gaza 
 
 
DB 2016:  
 
West Bank and Gaza made dealing with construction permits easier by 
streamlining the process for obtaining the civil defense permit and for submitting 
the stamped concrete casting permit to the municipality.  
 
The credit registry in West Bank and Gaza began to distribute credit data from 
retailers and utility companies.  
 
 
DB 2015:  
 
West Bank and Gaza made paying taxes easier for companies by introducing the 
option to make either 1 or 4 advance payments of corporate income tax.  
 
 
DB 2014:  
 
West Bank and Gaza made starting a business less costly by eliminating the 
paid-in minimum capital requirement.  
 
West Bank and Gaza introduced a minimum wage.  
 
 
DB 2013:  
 
West Bank and Gaza made transferring property more costly by increasing the 
property transfer fee.  
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West Bank and Gaza improved access to credit information by guaranteeing 
borrowers’ right to inspect their personal data.  
 
 
DB 2011:  
 
West Bank and Gaza made starting a business more difficult by increasing the 
lawyers’ fees that must be paid for incorporation.  
 
More efficient processes at Palestinian customs made trading easier in the West 
Bank.  
 
 
DB 2010:  
 
West Bank and Gaza made starting a business more difficult by increasing the 
minimum capital requirement.  
 
West Bank and Gaza reduced the time required for registering property by 
completing a major project to computerize records at the land registry.  
 
West Bank and Gaza speeded up contract enforcement by recruiting and 
training new judges, by appointing “enforcement judges” solely to handle matters 
relating to the enforcement of judgments and by fully implementing case 
management software.  
 
 
DB 2009:  
 
West Bank and Gaza reduced the time required to start a business by fully 
implementing the management information system at the commercial registry.  
 
Dealing with construction permits became more costly in West Bank and Gaza 
as a result of rising prices for construction materials and price indexation.  
 
West Bank and Gaza’s public credit registry set up an online system for banks to 
share credit information.  
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DB 2008:  
West Bank and Gaza’s public credit registry eliminated the minimum threshold 
for loans included in its database and instructed banks to disclose all loans granted 
to customers.  
 
West Bank and Gaza made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing 
the corporate income tax rate.  
 
 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
 
DB 2015: 
 
In the Republic of Yemen trading across borders became more difficult as a 
result of inefficient port operation.  
 
 
DB 2012: 
 
Yemen made starting a business more difficult due to the suspension of 
registration services at the one-stop shop.  
 
The Republic of Yemen enacted a new tax law that reduced the general corporate 
tax rate from 35% to 20% and abolished all tax exemptions except those granted 
under the investment law for investment projects.  
 
 
DB 2010: 
 
The Republic of Yemen made starting a business easier by eliminating the 
requirement to obtain a bank account certificate for company registration.  
 
The Republic of Yemen improved access to credit information by eliminating 
the minimum threshold for the loans reported and guaranteeing borrowers’ right to 
view their credit reports.  
 
The Republic of Yemen reduced the time required for trading across borders by 
implementing a risk-based inspection system and an electronic data interchange 
system.  
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DB 2009: 
 
The Republic of Yemen reduced the time and number of procedures to start a 
business by launching a one-stop shop and eliminating the paid-in minimum 
capital requirement and the requirement for a company seal.  
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(M
illions of US dollars )
Country/Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
          Algeria
280.1
1,107.9
1,065.0
633.7
881.9
1,081.1
1,795.4
1,661.8
2,593.6
2,746.4
2,264.0
2,571.0
2,264.0
2,571.0
1,499.0
1,691.0
1,507.0
(587.0)
          Bahrain
363.6
80.3
217.0
516.7
865.3
1,048.7
2,914.9
1,756.1
1,793.9
257.2
155.9
780.9
155.9
780.9
891.0
989.0
1,519.0
(1,463.0)
          Djibouti
3.3
3.4
3.4
14.2
38.5
22.2
108.3
195.4
228.9
99.6
26.8
78.0
26.8
78.0
110.0
286.0
153.0
124.0
          Egypt
1,235.4
509.9
646.9
237.4
2,157.4
5,375.6
10,042.8
11,578.1
9,494.6
6,711.6
6,385.6
(482.7)
6,385.6
(482.7)
6,881.0
5,553.0
4,612.0
6,885.0
          Iraq
(3.1)
(6.5)
(1.6)
1,000.0
300.0
515.3
383.0
972.0
1,855.7
1,598.3
1,396.2
1,616.7
1,396.2
1,616.7
2,376.0
2,852.0
4,782.0
3,469.0
          Jordan
913.3
273.6
238.2
547.0
936.8
1,984.5
3,544.0
2,622.1
2,826.3
2,413.1
1,650.8
1,469.0
1,650.8
1,469.0
1,497.0
1,798.0
2,009.0
1,275.0
          Kuwait
16.3
(111.5)
3.6
(67.1)
23.8
233.9
121.3
111.5
(6.0)
1,113.6
318.7
398.6
318.7
398.6
3,931.0
2,329.0
953.0
293.0
          Lebanon
964.1
1,451.2
1,336.0
2,860.0
2,483.7
3,321.5
3,131.7
3,376.0
4,333.0
4,803.6
4,279.9
3,200.0
4,279.9
3,200.0
3,674.0
2,833.0
2,906.0
2,341.0
          Libya
141.0
(133.0)
145.0
143.0
357.0
1,038.0
2,064.0
3,850.0
3,180.0
3,310.0
1,909.0
0.0
1,909.0
0.0
1,425.0
702.0
50.0
726.0
          M
auritania
40.1
76.7
67.4
101.9
391.6
814.1
154.6
139.4
342.8
(3.1)
130.5
45.2
130.5
45.2
1,383.0
1,154.0
500.0
495.0
          M
orocco
422.2
2,807.7
481.3
2,314.5
894.8
1,654.0
2,449.4
2,804.5
2,487.1
1,951.7
1,573.9
2,519.1
1,573.9
2,519.1
2,728.0
3,358.0
3,561.0
3,162.0
          Palestine
62.0
19.2
9.4
18.0
48.9
46.5
18.6
28.3
51.5
300.5
180.0
213.8
180.0
213.8
244.0
177.0
160.0
120.0
          Oman
83.2
5.2
122.2
494.1
228.9
1,539.7
1,596.9
3,331.6
2,951.9
1,508.5
1,141.7
788.0
1,141.7
788.0
1,040.0
1,626.0
739.0
822.0
          Qatar
251.6
295.5
623.9
624.9
1,199.0
2,500.0
3,500.0
4,700.0
3,778.6
8,124.7
4,670.3
(86.8)
4,670.3
(86.8)
327.0
(840.0)
1,040.0
1,071.0
          Saudi Arabia
183.0
504.0
453.0
778.5
1,942.0
12,097.0
17,140.0
22,821.1
38,151.0
32,100.0
28,105.0
16,400.0
28,105.0
16,400.0
12,182.0
9,298.0
8,012.0
8,141.0
          Somalia
0.3
0.0
0.1
(0.9)
(4.8)
24.0
96.0
141.0
87.0
108.0
112.0
102.0
112.0
102.0
107.0
107.0
434.0
516.0
          Sudan
392.2
574.0
713.2
1,349.2
1,511.1
2,304.6
3,534.1
2,425.6
2,600.5
1,816.2
2,063.7
1,936.0
2,063.7
1,936.0
2,488.0
3,094.0
1,251.0
1,737.0
          Syrian Arab Republic
270.0
110.0
115.0
160.0
320.0
583.0
659.0
1,242.0
1,467.0
1,514.0
1,850.0
1,059.5
1,850.0
1,059.5
...
...
...
...
          Tunisia
779.2
486.5
820.8
583.6
639.1
783.1
3,308.0
1,616.3
2,758.6
1,687.8
1,512.5
1,142.9
1,512.5
1,142.9
1,603.0
1,096.0
1,063.0
1,002.0
          United Arab Emirates
(506.3)
1,183.8
95.3
4,256.0
10,003.5
10,899.9
12,806.0
14,186.5
13,723.6
4,002.7
5,500.0
7,679.0
5,500.0
7,679.0
9,602.0
10,488.0
10,823.0
10,976.0
          Yemen
6.4
135.5
101 .7
5.5
143.6
(302.1)
1,121.0
917.3
1,554.6
129.2
(93.3)
(712.8)
(93.3)
(712.8)
(531.0)
(134.0)
(1,787.0)
(1,191.0)
Total
5,897.7
9,373.7
7,257.0
16,570.3
25,362.0
47,564.6
70,489.0
80,476.5
96,254.3
76,293.6
65 ,133.2
40,717.4
65,133.2
40,717.4
53,457.0
48,457.0
44,287.0
39,914.0
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat
 Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Arab countries
(2000-2015)
Annex Table (4/1)
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(Billion US Dollars)
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance
Oil Price     
US $ per Barrel
2000 263.5 153.4 110.0 27.6
2001 239.8 160.0 79.8 23.1
2002 247.5 172.2 75.4 24.3
2003 305.9 194.8 111.1 28.2
2004 408.4 261.0 147.4 36
2005 562.2 316.2 246.0 50.6
2006 683.7 362.7 321.0 61
2007 795.8 479.9 315.9 69.1
2008 1,070.2 628.9 441.3 94.4
2009 736.9 547.5 189.4 61
2010 919.4 599.0 320.4 77.4
2011 1,235.2 690.0 545.3 107.5
2012 1,391.5 766.8 624.7 109.5
2013 1,376.0 811.4 564.6 105.9
2014 1,244.8 815.7 429.1 96.2
2015 864.5 746.3 118.3 49.5
Source : AMF, Joint Arab Economic Report database.
Annex Table (5/1)
Export, Import, Trade Balance and Oil prices in Arab Countries
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Chapter 2 
Annex (1/2) 
 
The competitiveness performance of individual Arab economies 
 
In this Annex we analyse the competitiveness performance of each Arab country 
included in WEF (2015) report, compared with the report of 2010, and the 
developments that occurred between these two years. We will investigate the 
policies and measures adopted, together with the advantages and disadvantages 
facing each country. This will include an analytical view for the high or low 
performance of Arab countries.  
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, some Arab countries achieved a strong competitiveness 
performance in 2015, including Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Morocco. Kuwait 
and Jordan however attained only a moderate competitiveness performance. The 
Arab countries with the lowest performance in the competitiveness ranking were the 
majority: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt.    
 
Concerning the best-performing Arab countries, Qatar is ranked first among Arab 
countries and 14 in the world in 2015. The accumulated fiscal surpluses in previous 
years, due to high oil prices, and low government debt, saw Qatar ranked second in 
the world for macroeconomic environment. In addition, Qatar attained 5th and 4th 
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position, respectively, for high efficiency in goods and services markets, and 
physical security. 
 
With regard to access to finance, Qatar is ranked 1st globally for loans facilitation 
and ease of access to loans. Also the government of Qatar is number 1 globally in 
acquiring the most recent technologies, given the patenting rate in Qatar is very low, 
ranked 29th globally. In addition, imports represent about 30 % of GDP, therefore 
Qatar needs to encourage trade and foreign direct investment, especially in 
technology transfer and know-how, bringing-in and improving the innovation 
culture among Qataris. WEF (2015) stated that the most problematic factors for 
doing business in Qatar included restrictive labour regulations, an inadequately 
educated workforce, an inefficient government bureaucracy, inflation and a poor 
work ethic in the labour force. 
 
Looking forwards, WEF (2013) indicated that the Qatar national vision 2030 aim to 
harmonize economic growth with social and human development, whilst ensuring 
environmental protection and sustainable use of resources. Through these four 
pillars, the government of Qatar seeks to enhance standards of living by adopting 
sound macroeconomic management and diversification. In particular, improving 
education, science and technology, will form the basis of attaining equilibrium 
between an oil-and knowledge-based economy.  
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In the competitiveness ranking of 2010, Qatar was also classified as the most 
competitive country in the Arab world (and 17 out of 139 globally). WEF (2010) 
stated that Qatar was the fastest growing economy in the world, recording 18.5% 
growth rate in 2010. The strong performance of Qatar was reinforced by solid 
foundation, with a high quality institutional framework (ranked 10th globally), stable 
macroeconomic environment (8th), and efficient goods market (12th). The solid 
institutional framework rests on low levels of corruption and undue impact on 
government decisions, high government efficiency and first-class security. 
 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the 2nd best Arab performer in the WEF 
competitiveness report of 2015, putting it at 17 globally. Compared with 2009 
(ranked 25th), the UAE has risen in the competitiveness ranking. This is a result of 
the massive efforts exerted by the government in the last 10 years in order to improve 
the investment climate in UAE. The ranking achieved in 2015 is due to the excellent 
macroeconomic environment, represented by highly developed infrastructure 
(ranked 4th in the world) and strong institutions (ranked 9th). In addition, the UAE 
economy is the most diversified economy amongst the GCC countries. 
 
Also, UAE was ranked 5th in competition, thanks to its openness to trade and 
investment. As the investment climate is supported by easy and attractive regulations 
for investors (ranked 3rd), a relatively efficient labour market (ranked 11th) and the 
presence of sophisticated labour market (15th). The main weaknesses in the UAE are 
tertiary education and innovation. Therefore, they need to improve the capacity for 
innovation, especially scientific research. In addition the UAE needs to counter the 
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drop in public revenues resulting from the fall in oil prices by adopting suitable fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
The ranking of 25 in the world in WEF (2010), was based on high investment in 
infrastructure, high level of new technology (ranked 14th) and efficient goods 
markets (ranked 6th). A stable macroeconomic environment, strong public trust in 
politicians and efficient government, played an important role in improving the 
competitiveness of the country. On the other hand, private institutions and 
accountability standards were ranked lower. At the time, the ranking was also 
undermined by problems faced by Dubai in failing to pay back its external debt. 
  
WEF (2013) showed that macroeconomic stability and diversification were the main 
factors in improving the ranking of the UAE. The non-hydrocarbon economy had 
grown significantly in 2013, supported by strong performance in trade, tourism, 
manufactured goods and logistics. Moreover, the country witnessed a high level of 
investments in order to improve the sectors of healthcare, renewable energy, 
financial services, materials science and information technology. 
 
The ranking of Morocco improved in 2015 to reach 72 (out of 140 countries) 
compared with 75 (out of 139 countries) in 2009. This improvement followed 
improvements in the ranking of institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic 
environment and goods market efficiency. The institutions ranking for Morocco 
improved in 2015 to reach 47, owing to better transparency in policy making, less 
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diversion of public funds and stronger property rights. Improved infrastructure was 
seen in particular in the quality of port infrastructure, mobile telephone subscriptions 
and available airline seats. The macroeconomic environment improved as result of 
a good ranking in gross national savings (30th) and inflation (48th).  
 
The improvement in goods market efficiency was based on better performance in 
agriculture policy (ranked 13th) and the business impact of rules on FDI (ranked 
22th). We believe that the easing of business rules attracted more FDI in the last 10 
years, reflected in the increase in Moroccan exports of manufactured goods, in 
particular cars and electronics. 
 
However, WEF (2015) shows that Morocco faces challenges in improving the 
competitiveness ranking. These include education and training, health and primary 
education, labour market efficiency, business sophistication and innovation. In 
particular the WEF’s report of 2013 confirmed that the challenges facing Morocco 
exist in two essential areas for competitiveness: education (ranked 101st) and 
efficiency in labour markets (122nd). The reports stated that all components of the 
education system need enhancement. Morocco registered very low levels of access 
to education, curricula and teaching methods. For the labour market, Morocco needs 
to improve labour market structure and sufficient flexibility in order to get the full 
benefit from its talent. Also WEF (2013) highlighted that Morocco, in the last 
decade, engaged in many free trade agreements with key trade partners like the 
European Union, the USA and many countries in the MENA area. The stable 
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macroeconomic environment enabled Morocco to become the second-largest for 
foreign investments in Africa since 2010.  
 
Previous to this, WEF (2010) stated that the competitiveness ranking of Morocco in 
2010 (75th) out of 139 countries, benefited from earlier efforts to stabilize the 
macroeconomic environment. Many measures were adopted to decrease the 
administrative procedures required to create companies. Also the report confirmed 
that the main challenge was high unemployment which stood at 9.4 % in 2008. 
 
Regarding Arab countries that achieved a moderate performance in global 
competitiveness rankings, Kuwait in 2015 stood at 34 (out of 140 countries) in the 
global competitiveness ranking, compared to 35 (out of 139 countries) in 2010. The 
main positive factor behind this was its macroeconomic environment. Kuwait was 
ranked first in the world in government budget balance, second in the world for gross 
national savings and fourth in general government debt. On the other hand it was, 
respectively, 27th and 46th for credit rating and inflation. With regard to other pillars 
of competitiveness, Kuwait has a low ranking for most. Kuwait is ranked 56th for 
institutions, 56th for technology readiness, 58th for market size, 54th for infrastructure 
and 63rd for health and business sophistication. In addition, it was ranked 79th for 
primary education, 85th for higher education and training, 98th for goods market 
efficiency, 109th for innovation and 117th for labour market efficiency.  
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WEF (2010) argued that in spite of Kuwait’s dependence on oil revenues, which 
helped to deliver a stable macroeconomic environment with a high level of saving 
and solid public finances, oil prices presented substantial risks given the possibility 
of their declining in the future. Also, Kuwait faced problems resulted from non-
performing loans in the banking sector, which affected the ranking of the financial 
sector in 2010.  
 
WEF (2013) stated that political tensions between the government and parliament 
affected negatively the competitiveness enhancements in Kuwait. These tensions 
impacted on the issuance of economic laws and regulations. The report also 
confirmed that the competitiveness of Kuwait faced challenges mainly in innovation, 
labour market and goods market.    
 
Jordan was ranked 64th (out of 140 countries) in 2015, compared with 65th (out of 
139 countries) in 2010. This marginal improvement was attributed to the 
performance of institutions (ranked 34 globally), goods market efficiency (ranked 
39th) and innovation and sophistication factors (ranked 40th). On the other hand, 
competitiveness pillars with lower rankings included higher education and training 
(50th), infrastructure (70th), financial market development (71st), technological 
readiness (76th), market size (76th), labour market efficiency (93rd) and 
macroeconomic environment (130th). 
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The ranking of 65th in WEF (2010) resulted from weaknesses mainly in institutions, 
good market efficiency and education. These challenges offset the improvement 
achieved in macroeconomic environment in 2010 compared with the previous year. 
According to WEF (2013), the Jordanian economy witnessed sustainable growth 
over the period 2000-2009. The average growth rate of GDP was 6% and exports 
15%. Jordan is more vulnerable to external shocks, owing to close ties with 
neighbouring countries and a large growing deficit. It is also dependent on oil 
imports and remittances.    
 
The Arab countries which saw their competitiveness ranking fall in WEF (2015) 
were Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Egypt. Saudi 
Arabia fell to 25th (out of 140 countries), from 21st (out of 139 countries) in 2010. 
WEF (2015) argued that, in spite of low oil prices, the macroeconomic environment 
was a very strong pillar in Saudi Arabia. Lower oil prices, however, required more 
effort in economic diversification and encouraging the growth of the private sector, 
in order to create more jobs to reduce unemployment. Effort was also identified to 
reduce administrative barriers (ranked 104th) and improve the financial sector and 
corporate governance standards (41th and 55th respectively). 
 
In recent years, Saudi Arabia achieved number of improvements in competitiveness. 
These were based on a strong and solid institutional framework, efficient markets 
and sophisticated business. Also, the government increased expenditure to improve 
the infrastructure. That said, the budget fell from surplus to deficit, which impacted 
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the macroeconomic environment indicators. In addition, the country faced 
challenges such as health, education and efficient labour market (WEF, 2010). 
 
WEF (2013) recognised the doption of initiatives aiming at boosting spending to 
enhance infrastructure, social programmes, healthcare and education. These 
initiatives should create more investment opportunities and improve the investment 
climate. Improving infrastructure included projects for enhancing the transport 
network, passenger and freight rail networks. Social programmes included 
investments in affordable housing for Saudi people, and support for unemployed 
Saudis by providing aid and technical guidance. 
 
Oman ranked only 62nd (out of 140 countries) in 2015, down from 34th (out of 139 
countries) in 2009. It received low scores for financial market development (ranked 
45th), goods market efficiency (ranked 52nd), technological readiness (ranked 62nd), 
market size (ranked 64th), health and primary education (ranked 66th), business 
sophistication (ranked 71st), higher education and training (ranked 88th), labour 
market efficiency (ranked 89th) and innovation (ranked 103rd). 
 
Oman scored better in macroeconomic environment (ranked 19th), institutions 
(ranked 31st), infrastructure (ranked 36th), but especially well in inflation annual 
change (ranked 1st) and general government debt (ranked 2nd). The strength in 
institutions are low wastefulness of government spending (ranked 6th) and business 
costs of crime and violence (ranked 6th). Within infrastructure, mobile telephone 
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subscriptions ranked 16th, quality of roads ranked 18th and quality of electricity 
supply ranked 29th. 
 
Previously, WEF (2010) ranked Oman as (34th out of 139 countries) on the basis of 
economic reform in previous years. These economic reforms, aimed at diversifying 
Oman’s economy, began in 1990 with a vision for 2020. The WEF report of 2010 
stated that the main strengths in the competitiveness performance of Oman were 
macroeconomic environment and institutional framework, offset by weaknesses in 
education and health, in spite of efforts exerted by the government in this respect.  
 
WEF(2013) identified key continuing weaknesses, notably in education and labour 
market efficiency. It noted, however, efforts promoting the transfer to a knowledge 
and service based economy. The country concentrated on constructing a high quality 
infrastructure and transport services, a skilled labour force and more advanced 
education. These efforts aiming to support the growth of the economy and improve 
the business environment.  
 
The global competitiveness ranking of Bahrain declined slightly in 2015, to 39th 
(out of 140 countries) from 37th (out of 139 countries) in 2010. This deterioration 
was attributed to a decline in the ranking of innovation (56th), macroeconomic 
environment (82nd) and market size (92nd). In macroeconomic environment, in spite 
of Bahrain being ranked first globally on inflation, other components received much 
lower scores. Bahrain was ranked 57th in credit rating, 70th in general government 
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debt, 81st in gross national savings and 119th in government budget balance. In 
addition to the poor macroeconomic performance, Bahrain scored poorly in foreign 
market size (71st), GDP (PPP $ billions) (88th), domestic market size index (94th). 
The innovation pillar also deteriorated, with falls in capacity to innovate (70th), 
quality of scientific research institutions (87th), company spending on R&D (87th) 
and university-industry collaboration in R&D (90th). 
 
Less problematic were the pillars of institutions, infrastructure and health and 
primary education. Institutions ranked 26th globally, scoring well for burden of 
government regulation, wastefulness of government spending, strength of auditing 
and reporting standards and protection of minority shareholders’ interests. Within 
the pillar of infrastructure (ranked 29th), mobile telephone subscriptions, quality of 
roads, ports, electricity supply and overall infrastructure scored well. Finally, health 
and primary education pillar ranked 35th, including infant mortality and deaths (35th), 
and quality of primary education (38th). 
 
WEF (2010) placed Bahrain 37th globally. The competitiveness performance was 
seen to be stable, in spite of the challenges in the pillars of health and education, 
financial markets and good markets. WEF (2011) confirmed the results of WEF 
(2010), adding that Bahrain had a strong institutional framework which supported 
property rights, corruption and efficient government. 
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WEF (2013) highlighted ten years of extensive reforms in economic and social 
policies. The efforts included the corporatization and privatization of many 
governmental businesses, enhancement of transparency, removing barriers to 
foreign investment, a free trade agreement with the USA, reforms to the labour 
market, liberalization of the telecommunication sector and enhanced public 
education. These reforms constituted a cornerstone to build the Bahrain economic 
vision 2030, which launched in 2008. The main objective is to improve living 
standards for all people in Bahrain. 
 
WEF (2015) rated Algeria as 87th (out of 140 countries), just below the rating in 
2010. This deterioration was attributed to the lower performance of the pillars of 
health and primary education (81st), institution (99th), higher education and training 
(99th), infrastructure (105th), innovation (119th), technology readiness (126th), 
business sophistication (128th), goods and labour market efficiency (135th) and 
financial market development (135th). 
 
These were partially offset by better performance in the pillars of market size and 
macroeconomic environment (37th an 38th, respectively). Within market size, the 
main improvements were in domestic and foreign market size, and GDP (PPP). In 
macroeconomics, the main improvements included general government debt, gross 
national saving and inflation rate. 
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Perhaps most negatively prior to this, macroeconomic environment saw Algeria fall 
from 2nd in 2009 to 57th in 2010. This deterioration was attributed to high budget 
deficit, low level of national saving, high inflation and increasing public debt. 
Algeria was also advised to concentrate on enhancing the efficiency of goods, labour 
and financial markets. The country could benefit from focusing on opening trade and 
remove barriers to foreign direct investments, which would help to improve the skills 
of the labour force.     
 
WEF (2013) reflected on other policies, for example efforts that has reduced youth 
unemployment, from 50% to 20%. The government was also working to increase 
the economic diversification of the country, in addition to increasing investment in 
housing, infrastructure, agriculture, education, information and communications 
technology (ICT), and small and medium enterprises (SME). 
 
The global competitiveness ranking of Tunisia fall sharply in 2015, to reach 92nd 
(out of 140 countries) compared with 32nd (out of 139) in 2010. We attribute this 
deterioration to the political and security unrest in recent years, which affected all 
economic sectors but especially tourism, the main source of foreign currency. 
Therefore the macroeconomic indicator was affected massively, falling to 97th 
globally in 2015. Indeed, the performance of all components of macroeconomic 
indicators scored poorly, notably 74th for country credit rating and 120th for gross 
national savings. 
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Beyond this, the ranking of other pillars included 58th for health and primary 
education, 69th for market size, 76th for higher education and training, 79th for 
institutions, 80th infrastructure, 80th for technological readiness. The pillars of goods 
and labour market efficiency, financial market development, business sophistication, 
and innovation, registered rankings of between 104th (for business sophistication) 
and 133rd (for labour market efficiency).  
 
The significance of the Arab Spring can be seen by noting that WEF (2010) placed 
Tunisia 32nd globally, the highest position of all North African countries that year. 
Prior to the disruption of the Arab Spring, the government worked hard to improve 
the macroeconomic environment and investment climates. As a result the 
performance of sub-components of macroeconomic environment improved 
significantly during 2010. In particular this was reflected in lower inflation, 
increased savings and a stable budget deficit. In addition, there were strong scores 
for efficient government institutions, political stability and good quality of 
education, although some bottlenecks to competitiveness needed to be addressed 
through reforming the labour market and enhancing the stability of the financial 
system. All of these improvements were negated by the upheaval of the Arab Spring, 
with WEF (2011) highlighting uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment and 
investment climate.   
 
The global competitiveness ranking for Lebanon in 2015 was 101st (out of 140 
countries), down from 92nd (out of 139 countries) in 2009. The country registered 
low scores in all indicators except for health and primary education (30th). The pillars 
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of labour market efficiency, infrastructure, institutions and macroeconomic 
environment were ranked 109th, 116th, 128th, 139th respectively. 
 
The ranking attained in 2010 was underpinned by a strong ranking (16th) for the 
quality of education, efficient good market and developed financial market. The 
weaknesses included infrastructure, macroeconomic environment and institutions 
(public and private) (WEF, 2010). These weaknesses were also reported in WEF 
(2011).  
 
WEF (2013) identified the wider regional political unrest and violence as being the 
main challenges facing the Lebanese economy. In addition the economy lacked 
policies to improve the investment climate and attract more inflows of foreign direct 
investment.   
  
In spite of reforms in Egypt, the country was ranked 116th (out of 140 countries) in 
2015, compared with 81st (out of 139 countries) in 2010. These reforms had included 
energy subsidies reduction, tax reforms, and enhancing business environment. The 
macroeconomic pillar was ranked 137th globally. All the macroeconomic 
components were raked low, from 105th for country credit rating, to 139th for 
government budget. The pillar of institutions was 87th, supported by an improved 
performance for efficient judiciary in settling business disputes and enhancing 
protection of property rights. The other pillars scored very poorly except for market 
size, which ranked 24th. WEF (2015) recommended reforms to create a more 
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attractive investment climate for private sector and foreign direct investments. In 
addition, these reforms would help to create more jobs and satisfy the social needs 
of the people. 
 
WEF (2010), prior to the revolution, placed Egypt 26th in terms of market size. The 
pillars of private institutions and transport infrastructure registered a moderate 
performance during 2010. The country faced a number of weaknesses, such as labour 
market rigidity, and increasing youth unemployment and female labour-market 
participation. The elements of the macroeconomic environment pillar were 
challenging, especially government debt, budget deficit and inflation rate.   
 
After two years of revolution and political upheaval, WEF (2013) reported that the 
country faced many challenges include the quality of institutions, corruption, the 
effectiveness of the legal framework and macroeconomic environment. 
Furthermore, there were structural challenges, which affected the business 
environment and growth, such as higher education and training, the efficiency of 
goods and labour markets, the developments in financial markets, business 
sophistication and innovation. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Appendix – A 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, 
some variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 56025.9 1893.2 44.4 5.4 38.1 72.1 22769.3 119.2
 Median 29133.0 531.9 46.5 3.4 36.9 69.0 11485.8 3.7
 Maximum 476305.0 38151.0 90.0 132.8 93.0 159.2 99529.0 1621.4
 Minimum 1081.0 -985.3 10.0 -9.8 0.0 12.8 2303.8 0.3
 Std. Dev. 72859.1 4359.2 22.3 10.7 25.2 30.1 23486.4 357.3
Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables
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Appendix – B 
 
Descriptive Statistics for individual countries’ variables 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, 
some variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 86254.6 1098.8 48.3 6.1 9.8 55.4 11273.9 68.4
 Median 62536.0 973.5 50.0 4.1 11.3 55.4 11594.2 72.4
 Maximum 170989.0 2760.9 55.0 29.8 16.2 69.5 12159.8 79.7
 Minimum 41764.0 0.0 32.0 0.3 3.9 40.7 9879.0 47.7
 Std. Dev. 44822.2 881.2 5.0 7.5 4.2 8.4 741.0 9.3
1- Algeria 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 11856.9 809.8 67.3 1.3 54.5 128.3 33541.9 0.4
 Median 9119.5 442.2 70.0 2.0 50.9 130.5 34163.6 0.4
 Maximum 22945.0 2914.9 77.0 3.5 79.6 147.1 35450.8 0.4
 Minimum 5849.0 -275.0 50.0 -1.3 41.6 93.1 29500.2 0.4
 Std. Dev. 6155.7 874.4 8.5 1.7 12.1 13.9 1839.8 0.0
2-Bahrain 
260 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, some 
variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 107952.0 3664.7 34.1 7.6 45.9 29.6 4887.3 4.7
 Median 90198.5 1155.5 30.5 6.1 48.0 25.0 4914.7 5.0
 Maximum 218912.0 11578.1 50.0 18.3 54.9 45.8 5821.3 6.2
 Minimum 60159.0 237.4 28.0 2.3 32.7 18.6 4034.8 3.4
 Std. Dev. 45014.6 3963.6 7.4 4.9 8.1 9.3 555.2 1.1
3-Egypt
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 12935.5 1179.9 43.8 3.7 75.0 89.2 8729.8 0.7
 Median 9891.0 730.2 47.0 3.1 71.9 81.9 8785.1 0.7
 Maximum 27574.0 3544.0 53.0 14.9 88.3 117.6 10233.5 0.7
 Minimum 6727.0 13.3 30.0 -0.7 68.9 68.1 7264.9 0.7
 Std. Dev. 6830.9 1163.4 8.0 3.6 7.0 15.4 1174.9 0.0
4-Jordan 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 258598.6 9699.4 61.3 1.9 32.4 65.3 38567.0 3.8
 Median 201562.0 678.3 62.5 0.7 29.3 59.0 39144.9 3.8
 Maximum 476305.0 38151.0 70.0 9.9 52.5 90.0 40775.3 3.8
 Minimum 142458.0 57.0 50.0 -1.3 20.9 47.2 34516.7 3.7
 Std. Dev. 113268.9 13507.3 9.2 3.1 9.3 13.8 1720.0 0.0
5-KSA 
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Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, some 
variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 65171.1 123.0 61.8 3.0 58.7 70.5 62429.9 0.3
 Median 43007.5 41.5 70.0 2.9 61.9 71.2 61537.2 0.3
 Maximum 148783.0 1113.7 70.0 10.6 82.4 75.7 75269.1 0.3
 Minimum 25946.0 -175.8 43.0 0.1 30.0 62.3 52462.5 0.3
 Std. Dev. 41437.1 289.0 11.0 2.5 14.2 4.2 7882.7 0.0
6-Kuwait 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 21577.4 2308.6 19.4 3.6 74.3 53.5 16923.5 1521.2
 Median 19617.5 2141.7 15.0 3.5 73.9 54.5 16748.5 1507.5
 Maximum 39155.0 4954.9 36.0 10.8 87.9 70.5 19996.0 1621.4
 Minimum 11719.0 35.0 10.0 0.0 54.9 39.6 15504.9 1507.5
 Std. Dev. 7501.9 1588.1 11.0 3.3 9.0 9.9 1274.6 31.8
7-Lebanon
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 42703.2 1155.5 15.9 1.3 16.7 66.7 17935.7 0.9
 Median 32043.0 144.0 10.0 2.6 15.9 72.5 15802.2 1.3
 Maximum 93168.0 4689.0 30.0 10.4 32.5 90.8 32839.2 1.3
 Minimum 19843.0 -148.0 10.0 -9.8 6.0 39.7 8818.7 0.4
 Std. Dev. 21959.7 1727.5 7.9 5.4 8.7 16.0 6613.5 0.4
8-Libya 
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Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, some 
variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 1906.9 131.8 30.3 6.1 9.7 81.6 2698.8 229.9
 Median 1429.0 53.8 30.0 5.7 0.0 74.0 2656.5 257.1
 Maximum 3636.0 814.1 32.0 12.1 30.4 111.9 3121.2 275.9
 Minimum 1081.0 -0.4 26.0 2.2 0.0 61.5 2428.9 129.8
 Std. Dev. 918.2 216.9 1.7 2.6 13.1 18.8 234.2 50.6
9-Mauritania 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 54785.6 1449.8 40.8 2.1 48.5 51.8 5025.1 9.2
 Median 45119.5 1333.8 38.5 1.7 47.0 50.4 4903.3 8.9
 Maximum 91375.0 2807.7 52.0 6.1 68.5 70.4 6371.2 11.3
 Minimum 32986.0 322.0 30.0 0.6 31.2 43.5 4180.4 7.8
 Std. Dev. 21499.3 924.0 8.1 1.5 10.6 7.2 731.1 1.0
10-Morocco
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 28814.8 828.9 66.6 1.6 37.0 86.7 39384.2 0.4
 Median 20795.5 106.3 70.0 0.5 36.3 86.4 39843.3 0.4
 Maximum 63199.0 3431.5 70.0 12.1 48.2 100.5 43705.0 0.4
 Minimum 13803.0 5.2 47.0 -2.1 25.6 75.7 32711.8 0.4
 Std. Dev. 16385.0 1109.6 7.4 3.5 6.8 7.4 2831.9 0.0
11-Oman 
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Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, some 
variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 42682.5 2027.8 76.3 4.5 36.5 79.4 51408.0 3.6
 Median 21449.0 624.4 73.0 3.0 34.9 79.7 43803.5 3.6
 Maximum 128593.0 8124.7 90.0 15.1 57.9 86.6 99529.0 3.6
 Minimum 8138.0 93.6 65.0 -4.9 26.8 64.6 19945.3 3.6
 Std. Dev. 40359.1 2429.3 8.4 5.6 8.5 5.1 25124.0 0.0
12-Qatar 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 26353.4 1283.7 29.9 23.8 6.5 29.0 3385.7 2.1
 Median 16378.0 1031.2 30.0 9.9 5.3 29.5 3234.8 2.3
 Maximum 62046.0 3534.1 35.0 132.8 13.7 42.3 4576.2 2.6
 Minimum 9018.0 0.4 25.0 4.9 1.6 12.8 2410.3 0.6
 Std. Dev. 18835.8 1131.9 2.9 33.6 4.6 8.0 752.7 0.6
13-Sudan 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 28025.1 520.3 17.6 4.2 12.4 56.2 5143.9 11.2
 Median 21989.5 266.5 10.0 4.2 10.5 53.0 5458.0 11.2
 Maximum 59103.0 1467.0 34.0 15.7 22.5 72.6 7224.2 11.2
 Minimum 11397.0 70.0 10.0 -3.8 7.7 43.7 2303.8 11.2
 Std. Dev. 15496.8 542.9 10.7 5.1 4.4 9.9 1652.5 0.0
14-Syria 
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Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
* Some variables have outliers, low values (zero, one, or …….) and high values (billions), in addition, some 
variables like FDI and inflation have negative values. 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 27183.4 1069.0 48.9 3.5 65.7 79.9 8114.2 1.2
 Median 23019.5 723.7 50.0 3.5 65.7 77.5 7997.2 1.3
 Maximum 44291.0 3307.9 53.0 6.2 68.8 107.6 10204.5 1.4
 Minimum 18031.0 351.1 42.0 2.0 62.2 67.5 5792.0 0.9
 Std. Dev. 9292.1 889.7 2.8 1.1 2.0 10.5 1390.9 0.2
15-Tunisia 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 121608.3 4675.3 77.1 4.4 58.7 138.3 74744.0 3.7
 Median 81932.0 2566.1 90.0 3.0 54.1 136.9 81126.7 3.7
 Maximum 297648.0 14186.5 90.0 12.3 93.0 159.2 88210.3 3.7
 Minimum 42807.0 -985.3 52.0 0.9 44.8 120.2 45319.4 3.7
 Std. Dev. 84410.7 5630.1 15.5 3.5 13.4 12.9 13559.3 0.0
16-UAE 
GDP FDI CORR INF DCPS OPENESS PROD NEXCH
 Mean * 14030.8 158.8 15.7 13.8 6.1 64.5 2884.8 165.0
 Median 10455.0 6.0 10.0 11.0 6.6 65.4 2879.2 179.5
 Maximum 29298.0 1554.6 27.0 55.1 8.2 83.3 3305.9 219.6
 Minimum 4236.0 -329.0 10.0 2.2 3.0 44.8 2633.1 40.8
 Std. Dev. 8274.9 553.2 7.6 12.8 1.5 9.3 193.2 46.2
17-Yemen 
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Appendix – C 
EViews printout 
 
Panel Estimation results: GMM (Fixed effects) 
 
Specification (1) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: First Differences  
Date: 04/23/15   Time: 14:51   
Sample (adjusted): 1998 2009   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 204  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument specification: @DYN(LGDP,-2) LFDI LOPENESS LCORR INF 
        DCPS FDI(-1) INF(-1)   
Constant added to instrument list  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) 0.887129 0.043258 20.50774 0.0000 
LFDI 0.022188 0.007306 3.036956 0.0027 
LOPENESS 0.424830 0.081716 5.198892 0.0000 
LCORR -0.038298 0.039143 -0.978414 0.3290 
INF -0.000693 0.002720 -0.254893 0.7991 
DCPS -0.013658 0.002699 -5.059578 0.0000 
INF(-1) 0.002677 0.000927 2.886318 0.0043 
DCPS(-1) 0.014828 0.002175 6.818643 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (first differences)  
     
     Mean dependent var 0.093584    S.D. dependent var 0.130333 
S.E. of regression 0.128957    Sum squared resid 3.542187 
J-statistic 182.8102    Instrument rank 97 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
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Specification (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: First Differences  
Date: 04/23/15   Time: 23:22   
Sample: 1998 2009   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 204  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument specification: @DYN(LGDP,-2) LFDI LOPENESS LCORR INF 
        DCPS FDI(-1) INF(-1) 
Constant added to instrument list   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) 0.810612 0.039058 20.75389 0.0000 
LFDI 0.025561 0.008721 2.931020 0.0037 
LOPENESS 0.411452 0.073524 5.596163 0.0000 
LCORR(-1) 0.036038 0.029427 1.224638 0.2221 
INF(-1) 0.001914 0.000664 2.880700 0.0044 
DCPS(-1) 0.005754 0.001780 3.232725 0.0014 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (first differences)  
     
     Mean dependent var 0.093584    S.D. dependent var 0.130333 
S.E. of regression 0.147053    Sum squared resid 4.649270 
J-statistic 197.2952    Instrument rank 97 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.000000  
     
     
 
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
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Specification (3) 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: First Differences  
Date: 04/24/15   Time: 23:33   
Sample: 1998 2009   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 204  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument specification: @DYN(LGDP,-2) LFDI LOPENESS LCORR INF 
        DCPS FDI(-1) INF(-1) 
Constant added to instrument list   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) 0.816425 0.037689 21.66197 0.0000 
LFDI 0.025713 0.008746 2.939802 0.0036 
LOPENESS 0.417514 0.071354 5.851279 0.0000 
INF(-1) 0.001995 0.000626 3.186871 0.0017 
DCPS(-1) 0.005326 0.001778 2.995339 0.0031 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (first differences)  
     
     Mean dependent var 0.093584    S.D. dependent var 0.130333 
S.E. of regression 0.147579    Sum squared resid 4.704372 
J-statistic 196.8391    Instrument rank 97 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.000000  
     
     
Source: Author’s calculation using EViews (7) software package. 
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Panel Estimation results: GMM (Fixed effects) 
 
After using the variables, labour productivity and nominal exchange rate. 
 
Specification (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: First Differences  
Date: 10/13/17   Time: 16:33   
Sample: 1998 2009   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 204  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument specification: @DYN(LGDP,-2) LFDI LOPENESS LCORR INF 
        DCPS FDI(-1) INF(-1) LPROD LNEXCH   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) 0.823560 0.048790 16.879670 0.0000 
LFDI 0.017332 0.007565 2.291008 0.0230 
LOPENESS 0.477830 0.085290 5.602402 0.0000 
LCORR -0.039549 0.046716 -0.846583 0.3982 
INF -0.001319 0.002362 -0.558638 0.5770 
DCPS -0.011399 0.002225 -5.122172 0.0000 
INF(-1) 0.003026 0.000585 5.172275 0.0000 
DCPS(-1) 0.015777 0.002378 6.635117 0.0000 
LPROD 0.000010 0.000003 3.571722 0.0004 
LNEXCH -0.000867 0.001254 -0.691302 0.4901 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (first differences)  
     
     Mean dependent var 0.093584     S.D. dependent var 0.130333 
S.E. of regression 0.119032     Sum squared resid 2.989590 
J-statistic 182.6798     Instrument rank 100 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.000000   
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Specification (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: First Differences  
Date: 10/12/17   Time: 14:05   
Sample: 1998 2009   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 204  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument specification: @DYN(LGDP,-2) LFDI LOPENESS LCORR INF 
        DCPS FDI(-1) INF(-1)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) 0.716940 0.056208 12.755090 0.0000 
LFDI 0.017316 0.009121 1.898464 0.0590 
LOPENESS 0.489455 0.097019 5.044914 0.0000 
LCORR(-1) 0.018237 0.047219 0.386209 0.6997 
INF(-1) 0.002192 0.000812 2.700596 0.0075 
DCPS(-1) 0.010467 0.002645 3.957310 0.0001 
LNEXCH -0.001617 0.003329 -0.485632 0.6277 
LPROD 0.000018 0.000007 2.675327 0.0080 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (first differences)  
     
     Mean dependent var 0.093584     S.D. dependent var 0.130333 
S.E. of regression 0.127634     Sum squared resid 3.469867 
J-statistic 193.7997     Instrument rank 98 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.000000   
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Specification (3) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments  
Transformation: First Differences  
Date: 10/12/17   Time: 16:02   
Sample: 1998 2009   
Periods included: 12   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 204  
Difference specification instrument weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Instrument specification: @DYN(LGDP,-2) LFDI LOPENESS LCORR INF 
        DCPS FDI(-1) INF(-1) LNEXCH(-1) LPROD   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LGDP(-1) 0.704954 0.056716 12.429460 0.0000 
LFDI 0.014759 0.006803 2.169543 0.0311 
LOPENESS 0.376138 0.069838 5.385881 0.0000 
INF(-1) 0.003589 0.001059 3.390150 0.0008 
DCPS(-1) 0.007454 0.002570 2.900474 0.0041 
LNEXCH(-1) 0.144272 0.068094 2.118725 0.0353 
LPROD 0.494070 0.095521 5.172394 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (first differences)  
     
     135 0.093584     S.D. dependent var 0.130333 
S.E. of regression 0.11807     Sum squared resid 2.983286 
J-statistic 220.2888     Instrument rank 100 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.000000   
     
     
 
